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This thesis examines the relationship between perceptions of communication control and 
political legitimacy. Four Asian cities (Beijing, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taipei) are 
compared and analysed as these societies have different levels of governmental influence in 
the media landscape while having similarities in other aspects. Importantly, the media systems 
in the societies to be analysed are often ranked vastly different by international civil society 
organizations. While vastly different in media control policy, these societies are frequently 
analysed together as they are at similar level of economic development and frequently seen to 
be of Confucian heritage culture that emphasizes on collectivism and deference to authority.    
Political legitimacy is the acceptance of and willingness to obey the government, which 
ultimately is based on the perception of the populace. Legitimacy can be performance-based 
(ability to deliver the physical needs) or process-based (sound governance system and 
procedures that are accepted by the people). Freedom of expression and media freedom 
would be critical elements in process-based legitimacy. Some studies concluded that a 
controlled media system would result in a trusting public supportive of the government while 
others show an inverse relationship between media control and political participation. 
Increase in political participation have been shown to increase political support and hence 
political legitimacy. So how does the level of communication control affect legitimacy?  
A survey (n=830) was conducted with university students from the four cities and OLS 
regression models are utilised for analysis. Perception of economic performance predicts 
support of government, hence supporting the view of performance legitimacy. Perception of 
the importance of media freedom predicts support of government for Beijing’s respondents 
with those placing less importance to media freedom being more supportive of the 
government. This suggest that respondents from Beijing have internalised and accepted 
media control as necessary for the country. Assessment of higher level of freedom speech in 
general significantly predict higher support for the government in Beijing, Singapore and 
Taipei. This suggest that communication controls that impact on individuals will lower 
political support. Data from Hong Kong displays quite different results from other cities, 
suggesting that there are conflicting values amongst the respondents as Hong Kong 
undergoes transitions in its political landscape.  
This research also conducted focus groups in the four cities. The data shows that third person 
effect is common in all cities as most respondents think that some media control is needed as 
“others” may not have the literacy or ability to critique information. Scepticism is also a 
common theme across the four cities with respondents from Beijing and Singapore being 
sceptical of media while respondents from Hong Kong and Taipei are sceptical of the 
government.   
This thesis argues that a moderate level of scepticism is beneficial for process legitimacy as 
scepticism towards the government would push people to monitor the government. 
Respondents from Hong Kong and Taipei show more willingness to consider contentious 
policy and think that government cover ups are unlikely with a free press. However, being 
highly sceptical of media hinders crisis communication and places undue pressure on 
performance legitimacy. Finally, implications within the context of widespread 
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Chapter 1  
1.1 Introduction 
“Get rid of censorship. The Chinese people want freedom.” The New York Times 
reported protesters in Guangzhou, China carried that banner at a demonstration that was 
sparked off by excessive censorship in January 2013. Various other news agencies also 
reported protests against censorship recently (See for example in Wong, 2013 and BBC, 
2013a). Given the widespread use of censorship in China, some might expect the Chinese 
people to have grown accustomed to censorship. In a quantitative analysis of 44 states, Norris 
and Inglehart (2010) found that the people in states with restrictive media environment tend 
to be more supportive of their government as there are no opposing messages that the people 
in pluralistic environments would face. How then can we explain the increasing protests 
against state censorship in China? Chen and Shi (2001) on the other hand found that the 
single editorial policy in China had a negative impact on political trust in the post-Tianamen 
period. In other words, the propaganda policies failed to manipulate people’s political attitude 
or shore up political support. For the people in societies with limited media freedom, are the 
perceptions towards political communication control changing?  
Restriction of political communication by the government is commonly viewed as 
unacceptable and against the will of the people. Literature of various fields such as 
communication, culture and democracy frequently theorised and expound on the importance 
of freedom of expression in society. In the literature for democracy, many have written on the 
importance of free speech for citizenship. The unencumbered discussion of public affairs in 
public sphere is argued to have a positive impact on citizenship. However, the literature on 
political discussions, according to Conover, Searing and Crewe (2002), is mostly “sustained 
by political theorists in an empirical vacuum”. In addition, would the process of public 
discussion that is part of the foundation of democracy also result in positive impact in 
different governance systems or is it an inculcated value only beneficial to democracy? Other 
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commonly given rationales are that freedom of expression allows the governed to participate 
and communicate their needs to the government (Norris, 2000; Scheufele, Shanahan, & Kim, 
2002) and it could also act as a counterbalance towards those in power by being able to 
expose misuse of power (Siegle, Weinstein, & Halperin, 2004; Chowdhury, 2004; Norris & 
Inglehart, 2010). 
However, within East Asia, media freedom appears to be the exception rather than the 
norm. Reporters Without Borders (2012a) declared “Censorship On The Rise In Asia” in its 
2012 report on press freedom while in Freedom House’s 2012 report on freedom of the press, 
most Asian countries are classified as “Partly Free” or “Not Free”, with the exceptions of 
Japan and Taiwan. In the report on internet freedom by Reporters Without Borders (2012b), 
10 out of 12 countries listed as “Internet enemies” are from Asia or the Middle East. The 
most recent study on internet filtering by OpenNet Initiative (2011) also reported a “trend of 
increasing controls in the context of growing connectivity is emerging in the region as a 
whole” (p.233).  
With increasingly more voices, both outside and within East Asia, calling for media 
freedom in East Asia, there is thus a need for closer examination of perceptions on political 
communication control and its impact on governance within the context of East Asia. 
Keeping in mind that there are countries in East Asia that are authoritarian or of mixed 
regime, an analytical approach via a liberal democratic lens would thus be incongruous. 
However, regardless of the type of regime, many would agree that all contemporary states are 
based on or influenced by the principle of popular sovereignty that requires the consent, 
explicit or otherwise, of the people to stay in power. Based on this view, popular perceptions 
on legitimacy of the government would affect the stability and efficacy of governments. 
Perception of legitimacy is also theorised to increase compliance with government policies 
and studies have found empirical data supporting the claim (Levi & Sacks, 2009; Tyler & 
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Huo, 2002). As for contributing factors of legitimacy, “good governance, poverty reduction 
and provision of civil liberties” (Gilley, 2006, p.518) are some of the factors found to have an 
impact. Other theorists differentiate contributing factors into input and output factors, with 
input legitimacy pertaining to judgement of processes in governance and output legitimacy 
pertaining to judgement of performance such as economic growth. While it may seem that 
political communication control is only one dimension out of many others in civil liberties or 
within the process of governance, political communication control may also influence 
perceptions on other dimensions since information dissemination and opinion formation on 
other dimensions are affected by political communication control.   
Political communication control is not merely about censorship. As pointed out by 
Gunther and Mughan (2000, p.414), “the nature of the government’s efforts to control the 
media – sophisticated and efficient, on the one hand, or crude, clumsy, and perhaps 
counterproductive, on the other – emerges as an important intervening variable” in the 
examination of media effects. The study of government control of communication 
environment hence requires the analysis to be done in context and take into considerations the 
socio-cultural factors so as to better understand how the people perceive the controls. 
Similarly for legitimacy, as pointed out by Beetham (1991, p.14), “legitimacy for social 
scientists is always legitimacy-in-context rather than absolutely”.  
This chapter will first review the literature for the concept of political legitimacy. 
Following that, the literature review will discuss the key concepts for the study political 
communication and civic orientation. Finally, the review will briefly discuss media theories 




1.2 Political Dimension  
1.2.1 Political legitimacy 
In the study of political communication control, the bulk of the literature focuses on 
how it relates to democracy. Some will also link media freedom to specific elements of 
democratic process such as accountability and transparency of the societies. The motivation 
in linking media freedom to the level of democracy can be attributed to the dominant view 
that democracy is the most accepted form of governance and media freedom is a form of civil 
liberty that contributes to democracy. However, examining the issue of political 
communication via the democracy lens is not as straight forward since democracy exists in 
different variations and frequently comes with an adjective attached to qualify the positions 
of different thinkers. The problem intensifies when there are still many countries that could 
not be considered as democratic and attempting to analyse how media freedom impact on the 
level of democracy would not be meaningful for non-democratic countries.   
While political systems may be different, the rationale for this study is that in the 
contemporary world, regardless of political system, the principle of popular sovereignty is 
universal (Beetham, 1991a). Popular sovereignty is the principle that the legitimacy of the 
state is conferred and sustained by the will of the people. The implementation of the principle 
may fall short for some countries but it would still be necessary for the governments to put up 
a façade even if they do not fully abide by the principle. Even though not all the case studies 
included in this study have the practice of universal suffrage, their claim to power and 
authority is still based on the will of the people. Taking China as an example, China’s 
constitution reflects the claim in Article 2 which states that “All power in the People's 
Republic of China belongs to the people” rather than the Communist Party of China. This is 
not a historical relic but a point that is acknowledged by the Chinese leaders, as affirmed by 
Wen Jiabao in 2011 with his quote “国之命在人心” (translated as “the fate of the nation lies 
in the hearts of the people”) becoming a catchphrase in China (China Media Project, n.d). 
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Political legitimacy as conferred by the people would also be valued by political elites across 
different political systems since it lowers the cost of enforcing compliance and 
implementation of public policies. Hence, studying the relationship between popular 
perceptions of legitimacy and political communication control would be of greater relevance 
to a wider audience than studying the concepts via a democracy emphasis. 
The concept of legitimacy, commonly understood as the acceptance and willingness 
to obey authority, can be studied via the normative or descriptive approach.  Beetham (1991a) 
classes the different approaches as political philosophy and political sociology. From the 
political philosophy approach, legitimacy is examined normatively from the perspective of 
political theorists, while the political sociology approach examines legitimacy empirically 
from the perspective of the people. The politico-sociological view is predominantly 
influenced by Max Weber whereby he argues that legitimacy is not a moral or normative 
judgement made by the investigator but an empirical report on the beliefs of the relevant 
agents concerned. As stated by Weber (1968, p. 263):  
“In general, it should be kept dearly in mind that the basis of every authority, and 
correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of 
which persons exercising authority are lent prestige” 
Weber identifies three sources that fuel the beliefs of legitimacy, namely: rational-
legal, traditional and charismatic. For rational-legal source, legitimacy is derived from the 
perception that the government derives its power from established laws. For traditional 
source, legitimacy is derived with the acceptance of the people that the government is in 
continuation from ensuing customs and tradition. Lastly, charismatic authority is derived 
from the perception of extraordinary attributes of the leader.  
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While Weber has considerably influenced the study on legitimacy, some (Dogan, 
1992; Pitkin, 1972) pointed out the inadequacy of stripping the concept into merely sources 
of belief in contemporary society. Grafstein (1981) deems the approach as “reducing it to 
routine submission to authority” and the rational-legal source fails to account for factors 
triggering obedience under conditions of diversity. The many differences in the analysis of 
communist regimes via Weber’s approach also lead to scholars highlighting that the approach 
is open to subjective interpretations (e.g. see Gill, 1982 and Rigby, 1982). Scholars also 
pointed out that beliefs would have to be established by behaviours and indicated that 
voluntary compliance that is deemed to exhibit beliefs of legitimacy would be difficult to 
establish in situations whereby there exist structures or apparatus organised to coerce those 
who refuse to comply.  
Even though it appears that there are weaknesses in Weber’s approach, we have to be 
mindful that these sources are ideal types which Weber had intended as tools for analysis and 
which he acknowledged that pure types are rare and beliefs normally exist in complex 
variants, transitions and combinations (Weber, 1946). Legitimacy may be too complex to be 
simply distilled into pure sources and as pointed out by Huntington (1991), legitimacy can be 
a “mushy concept that political analysts do well to avoid” (p.46). While the classification 
foundation established by Weber may have weaknesses, it has led to derivative works that 
could better suited for the contemporary world. 
Beetham (1991a) builds on Weber’s work and argues that the three sources of 
legitimacy as theorise by Weber are inter-related rather than different sources. In his view, 
legitimacy consists of three dimensions that are all required to be present for legitimacy to be 




“ i) it conforms to established rules 
ii) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant  
and subordinate; and 
iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation.”    
 
From the above, it is apparent that there are correspondences in conceptualization. 
Both Weber and Beetham emphasized on established or traditional rules. Weber’s rational-
legal source corresponds with Beetham’s justifiability of rules as Weber (1968) states that 
legal norm may be established by agreement “on grounds of expediency or value-rationality” 
(p.217), which fundamentally is about justifiability. Lastly, charismatic authority is primarily 
about the ability to gain the admiration and consent of the subordinate.  Beetham also noted 
that Weber’s typology appealed to many scholars because each of Weber’s sources contains 
an element that is required for legitimacy. 
Differing from Weber’s sources of beliefs, Beetham’s multi-dimensional framework 
allows one to look beyond a “source” and examine closer the different dimensions in regimes 
that would strengthen or erode the perception of legitimacy. Beetham’s approach is still 
rooted in the perspective of the people, as emphasized by Beetham (1991b, p.42) “Legitimacy 
is something conferred and confirmed by the actions of relevant subordinates”.  Beetham’s 
framework, by breaking the concept down to the three dimensions, allows one to examine 
how changes in perception of legitimacy might come about in the different dimensions and 
what the relevant structural or cultural factors are in different dimensions. One could examine 
whether a new regime conforms to established rules or when examining mutual justification 
of rules, one could look at whether the justification still exists structurally or whether 
perceptions of justification has changed. In the final dimension, one can examine the 
manifestation and perceptions in demonstration of consent. This conceptualisation of 
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legitimacy is relevant to this study since public communication within the political process is 
needed for justification of rules and signalling of consent.  
As emphasized by Beetham (1991a), consent of the governed is an important factor 
for legitimacy and in the contemporary world; this pertinence is also demonstrated by how 
the principle of popular sovereignty is enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. 
Article 21 of the Declaration states that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of the government”.  Beetham further explained that “one consequence of the 
universality of the principle of popular sovereignty in the contemporary world is that consent 
has to be popular consent, even when the rules of the office rest on non-democratic source of 
authority” (p.131).  
Consent is typically seen as being demonstrated via elections but there is a need to 
examine the manifestation or signalling of consent in other forms since not all countries 
practise universal suffrage. In societies which do not have the practice of popular election of 
leaders, what are the alternative forms of demonstration of mass consent? Would it suffice if 
it is merely a lack of dissent and would a lack of dissent bring about lasting stability? Real 
consent requires effective choice (Beetham, 1991a). Choosing to give your money to a robber 
is not consenting to the act when you are to choose either giving up your life or giving him 
your money. A decision or an agreement gained without effective choice is merely disguised 
coercion. According to Beetham, “effective choice is guaranteed by the freedoms of 
expression and association that allow parties and policies to be formed and modified in a 
manner that reflects a range of public opinion” (p.152). Following this argument, restrictions 
in the media environment could affect the demonstration of consent and will be probed 
further in data collection stage.  
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It would appear that the simplified view of legitimacy as a merely a belief or a virtue 
would be inadequate. Rather than simply thinking and discussing legitimacy simply as a 
virtue or quality that someone has as how Merelman (1966) defines as “a quality attributed to 
a regime by a population”, legitimacy could be analysed as a procedural concept that requires 
constant appraisal. When viewed as a quality, there is a tendency to view it as a solely 
dependent on the organisation that possesses it and in a dichotomous manner of either 
possessing it or not. However the elements of justification and consent that is propounded by 
Beetham offers support in thinking of legitimacy as a procedural concept. As a procedural 
concept that exists through interactions in social situations, the processes involved would 
matter as much as the constitutive attributes. Justification via common beliefs and consent are 
processes rather than attributes. These processes in turn are dependent on the communication 
environment of a society as information is disseminated and beliefs are contested amongst the 
people. Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway (2006) highlighted that legitimacy when viewed as a 
social process could explain why inefficiency and inequality in groups could exist and still 
maintain social stability. Habermas (1996) also pointed out that the process of deliberation 
and communication can be a legitimating force and serve a “socially integrative function” 
(p.304) while Huntington (1968) argues that government actions “are legitimate if they 
represent the outcome of a process of conflict and compromise in which all interest groups 
have participated” (p.27).  
Admittedly, while many have argued normatively the value of political discussions 
for legitimacy, few have empirical data to show the impact. Searing et al. (2007), through 
self-reported survey, showed that the “more that citizens discuss topics of public concern in 
public contexts, the more they are likely to see their government as accountable, attentive and 
legitimate.” This study however, is conducted in the US and UK, which are democratic in 
nature. It would be meaningful to examine whether including the people in political 
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discussions in different governance systems would yield similar impact. The level of political 
communication control would have an impact on the people’s attitude and ability to discuss 
public issues (legitimation process), thereby providing this study with the theoretical impetus. 
Having examined how the perception of legitimacy could be formed procedurally, 
how then would the acceptance of legitimacy manifest or be measured? There is no widely 
used instrument or model and a few scholars have proposed measurement models that rely on 
groups of proxy measures. Gilley (2006) drew upon Beetham’s multi-dimensional approach 
towards legitimacy to build his legitimacy measure. Gilley defined legitimacy as “a state is 
more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising 
political power” (p.500) to reflect the different stakeholders, orientation and degree of 
legitimacy. While he acknowledged the complexity of the concept, he distilled the 
perceptions into 3 subtypes, namely “views of legality”, “views of justification” and “acts of 
consent” (p. 502-3). These 3 subtypes were then operationalized into attitude survey 
measures and actions measures. For example, views of legality would include perception 
surveys about the judicial system and corruption, views of justification would include surveys 
of political trust and finally acts of consent included election turnout and tax payments. These 
are then computed to measure how legitimate states are rather than how an individual 
perceive legitimacy of a state.  
Other than Gilley, others predominantly relied on models that are variations of or 
closely resemble the input/output legitimacy framework that is proposed by Scharpf (1999). 
Input legitimacy refers to procedural fairness, participation of the people in policy 
formulation and transparency while output legitimacy refers to performance assessment of 
the government. Weatherford’s (1992) model is based on multiple factors that can be grouped 
into two dimensions, namely “judgements of system performance” (output legitimacy) and 
“personal/citizen traits” (input legitimacy). Tyler (1997) examined legitimacy from a 
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psychological perspective and identified two models which emphasize on different causal 
factors. In the resource-based model (output), instrumental factors such as favourability of 
outcomes and degree of influence over decisions are identified as causal factors. In the 
identity-based model (input), social status and intergroup relationship between dominant and 
subordinate are keys to the perception of legitimacy. Tyler highlighted that many had tended 
to focus on the resource-based model and there should be as much attention for the identity-
based factors as when “people feel valued and respected, they defer to group authorities” 
(p.338). 
Using survey data from African societies, Levi, Sacks and Tyler (2009) build upon 
the psychological approach taken by Tyler (1997; 2006) and distilled the explanatory 
variables to four factors. These variables can also fit neatly into the categories of input 
legitimacy (“procedural justice” and “trustworthy government”) and output legitimacy 
(”government performance” and “administrative competence”). These explanatory variables 
are then used for the analysis of relationship with willingness to comply with the courts, 
police and tax department.  They found that there is a co-relation between the variables and 
suggested that “the more trustworthy and fair the government, the more likely its population 
will develop legitimating beliefs that lead them to accept government’s right to make people 
obey its laws and regulations” (p.367). 
Finally, for the context of this study, it would be timely to examine the concept of 
legitimacy and its perception within East Asia as the global economy begins to slow. After 
the Second World War, the legitimacy of governments in developing countries is widely 
viewed as based on economic growth and the ability to bring about wealth creation to the 
masses. This is evidenced in China’s fixation on the 8% economic growth rate (Thompson, 
2009) and the level of emphasis that the government places on communicating that to the 
public. Many other developing countries too depend on providing or achieving a certain level 
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of economic growth so as to justify their rule. However, fast growing economies will 
eventually slow down and when that happens, regimes which are unable to respond 
appropriately and in a timely manner will face political instability. As can be seen with 
China, it “presented 8% gross domestic product (GDP) growth as a threshold below which 
the country's economy could not fall, if it hoped to maintain social stability” (Rein, 2013). No 
country in history, however, had been able to sustain this high rate of growth perpetually and 
when the slowdown eventually begins for China, the government would have to manage 
unfulfilled expectations and the social problems associated with slow economic growth. As 
maturing countries face increasing level of unemployment and income disparity, legitimacy 
that is dependent on economic performance would weaken. Hence it is important to 
understand legitimacy as a continuous process on which the relationships and expectations 
between the dominant and the subordinate is formed and communicated. 
Legitimacy when viewed as a continuous process rather than as a virtue to be 
possessed hence would emphasize on the continuous justification between the people and the 
state. Media and political communication would then play an important role in this 
continuous process since the political actors involved would need to communicate and justify 
their decisions. When political communication is limited to state institutions and citizen 
participation is low, the performance of the government in delivering economic needs will 
play a greater role in the legitimation process. It would also mean that performance failures 
will be attributed to the state to a higher degree since policy making is no longer a negotiated 
outcome that involved the citizens or different communities within a country. There would be 
no sense of ownership or responsibility for the citizens for any policy. The involvement of 
citizens in policy formation or the provision of space for political participation could be a 
legitimizing process for governments. When policy making is conducted transparently and 
open to citizen participation, there could be a shared sense of responsibility of the outcome 
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even if the outcome may not meet expectations of the citizens.  As Searing et al. (2007) 
argued, “those who still disagree with public policies may nevertheless accept them because 
of their satisfaction with having been involved in discussions about these matters (p.588).” Or 
as pointed out by Habermas (1997, p.46), “consensus and majority rule are compatible only if 
the latter has an internal relation to the search for truth: public discourse must mediate 
between reason and will, between the opinion-formation of all and the majoritarian will-
formation of the representatives.” 
An important factor to consider when analysing the legitimation process is how 
politics is structured in a country. Saich (2011) highlighted that Chinese “citizens 
‘disaggregate’ the state and while they express high levels of satisfaction with the central 
government, satisfaction declines with each lower level of government”. Singapore’s former 
Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew (2013), made the same remark, noting that the protesters in 
China generally seek to right their grievances that are committed by corrupted local officials 
and seek the support of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing. Hence in the investigation 
of legitimacy, it would be prudent to examine whether perceptions can be differentiated 
between particular government office holders and the system itself. In countries with a freer 
media environment such as Taiwan, the high level of dissenting voices may cause the 
political office incumbents to appear less than competent but the freedom could also possibly 
allow the people to think that the system is sound in allowing dissent and grievances to be 
aired. As pointed out by Scharpf (2009), governments losing at elections for implementing 
unpopular policies may “not have established the input legitimacy of these policies. But it 
will have reaffirmed the institutional legitimacy of a system of responsible and 
democratically accountable government” (p. 189). Norris (2000) in her investigation of media 
malaise effects too highlight the difference between particular governments and political 
system and argued that “public support for particular issues, leaders, and governments can be 
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expected to rise and fall as part of 'normal' politics, without thereby undermining people's 
deep-rooted faith in the political system.” (p.314)  
All things considered, the role of political communication could be an integral 
mechanism in the legitimation process since both the state and the polity needs information 
and discursive space to enable the assessment of legitimacy. Whether it is the conformation 
to laws, mutual justification of beliefs or the display of consent, all these require 
communication. Governments have always sought to influence the perceptions of the people 
to strengthen their legitimacy through communication and authoritarian governments 
throughout history have always sought to control the mass media outlets. However control of 
the media has never guaranteed control of the people, as evidenced by the revolutions 
throughout history. In contrast to the study by Norris and Inglehart (2010) which indicated 
that the people in restrictive media environment are more supportive of the government, it 
thus presents a puzzle on how control of political communications affect the perception of 
legitimacy. The different approaches in the treatment of media space that the four societies 
take in this study could provide insights on how the mechanism of political communication 
works in the legitimation process. The next section will elaborate on the position this study 
will take for political communication and political communication control.   
1.3.1 Political Communication  
It is important to clarify that this study focuses on political communication control 
rather than all forms of communication control. In most if not all societies, there would 
limitations to free speech. As is commonly highlighted, free speech does not entail the right 
to shout fire in a packed theatre and cause a stampede. Societies have limitations on 
communication that adhere to various factors such as morality and responsibility towards 
public safety. Hence, a definition of political communication would be necessary. As 
highlighted by McNair (2011, p.3), the phrase “has proved notoriously difficult to define with 
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any precision” since the two components of the phrase are open to numerous definitions. He 
defines it as all public forms of communication by, communication addressed to and 
communication about politicians and related political actors. He further clarifies that his 
definition excludes interpersonal communication. While McNair’s definition provides much 
clarity on what political communication encompasses, his definition emphasizes or revolves 
too much around political actors and official communication. The exclusion of interpersonal 
communication also neglects the influence of social media which can be both interpersonal 
and public, and is gaining importance in society.  
Taking a wider definition, this study will be guided by the definition offered by 
Denton and Woodward (1990), political communication is the “discussion about the 
allocation of public resources (revenues), official authority (who is given the power to make 
legal, legislative and executive decisions), and official sanctions (what the state rewards or 
punishes)” (p.14). In other words, issues or content broadly related to politics and political 
figures, governance and civil liberties in any form of communication can be included. 
Mansbridge’s (1999, p.214) concept of “everyday talk” that includes everything “that the 
public ought to discuss” would fit into this definition as well. This echoes Gilley’s (2006, 
p.503) argument on legitimacy that “rightfulness is drawn from a shared morality that exists 
in the everyday discourse of citizens” (emphasis added). It will not have to revolve strictly 
around politicians and can include issues that are not directly linked to politicians but are 
dependent on the actions of politicians. An example would be the discussion of public health 
issues such as air quality and soil contamination, which are closely monitored and censored 
by the Chinese government.  
However, issues that most societies impose limitations on such as those related to 
morality or security issues such as pornography, gambling, illicit drugs or firearms will not be 
addressed in this study. Neither will this study include issues related to privacy rights or 
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economic rights such as copyrights. Having highlighted what is the focus, it is also 
acknowledged that while certain topics can be distinctively excluded (such as pornography), 
others (such as ethnic hate speech) would require a certain level of subjective judgement. 
 
1.3.2 Political communication control  
At this point, it is worthwhile to highlight that this study does not make any 
distinction between the terms “political communication control”, “media control/freedom”, 
“press control/freedom” and “freedom of expression” as the concepts are very closely related 
and the proponents and usage of these concepts are essentially advocating the same value. 
Constitutions of many countries, including the UN Declaration of Human rights (in article 
19), also address the concepts freedom of expression and media freedom concurrently. For 
the use of these terms within this study, it will only concern political communication as 
elaborated above in 1.3.1.  
The control of mass communication to influence public opinion has been done for 
hundreds of years. The printing press brought along with it various actions and laws in 
different countries that seek to control the distribution of information and expression. China’s 
Qin Shi Huang outlawed and burned books while England’s Statute of Anne was also known 
to be used as a censorship tool other than as a protection of authors’ rights. However as 
Beetham (1991b, p.183) note, “in stifling any expression of dissent outside accepted party 
channels, it ensured its emergence with all the more force when it did eventually break out”. 
This observation made 20 years ago still rings true as demonstrated by the events emerging 
out of the 2010’s Arab Spring. In the context of China, Chen (2012) argues that the state’s 
tolerance of small scale localized protests is its way of collecting feedback as well as a 
pressure valve for which citizens could release the pressure of discontent. Hence, not all 
protests are treated with the same heavy handed approach as Tiananmen in 1989.  
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Tyler (2006) highlighted that his studies on legitimacy with the police and court 
system showed that perception of legitimacy improves when the people personally 
experience these institutions as exercising their authority fairly. Objective performance 
assessment by external organisations of these institutions did not have much influence on 
perception of legitimacy. In the same vein, the people’s personal experience with the state as 
it carries out its authority in censoring communication could possibly have a greater impact 
on perceptions of legitimacy than reports by organisations such as Reporters Without Borders 
or Freedom House. These main sources of data (Freedom House and Reporters Without 
Borders) regarding media freedom use expert surveys to assess the level of control in each 
country. Reading a report compiled by a foreign organisation that the media in one’s country 
is heavily censored or hearing stories about a reporters’ stories being suppressed would be a 
different experience than when one’s personal blog post got mysteriously deleted or certain 
search terms stop returning results. For the lay person, stories about state censorship could 
merely be perceived as hearsay until the person experiences it first-hand. Stern and Hassid 
(2012) noted that less than one percent of journalists in China experienced any form of harsh 
actions from the state. In the new media environment whereby anyone could be a content 
producer, the possibility of being censored is higher than in the traditional environment of 
merely being a passive media consumer. Expression of discontent is part of social interaction 
and with the advent of the internet, this activity has shifted from the casual coffee shop to the 
cyberspace for some people. Evanescent remarks in a coffee shop will unlikely garner any 
attention from the state but the permanence nature of online postings may. A blog post may 
garner a lawyer’s demand or a Weibo post may mysteriously disappear. In addition, even if 
one is not a content producer, the new media age has also changed how content is consumed. 
The people are now less reliant on mass media that act as gatekeepers of what one consumes 
and the individual is able to actively seek out the information that interest them. When certain 
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terms become unsearchable or webpages inaccessible due to government control, the effect is 
felt more keenly than when content editors withhold any information. These first-hand 
experiences will inevitably contribute to one’s perception of the authority.  
Political communication control however is not limited to overt censorship. 
Censorship is merely a single tool in wide ranging arsenal that governments tap on to control 
what can be discussed.  Even within the understanding of censorship, there can be different 
approaches to carry out the task. At the content producer level, information can be withheld, 
news stories suppressed, journalists can be pressured not to present some point of views or 
the state could simply shut down the companies that do not comply. Governments could issue 
business licenses to only those companies that toe the line, sue those that cross the line for 
libel or simply ensure that the top management comprised of government officials or people 
who are willing to toe the line. At the consumer level, distribution channels can be restricted 
and access controlled. China only allows 20 foreign films a year (BBC, 2012) while 
Singapore still has a ban on satellite dishes for consumer use. Libel suits or surveillance 
measures could also change the behaviours of consumers. China’s evolving approach towards 
control of the internet from monitoring of internet cafes prior to 2003, to blocking websites 
and then implementing the “Golden Shield Project” to automate filtering of content goes to 
show how authoritarian states would adapt according to the media environment. Both 
Singapore and China also control content on the internet stealthily by devolving the task to 
content providers. The practise of making content providers responsible for user generated 
content allows censorship to be carried out by private companies rather than the state. This 
involves onerous requirements that make companies err on the side of caution and steer clear 
of politically sensitive issues. Lastly, if the state could not control the content, it could 
confuse the people by flooding discussions with misinformation as what China does with the 
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“Wumaodang” or “50-centers”, anonymous internet commentators paid by the government to 
sway discussions online (Bandurski, 2011).  
 
The approach taken by the state in the treatment of political communication control 
should also be factored into the analysis as meta-censorship could affect how the people 
perceive political communication control. For two of the states with high levels of control in 
this study, Singapore takes a very different approach as compared to China. The Singapore 
government makes immense effort in ensuring that the communication control policies do not 
have a direct impact on the average citizen but are directed at major media outlets and content 
creators with high visibility. Restrictions and control are subtle in the form of licensing and 
economic disincentives. Even when one is penalised for crossing the line, they are typically 
dealt with openly through legal means and in open court in order to portray a sense of 
righteousness. Whereas for China, many censorship actions could be felt directly by the 
people. Search terms return non-relevant results in search engines, Sina Weibo posts are 
deleted regularly and television programmes get pulled from broadcast mid-season without 
reasonable explanations. Access to foreign media content online is also arduous and many 
Chinese have to resort to non-legal channels in order to consume them. The perceptions of 
communication control could be different when states have different approaches in control. 
Most studies on media control generally revolve around the perceptions of a very 
small group of media practitioners or experts (Becker, Vlad, & Nusser, 2007). Measuring the 
real level of control would be difficult since no government would be willing to share 
information of this nature to the public. Given also that the approach to control could be very 
different, an objective measurement would also be problematic. Does one equate 10 deletions 
of single word with one entire suppressed news story? What about the reporting of half-
truths? The 2013 Southern Weekend saga in China that resulted in street protests was not 
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merely due to censorship but over extreme control. As a former staff commented, the new 
head of party propaganda “enforced his power to the extreme and without an iota of 
flexibility, and micromanaged every aspect of media operations” (Xiao, 2013). It is probably 
impossible to formulate any objective measure of control that is quantifiable and meaningful 
across different societies. It ultimately boils down to the perception and subjective tolerance 
of those who are being subjected to the control. While the perceptions of media practitioners 
are important, the perceptions of the people should be taken into account too. However, the 
annual studies conducted by Reporters with Borders and Freedom House only surveyed the 
perceptions of experts and media practitioners. Intuitively, it would appear that people in 
controlled media environment would trust the media less. Edelman Trust Barometer (2013), 
however, shows that people trust the media more in countries with more control. Is the higher 
level of trust due to ignorance of control or indoctrination? Do the people know about the 
control? If so, how are they taking it? Is it resignation, acquiescence or deference to 
authority? Why do some try to circumvent the control while others do not? Are the 
boundaries of control clear to the people? These are questions that have not been examined or 
answered satisfactorily. Hence this study could contribute to a lacuna in knowledge by 
surveying media consumers rather than experts. Comparison between the level of control as 
reported by foreign NGOs and the people’s perception of control could also provide some 
insights on whether meta-censorship is effective or differentiate the communication control 
policies that different governments adopt.  
 
Finally, findings from prior studies suggest that media freedom as a value needs to be 
examined in relation to other values instead of solely on its own. When a survey question is 
framed as whether the media should be free from government control, 85% of respondents in 
both China and Hong Kong answered positively. However, in the same survey 
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(WorldPublicOpinion.org , 2009), when the question on media freedom is framed as whether 
government has right to prevent media from publishing politically destabilizing materials, 
China drops significantly lower with 42% agreeing as compared to only 18% agreeing in 
Hong Kong. Hence this shows that most people think that media freedom is desirable but 
some are more willing to sacrifice press freedom to preserve political stability than others. 
This closely relates to how governments in Singapore and China justify their tough control of 
the media.  Both Singapore and China rely on the rhetoric of social harmony and collective 
interest in justifying why control of the media is necessary. Whereas most people in Hong 
Kong, who have been through long periods of political stability in spite of a laissez-faire 
media environment, apparently do buy into the rhetoric that control of the media is necessary 
for political stability. The split in opinion in China (and likely Singapore) warrant a closer 
examination on whether those who are willing to sacrifice media freedom for political 
stability share any similar traits.  
 
Tolerating or accepting that the state has a significant control of the communication 
space does not mean that the people are ceding agency within or to the system. People from 
different societies may have different approaches towards responding to disagreeable 
policies. Protesting and head-on resistance to such disagreeable policies would be what most 
can identify as the normal approach.  Presented with a roadblock, some may attempt to 
bulldoze over or crash through the roadblock. However, the head-on approach that requires a 
large sacrifice may not be what everyone or every society may subscribe to. While the epic 
Tiananmen tank blocking style of resistance might make great a great front page picture, that 
might no longer be the preferred approach. Some others may just look to circumvent the 
blocks or scale over the wall. As illustrated by a popular website providing information to 
Chinese netizens on how to and what to after circumventing the “great firewall of China”. 
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The website is named “fan qiang hou” (translated as “after scaling over the wall”), giving a 
sense that some may prefer the circumvention approach rather than championing for change.  
People’s reaction towards control should thus be viewed with consideration of the systems of 
power and control within which those tactics emerge (de certeau, 1984).  
 
1.4 Civic Orientation and Public Sphere 
In the examination of political communication control, it is primarily an examination 
of how conducive the communication environment is for political discussion. That is a 
structural perspective of the issue. However, focusing merely on how free the media 
environment is would be ignoring the factors of political culture and individual agency. A 
free environment offers people the opportunity to participate in the public communication of 
politics but whether people take the opportunity would also depend on the political culture. 
Putting a cricket field in a town in USA or UK would have vastly different outcomes in the 
participation of the sport. As Almond and Verba (1963) pointed out, the “national histories 
and social structures” would affect the political culture of a society. Different societies would 
have different expectations of the public and how much one should contribute to political 
discussions.  
What are the duties of the public? The commonly held view in liberal democracy is 
that one should keep informed of public matters (McCombs & Poindexter, 1983), follow 
governmental affairs, actively participate in societies (Almond and Verba, 1963), vote, 
amongst other activities that are part of being engaged in public life. However, is it too much 
a burden for the individual or a member of the public, to perform all the duties as expected 
from the liberal democratic view? Just for the task of keeping informed, as Lippman (1927, p. 
10) pointed out that the common man “has been saddled with an impossible task and he is 
asked to practice an unattainable ideal” and he himself confessed that he “cannot find time to 
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do what is expected …in the theory of democracy”. Ferre et al. (2002) too noted that “to 
expect citizens to be actively engaged in public life is seen by advocates of this view as, at 
best, wishful thinking”.  
Whether viewed normatively as “civic duty” or culturally as “civic culture”, these 
concepts are not universal and are dependent on the society. Even in the USA, whereby 
perceived by many to have an active citizenry, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) found that 
“most citizens do not care about most policies and therefore are content to turn over decision-
making authority to someone else” (p. i). Hence, if the idea of an active citizenry with a 
strong civic culture is not readily apparent in a liberal democratic society, there is more 
reason to examine how political and civic culture differs in the societies being examined in 
this study. “Asian values” such as “communitarian principles, willingness to forsake personal 
freedoms for the prosperity and well-being of the community, support for social consensus 
and harmony, respect for elders and leaders” (Romano, 2010, p.358) have been brought up 
regularly by politicians and academics to explain the differences in freedom between media 
environments in Asia and Western societies. Whether it is a valid explanation or not, there is 
a need to consider the differences in how individuals see themselves as part of society. The 
differences in expectations of civic duty (in the context of this study, whether it is a duty to 
keep informed and discuss politics) could likely affect whether or how participation in public 
discussions impact on perceptions of political legitimacy. When comparing how public 
discussions affect perception of political legitimacy, Searing et al. (2007) found differences 
between USA and UK as well as differences between urban and suburban contexts. Hence, 
this study would take guidance and examine how political culture and individual political 
attitudes might possibly influence the perceptions of the variables. Specifically for political 
attitudes, internal political efficacy (self-confidence in ability to understand and participate in 
political activities) and external political efficacy (belief that the government will respond to 
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the demands of the people) will be investigated. Authoritarian orientation and survival values 
would also be taken into account since as pointed out earlier, some are more willing to 
sacrifice freedom of speech in the name of social stability.  
 As for the examination of political culture, the focus of this study would be narrowed 
on a specific aspect of political culture that is relevant to political discussions. Political 
discussions may take place privately behind closed doors and discussions may take place in 
the public in full view by others. Theorists, such as Thompson (1995) and Meyrowitz (1985), 
highlighted that people behave and talk differently in different social contexts. What this 
study is concerned with it political discussions that take place within the realm of “public”. 
Habermas (1991) observed that as the rise of periodical press and gathering of private 
individuals led to the rise of a bourgeois “public sphere” in 17th and 18th centuries Europe. He 
theorised that “public sphere” is that of a group of "private persons" gathered to discuss 
matters of "public concern" or "common interest." Key elements for this arena are that the 
discussion has to be accessible to all, private interests are not to be admissible in the 
discussion, statuses of participants are to be “bracketed” and participants are to deliberate as 
peers. The outcomes would then be public opinion for the common good. By framing the 
public sphere with a backdrop absenting the state, “the public sphere, in short, is not the 
state; it is rather the informally mobilized body of nongovernmental discursive opinion that 
can serve as a counterweight to the state” (Fraser 1990).  
Underlying the theory of the public sphere is also the assumption that individuals 
have an interest to debate or contribute to the opinions formation of public issues. However, 
do the people share such a conception? Or is the conception of the “public” or “public 
sphere” similar in different societies? Zhao (2012) compared the Habermasian concept of the 
public sphere with that in China and concluded that the change in media technologies is 
“reconstituting China’s social class relations and redefining the nature of China’s post-
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revolutionary and post-reform ‘public sphere’ in the twentieth century”(p.161). If the 
perception of civic duty is different and people are not expected to speak out in public, how 
would the expectations of political talk in public be different? Political communication 
control affects the public sphere since it is the control of who and what can be discussed in 
public. Structurally, the state may restrict or attempt to shape the public sphere but end result 
would still depend on the political culture that is the performance and reproduction of 
political actions that people within the structure carry out. Political culture is constitutive of 
public sphere since acts which conform to the prevailing culture are reproduced in public or 
contestation of what is acceptable to the political culture has to be done in public in order to 
effect change. Individuals then take cues from others in public and choose their actions 
accordingly.    
Would the quality of a public sphere then affect how individuals perceive their civic 
duty or whether they should discuss politics in public? As described by Habermas, the public 
sphere in Western Europe “emerges” only in the late 18th century. So as can be seen, it is a 
cultural phenomenon. Whereas  Rawnsley (2003) argue that “in China, the government has 
sought to fill the void of legitimacy with nationalism (‘patriotism’) as the basis for a new 
inclusive discourse” (p. 311). Public sphere and public discourse thus depend on production 
and re-production of actions and norms. How can the quality of a public sphere be analysed? 
Ferree et al. (2002) and Bennett et al. (2004) distil the concept of public sphere and proposed 
that the quality of a public sphere can be examined in the dimensions of access, 
responsiveness and recognition. This study would thus examine how the people think of the 
public sphere in these dimensions in order to analyse whether the public sphere affects how 




1.5 Media Freedom and New Media Ecology 
1.5.1 Role of the media in society 
The role of the media in society has been extensively researched over the years. 
Where humans live together in a place, there is an inherent need to disseminate information 
and organise. When villages and towns used to be much smaller generations ago, that 
function was carried out in the public square – an open place where everyone can gather to 
find out information and make collective decisions. Then as societies develop both in terms 
of size and complexities, the transmission of information depends less on physical spaces. 
With the advent of literacy and printing press, that function slowly became mediated by 
newspapers and then eventually electronic broadcast media such as radio and television. Over 
the years, scholars begin to examine the role of the media as societies and media ecology 
changes. From the potent effects hypodermic needle theory proposed in early 20th century to 
the more recent limited effects theory, there is a range of perspectives on how much influence 
the media has on society. Most of the recent studies have shown that media consumers are 
not passive recipients of information. They play a more active role of selecting and digesting 
than the myth of passive recipient who would believe anything in the media. As Thompson 
(1995) pointed out, “reception of media messages is in any case a relatively independent 
process that producers cannot completely control (p.118)”.  
At the individual level, the effects of the media might not be direct or apparent, social 
theorists have observed that developments in media have led to changes in social spaces. The 
advent of “technical media” that allows fixation, reproduction and space-time distanciation of 
ideas has changed how individuals interact with one another (Thompson, 1995; Meyrowitz, 
1985). While there is a range of perspectives on how much influence the media has on the 
individual, there are much lesser disagreements that the media and politics are closely related. 
As highlighted by Thompson (1995), in the transmission of information and communication, 
the media plays a part in the production of “symbolic power” and in “the mediated field of 
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interaction is a field in which relations of power can shift quickly, dramatically and in 
unpredictable ways” (p. 118). At the same time, the re-ordering of space and time through 
media, according to Thompson, has resulted in the world seeming like a smaller place. 
Thompson highlighted 3 trends that are changing the media landscape: consolidation of 
media institutions into large scale commercial concerns, globalization of communication and 
development of electronic communication. There is a growing interdependency between 
societies and that includes how countries are governed.  
Much has also been written on media systems and regime types. Siebert, Peterson and 
Schramm’s (1956) Four Theories of the Press written in the Cold War era laid the foundation 
that linked different types of media systems to different regimes. Updating the Four Theories, 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) focused only on Western democratic countries and proposed a 
three model framework. They clarified that the models are “ideal types” and attempting to 
apply the framework would require substantial modifications, while application to contexts 
outside of democratic systems would be problematic. From their study, they did find the 
media systems in many countries to be closely aligned with their political systems and called 
it “political parallelism”(p.26). However, they also observed that the recent decades, 
“national differentiation of media systems is clearly diminishing” and there is a convergence 
of media system types towards the “Liberal Model” that is exemplified by the USA. They 
concluded that “whether that process of convergence will stop at a certain point or continue 
until national differentiation becomes irrelevant we cannot yet know.”  
In the age of traditional mass media whereby access to communication can be easily 
restricted and barrier of entry as a content provider is high, one might conclude that political 
reform is needed before there can be media freedom or convergence towards the “liberal 
model”. However, in the age of new media, the potential exists for a citizenry to agitate for 
reforms via expressions and mobilizing online. Barrier of entry may still be high for some 
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societies but comparatively, communication amongst and to the masses is much more 
accessible now. One no longer needs a printing press or a broadcast station to reach out to the 
masses. All that a person needs is a computer with internet connection to potentially be able 
to communicate with thousands of people. The role of the media in society could thus be 
evolving as the media ecology develops exceptionally with the internet. 
 
1.5.2 New media/ Changing media ecology 
In the examination of how (controlled) media affects the society, one also has to 
consider that the media ecology is not static and constantly undergoes technological changes. 
The printing press brought about changes to the oral tradition, the telegraph brought about 
instantaneous communication over large distances, the radio and television allowed easier 
communication to the masses; these all brought about changes to society in different eras 
(Hanson, 2008). Meyrowitz (1985) asserted that “the introduction and widespread use of a 
new medium of communication may restructure a broad range of situations and require new 
sets of social performances” (p.39). He also suggested that the advent of electronic media in 
late 20th century broke down the social walls and changed social behaviours. 
Just as Meyrowitz described how new media merged social situations and audiences 
to produce new ones, the internet could be seen as producing the same impact now. The 
media landscape in the recent two decades has been changing rapidly with the advent of 
computers and the internet. The ease at which information is transmitted and how many 
aspects of life are associated with the internet that many terms such as “knowledge 
economy”, “digital age”, “information society”, “digital public sphere” etc. are coined for the 
current era and analysed (Beniger, 1986; Castells, 2010; Webster, 2007). The advent of social 
media via the internet has changed how people interact. The “watercooler talk” has now 
moved to the virtual world for many, sharing gossips and latest updates on Facebook and 
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Twitter rather than at the water-cooler. The “public square” is now digital bulletin boards or 
forums. Many have also written about the affordances of the internet that empowers the 
people and allow for political change. Ranging from the Zapatista rebellion in the 1990’s 
(Cleaver, 1998) to the multitude of studies that the recent Arab Spring in 2010’s generated 
(Howard et al., 2011; Khondker, 2011; Allahui & Kuebler, 2011), many scholars have 
attributed the internet as a key factor in political change (O’Loughlin, 2001; Coleman & 
Blumler, 2009; Chadwick, 2006; Jordan, 1999). 
It is not surprising there is so much interest in the effects of the internet with its 
potential to transcend national borders. In the 1980’s, when Meyrowitz analysed how the 
television collapsed spaces, any effect was still limited to national boundaries since television 
broadcast is territorial. However, effects of the internet have the potential to be on a global 
scale. Practices of legitimacy are being performed to an international audience now. Acts of 
government that affect perception of legitimacy are performed to an international audience 
and audiences also see how governments of other countries legitimise their authority. 
Justification of beliefs could be influenced by both how domestic processes are carried out as 
well as how foreign countries allow their processes to be carried out. 
While the internet has presented the possibility of rendering national borders porous, 
the process of content creation and distribution still tend to be shaped by geography. 
Localisation of content for consumption in different regions is still apparent for the internet 
despite its international reach. The introduction of new communication medium in societies 
could have different impact within each society as “the process of technological adaptation is 
one where the introduced technology is adopted to the social processes of the adopting 
society, and not vice-versa” (Schaniel, 1988). Even with the potential to communicate with 
anyone in the world, people still tend to participate in virtual forums with fellow users who 
are more similar to themselves and consume media that they can better identify with. Rather 
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than thinking that the internet has created a single global media ecology, it may be more 
appropriate to deem it as creating multiple ecologies with porous borders. Provision of easier 
access to people does not mean everyone will consume the same content and like every 
media before the internet, there will be segmentation of audiences.  
The adoption of the internet in different societies will take its own distinct course and 
as highlighted by George (2006), while Singapore and Malaysia shared similar culture and 
history, the development of politics that is facilitated by the advent of the internet is vastly 
different. Structurally, the internet would seem to provide similar resources political 
development in both countries and in fact, the internet adoption rate is faster and higher in 
Singapore. However, Malaysia experienced a wider and more active political participation 
via the cyberspace while online politics remains muted for Singapore. Yang’s (2009) study of 
citizen activism online in China argues that the internet reflects the changes in society rather 
than directly cause the increase in activism. Hence, investigating whether and why people in 
the societies concerned seek out and use political information online that is created outside of 
the local mainstream media is an aspect that this study will examine.   
Many studies have also investigated how the internet has changed civic engagement. 
However, most tend to be conducted in Western liberal democratic societies and also tend to 
assume that the internet everyone has access to is the same. There is little analysis on the 
different levels of control that different people encounter and how that affects their civic 
engagement experience and attitude. In the past, authoritarian governments only had to 
control a small group of media owners or producers and the media experience of the 
population would be similar. With the internet, that is no longer the case as different people 
would attempt to access different content and the experience of being censored would be 
different according to the content. Some within the Chinese government has begun to 
acknowledge that open communications matters more in the internet era as quoted in the 
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Washington Post (Denyer, 2013), a report produced by China’s People’s Daily said that “in 
the Weibo era, an Internet public opinion crisis cannot be handled by evading and dodging”. 
That report further advised “facing the questions directly, speaking with the facts, convincing 
people by sincerity is the key to resolve the problem.” However, the recently leaked memo 
“Document No. 9” from the party leadership indicates that the top leaders are still advocating 
for strict control of the media (Buckley, 2013).  
Thompson argues that publicness should be seen as “openness and visibility, of 
making available and making visible” (p. 236). In the traditional broadcast media 
environment, the power to make available and visible would be concentrated in the hands of 
the state and media owners. However, as in the digital age whereby information is readily 
available, replicated and disseminated by internet users, what is deemed as “public” (and thus 
open to public discussion) is less in the hands of the state or media owners. Beyond the 
change in media space that is brought about by the widespread adoption of the internet, 
various theorists are also examining how different media are being used by the people. 
Meyrowitz (1985) pointed out that it is “meaningful to ask how the ‘media matrix’ in a 
particular society is altered when a new medium is added to it” (p.69). In the digital age, 
content is no longer confined to a particular medium. Just a few decades ago, there was a 
clear segregation of content. A television show can only be viewed on the television while a 
newspaper article can only be read on the newspaper. However, in the recent years, 
production, distribution and consumption of content are increasingly conducted over multiple 
platforms or mediums. Digitisation allows content to be easily reformatted and remixed, 
delivered on multiple platforms and generating instantaneous responses from audiences 
(Jenkins, 2006; Chadwick, 2011). The user-producer dichotomy in media is increasingly 
breaking down due to the affordances provided by the internet and media is gradually 
becoming what people do rather than what people consume.  
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Communication control in the traditional mass media era exists predominantly at the 
producer level. Censors can control the decisions of the editors. Editors control what gets 
printed and what gets printed on the front page. Broadcasters control what gets broadcasted 
and what gets broadcasted on primetime. This is the agenda-setting and visibility-setting 
power of the state and media owners. The masses, being regulated, would have limited 
knowledge or personal experiences of such control while still have the façade of being free to 
make choices to buy a newspaper or watch a broadcast. However, in the new media age, 
whereby many can be both producers and consumers, the ordinary person may now 
experience being directly censored or denied access to content. In addition, the affordance of 
the internet has already been highlighted for facilitating political participation in many 
countries and thus the people in these constrictive countries could more likely encounter 
communication control. Media control can now feel more real and closer to heart. This could 
change how the people perceive control of communication and how governments implement 
communication controls.  
Technology is deeply implicated in the media ecology and the production of public 
sphere. However, introducing new technology does not merely introduce a new (public) 
sphere for interaction. Rather, it transforms the understanding and opportunities that existing 
spheres provide. Information that people obtain from particular spheres do not circulate 
solely internally. Information crossover and overlap. People talk about what they read in the 
papers, share in social media, newspapers report what happens on the internet and on 
television etc. The key point to note would be that media practices and spaces are not static 
and has to be taken into account in the analysis of control of political communication by the 




The concept of legitimacy can be more germane as compared to the concept of 
democracy when studying a region with different political systems. Legitimacy depends on 
the adherence to existing rules, mutual justification of beliefs and consent; and hence is a 
process that requires continual assessment. These elements of legitimacy are affected by the 
communications between the governed and the government. As shown by Leeson (2008), he 
found a positive relationship between media freedom and willingness in political 
participation. Increased in political participation in turn leads to higher political support 
(Chang & Jacobson, 2010; Finkel, 1987). However, Norris and Inglehart (2010) in a 
comparison of media freedom found that confidence in the government is higher in societies 
with restricted media environments. These studies indicate that the relationship between 
perceptions of the government and media freedom may not be a simple causal relationship. 
As Norris and Inglehart added in their analysis, it “cannot be viewed as conclusive proof, 
since various other factors could conceivably be generating this pattern”(p.194). If it were 
that simple a relationship of control of information is sufficient for the control of the people, 
there will not be so many examples of despots being overthrown. Moreover, in an 
increasingly interconnected world, it is impossible for any government to have total control 
over the media and information. Importantly, Norris and Inglehart had examined the 
relationship at the country level and relied on expert surveys for the variable of media 
freedom. Perceptions of experts and the ordinary person might not be the same. This study 
hence will examine at the individual level and compare how individuals in different 
communication environments might possibly have different perceptions.  
Almond and Verba (1963) suggested political culture as the link between micro-
politics and macro-politics. Communication would naturally be a facilitator or mechanism of 
that link since culture requires communication and propagation. By examining political 
communication as a mechanism mediating the actions and attitudes of the people with that of 
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the political structure, it relieves placing the responsibility solely on either the individual or 
structure. Lack of political development is not entirely due to lack of agential action, neither 
can government policies and propaganda be given full credit in controlling the actions and 
perceptions of the people. Hence the problem of why some regimes with stricter media 
control have higher levels of support for the government cannot be entirely explained as the 
lack of dissenting views. Doing so portrays the people as merely sheep that can be herded 
obediently to anywhere. Authoritarian leaders such as Egypt’s Mubarak and Libya’s Gaddafi 
had tight control over their countries’ media space and would not have been ousted from 
power if the people could be herded via the media. The political culture (that requires 
years/generations of socialisation) of the people too plays a part that no government can 
transform instantaneously in times of crisis. This is a dimension that needs to be taken into 
account to avoid the oversimplified assumption of direct causal relationship between media 
control and changes in perception of the government.  
The current state of knowledge on political communication are conducted within 
liberal democratic contexts which rely on normative arguments on the desirability of a free 
media and the media that is not tightly controlled. Thus there is value in examining how 
various concepts critical to media analysis, such as media freedom, political attitudes and 
political talk are understood in East Asian societies. This thesis hence seeks to examine 
empirically, in the East Asian context, how different levels of media control affect the 








Chapter 2  
2.1 Why Compare 
 
As highlighted by Ciagla (2013) and Pfetsch and Esser (2004), the comparative 
method has been underutilised in political communication. Generally, studies on political 
communication examine the practices within specific countries. However, examining 
countries across a spectrum of communication control levels could allow different 
understandings to emerge. As highlighted by Hallin and Mancini (2004), comparative 
analysis of different communication systems is “useful in sorting out relationships between 
media systems and their social and political settings” (p.4). More importantly, it “makes it 
possible to notice things we did not notice and therefore had not conceptualized, and it also 
forces us to clarify the scope and applicability of the concepts we do employ” (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004, p.3). In the scarce occasions that the comparative approach is taken, the 
examination of Asian case studies is even rarer. Taking for example, after Hallin and 
Mancini’s “Comparing Media Systems” in 2004 which focused on the western world, the pair 
followed up with “Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World” in 2011 that only 
allocated space for China as the single case study for the whole of Asia. Whether it is due to 
language barrier or the lack of scholars specialising in political communication in East Asia, 
this points to a lacuna that urgently needs to be filled as East Asia becomes more important to 
global political stability.  
As this research examines the perceptions that individuals hold there is a need to 
examine and elicit the contexts that individuals are situated in. This study is not merely an 
analysis of behavioural responses whereby an input triggers an output. As highlighted by 
Thompson (1995, p.12) “if communication is a form of action, then the analysis of 
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communication must be based, at least in part, on an analysis of action and on an account of 
its socially contextualized character.” 
It is also important to note that context is not static and changes with time. It is 
particularly important with the media environments of the societies examined as socio-
political and technological changes are bringing about rapid changes to the media 
environments. This is hence also a study of social changes. In the study of social change, 
Delanty (2012) proposed to investigate it via analysis of the pre-conditions, social 
mechanisms, processes and trajectories of historical change. He further differentiated social 
mechanisms into 3 types, those that are transformative, generative and institutionalizing. 
Media environment could be seen as a social mechanism that could be one of the three types 
depending on the level of media control. For Meyrowitz (1985), he examined social change 
via the combination of situationist and media theorist perspectives. Drawing on the 
situationist tradition that behaviour is shaped by knowledge and expectations in specific 
social situations, Meyrowitz theorised that new media changes “who knows what about 
whom” (p.70) in what social situation and thus accepted behaviour in different situations 
evolves due to changes in the media matrix. From his analysis of the progress from print 
media to electronic media, he concluded that social situations are less defined by the physical 
locations as the flow of information changes. In the similar vein for this study, the internet 
has changed information flows between content producers and content consumers as well as 
across national boundaries and could possibly affect the relationship between the people and 
the state. Building on Meyrowitz’s theory, changes due to electronic media could possibly 
have two stages with the first being the analogue stage which Meyrowitz studied and the 
current digital stage which further changes the media matrix. Some other theorists such as 
Almond and Verba (1963), Huntington (1996) Fukuyama (1995) and Inglehart (2000) too 
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pointed out the importance of culture in shaping the economic and political outcomes of 
societies.  
From all the above, it indicates that context matters in the analysis of changes in 
society and social changes can rarely, if ever, be explained by a single element. The approach 
to be taken in this study is not to assume the examined concepts to be values-free or assume 
equivalence across the societies without taking into account the context. Rather, in examining 
these concepts, this study will attempt to tease out potential differences in interpretation of 
the concepts across the case studies through focus group sessions and factor these differences 
into the analysis. Context in this study will take into account the factors as highlighted by the 
theorists above and draw on critical realist perspectives (Archer, 1995; De Souza, 2013). 
Specifically, context will be unpacked into structure (comprising of elements such as political 
institutions, legal framework, technological affordances, etc.), culture (comprising of political 
culture, civil society, public sphere etc.) and agency (comprising of individual beliefs and 
attitudes). 
While the intended survey can help highlight differences in individual agency, 
examination of the structure and culture of the countries via interviews, focus groups and 
secondary research would offer a more comprehensive picture of the differences in contexts 
and outcomes. This framework of examining context in terms of structure, culture and agency 
will be utilised in conjunction with the hypotheses and research questions in the section 2.1. 
While the hypotheses allow the study to be focused, unpacking context into structure, culture 
and agency clarifies the differences in context for each of the case study being compared. The 
social changes (or resistance to change) will be analysed together with the differences in 




2.2 Justification for the selection of cities 
 
Various media monitoring organisations have rated and ranked many Asian countries 
unfavourably in terms of media freedom (Reporters Without Borders, 2012; Freedom House, 
2011). How do the people of countries with different media control practises perceive 
political communications control? Why are some people aware of but are tolerant towards 
press control? George (1998) argued that Singapore's controlled “press culture is sustained 
not just by coercion, but also by consent”. de Burgh’s (2003) interview with Chinese 
journalists found that some see no contradiction in both being a mouthpiece of the 
government and representing the interests of the people. Is the demand for media freedom 
universal or is it a Western value? Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) approach in selection of 
countries began with political systems (liberal democratic) that are similar. Following their 
approach of selecting similar political systems would be trying to fit into their models without 
consideration of political contexts/systems that do not fit closely with the liberal democratic 
model. This study will instead begin from similar cultural and values system (according to 
various scholars elaborated below) while allowing the differences in political institutions and 
media control policies to serve as differences for analysis.  
This comparative study will attempt to provide insight and contribute to the discourse 
on political communication control in the East Asian context by focusing and comparing 
countries in greater China (namely mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong) and Singapore. 
The choice of the four countries would provide examples of different levels of control in 
media freedom (see Table 2).  
Przeworski and Teune (1970) suggested two approaches when selecting case studies 
for comparison, namely “most similar systems design” and “most different systems design”. 
By choosing countries that are as similar as possible, the “most similar systems design” 
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allows the researcher to examine the few dissimilarities between these countries as the likely 
reason for the difference in outcomes. On the other hand, “most different systems design” 
focuses on a particular phenomenon and selects cases in many different countries to highlight 
the intercultural differences. Wirth and Kolb (2004) built on these approaches and suggested 
modifications such as parallel analysis using both most different and most similar systems 
design and multi-stage treatment to the case studies.  
This study will be guided by Wirth and Kolb’s approach of multi-stage treatment of 
the case studies. From Table 1, it would be apparent that the choice of the countries allows 
the study to compare perceptions across a wide spectrum of media control. For internet 
control, other than China, the other three countries have not been found to practise any 
restriction on political communication. This could allow comparisons between the countries 
to be made for different situations. For example, between China and Singapore, this study 
would explore whether a freer Internet would have a different influence when traditional 
media is strongly controlled by the government. While between Singapore and Taiwan, the 
constant would be a free Internet while freedom for traditional media is different. (See Table 
3 for paired comparisons.) 
Other than the difference in media freedom, the countries are similar in economic 
development, with the exception of China. China is much larger in terms of population and 
land mass as compared to the other case studies. The level of development is more diverse for 
different regions while the other case studies are more homogeneous. Hence, for this study, 
the selection of study subjects would be limited to urban populations so as to minimise 
differences due to economic differences. According to data from Brookings Institute (2012), 
the GDP per capita for the cities are as follows: Beijing ($20,275), Taipei ($42,534), Hong 
Kong ($48,672) and Singapore ($62,523). While it appears that there is still a significant 
difference between Beijing and Singapore in terms of GDP per capita, we have to take into 
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account that Singapore is a city state and thus the GDP per capita includes all economic 
activities within the country. Beyond economic measure, based on the Human Development 
Index, the cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin are on a similar level as Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. Moreover, the survey in this study will only target university students, 
further narrowing down the differences since university students are more likely to be from 
middle class backgrounds.  
The intent in targeting university students is due to factors commonly seen as having 
an influence on political participation. As highlight by Huntington (1968, p.5), “urbanization, 
increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass media expansion” contribute to or 
extend political consciousness. Studies have also shown that various factors, such as gender, 
education (Campante & Chor, 2012; Hillygus, 2005) and social economic status (Shields & 
Goidel, 1997; Verba & Nie, 1972), could affect political participation. Given that the level of 
urbanization and literacy level is not homogeneous in the countries, a feasible approach 
would be to select subjects who are of similar backgrounds for comparability. Moreover, the 
strong link of university students and political change, which as Huntington (1968) noted, 
“alienated university graduates prepare revolutions” (p. 48), suggests that focusing on this 
particular group of the populace would be the most meaningful. In sum, by ensuring that 
research subjects are varsity students from major cities in the four countries; the standard of 
living, literacy and access to media would be closest matched across the subjects from all the 
countries.  
Importantly for equivalence, the countries comprise of predominantly population and 
culture of ethnic Han Chinese descent. This could minimise effects that could be due to 
cultural and ethnicity differences. In education research, these countries are also frequently 
grouped together as “Confucian heritage cultures” for the purpose of analysis and comparison 
(e.g. see Watkins & Biggs, 1996). Inglehart and Welzel (2010) constructed a “global cultural 
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map” using data from the World Values Survey study and these countries are grouped 
together under the “Confucian” category. Based on “Traditional/Secular Rational” and 
“Survival/Self-Expression” dichotomies, these countries are “cultural neighbours” that score 
high on secular-rational and survival values. “Survival values” place higher emphasis on 
economic and physical security while “self-expression values” give higher priority to 
participation in decision-making in economic and political life. It should be highlighted that 
according to Inglehart and Welzel, scoring high on “survival” meant that respondents of these 
countries valued “self-expression” lesser. Even in this group of predominantly ethnic Chinese 
societies that are closely clustered together in terms of values, there is a wide spectrum of 
how free the media systems are. Hence, values of the people would just be a minor 
explanation of why some societies tolerate curtailments in freedom of expression. 
Taking a leaf from Huntington (1968), rather than emphasizing on the types of 
political system, examining the level of governance as represented by the stability of political 
institutions could possibly shed light on how legitimacy is perceived in differing 
communication environments. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007) ranks all these four 
cases as moderate risk of political instability with index scores narrowly ranging from 4.0 to 
4.8 (out of 10) amongst them. Hence, while the political systems are different ideologically, 
these four cases can be deemed to be political systems of similar stability. Pye and Pye 
(1985) too noted how some provinces of China “might have been as successful in 
modernizing as the competing units of Chinese culture-Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore-
have been” (p.64) if they had broken away from China. Literatures in other social sciences 
too associate these countries together under the label of “East Asian culture”. Together, these 
demonstrated that the four case studies have very similar features and could be examined as 
most similar systems. 
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Lastly, it has to be emphasized that complete equivalence would be impossible as 
pointed out by Wirth and Kolb (2004). Equivalence would have to be prioritized according to 
the factors that a study seeks to examine. Hence, a best fit would be the compromise that 
researchers have to settle for while being aware of the limitations that are present in the 
selected case studies. The limitations due to the differences in the case studies would then be 
accounted for in the analysis.  
Differences in Context 
It is acknowledged that the political systems in the case studies are different. Political 
systems can never be an exact replica for different countries. Democracy in the United 
Kingdom is different from that of the United States while China’s version of authoritarianism 
is different from that of North Korea. Differences in the systems could then shed further 
insights. Other than differences in level of political communication control, this study could 
offer insights with paired countries, highlighting the key differences between two countries 

















Chapter 3  
To meaningfully compare different societies, one has to take into account the different 
historical trajectories, social and institutional structures and culture of the societies. The next 
few chapters will thus present an overview of the communication and socio-political 
landscape of each of the societies to be analysed. Socio-historical events that may have 
contributed to how people perceive the media as well as key socio-politico institutional 
dimensions will also be highlighted and provide the contexts for comparison and analysis.   
 
China 
Regularly called the “factory” of the world, China’s politics and its stability concern 
not just the Chinese but also the rest of the world. Many China analysts have commented on 
how the social compact between the CCP and the Chinese people involves the giving up of 
civil liberties in exchange for rapid economic growth. Judging by rapid economic 
development in the last two decades, with GDP per capita growing from US$363 in 1992 to 
US$6091 in 2012 (World Bank, n.d.), the CCP certainly kept its end of the bargain in 
bringing about wealth to many people in China. However, as per the other side of the social 
compact, the media environment in China has been described as restrictive by every measure 
that is available. It is well known that both the internet and mainstream media are highly 
controlled by the CCP.   
 
3.1 Political History Context 
 
Before delving into China’s media situation, there would be a need to review China’s 
socio-political situation. After all, media does not operate in vacuum but function within the 
political and cultural landscape of a society. The CCP also depends heavily on recent history 
to justify its rule of China. Tracing back to the recent history of about a century as the last 
Chinese imperial dynasty (Qing dynasty) fell in 1912, China had been through many periods 
48 
 
of upheavals and the notion of a need for political stability has been trumpeted by the Chinese 
political elites in the recent peaceful decades. 
 
The fall of Qing dynasty led to a fragmentation of China as there was a power 
vacuum. Various warlords fought to take control of China, but no one had the means to hold 
on to power. Aside from internal power struggles, China also faced the problem of foreign 
powers (Western Allies and Japan) carving up and trading parts of China without regards of 
the Chinese people. The inept responses of the government in Beijing led to the May Fourth 
Movement, which was mainly a period of student protests led by the universities in Beijing. 
This tumultuous period and its related student movements remains to this day widely taught 
in school, reminding people what could happen to China if it is weak and that it is the duty 
and responsibility of the Chinese people to be united for China. The May Fourth Movement 
was also the foundation for which the CCP was founded as Marxist ideology spread amongst 
the student protestors in that period.  
  
For a short period in the 1920s, the CCP joined the Kuo Min Tang (also known as 
Chinese Nationalist Party, henceforth KMT) as the strategy was to change the KMT from 
inside and ride on the military success of the KMT in overthrowing the various warlords and 
reuniting China. However, the death of KMT founder, Sun Yatsen, led to a change in 
leadership within the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek took over. Chiang did not subscribe to the 
communism ideology and turned against the CCP. The CCP was expelled and were driven to 
the western and northern parts of China by the KMT as KMT consolidate power in the 
southern and eastern parts of China. It was also this period that Mao Zedong established 




 The civil war between the CCP and the KMT was put on hold in 1937 as the second 
Sino-Japanese war broke out in that year. Facing a common external enemy of Japan, the 
KMT and CCP called a truce between them and each focused on fighting the Japanese 
separately. With the end of the second World War, the two Chinese sides resumed to fighting 
for the control of China. KMT’s Chiang Kai-shek eventually lost the fight and retreated to 
Taiwan island still hoping to return someday. After the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949, the 
People’s Republic of China was founded and Mao’s era of upheaval began. Right off the bat 
in 1949, redistribution policies were debated and implemented forcefully. Land was 
confiscated from private owners and redistributed to communes. Some landowners were even 
executed. Collectivism was eventually implemented throughout the country and land were all 
re-possessed by the state. Labour camps were also set up to punish those who transgressed 
against the party.  
In a delusional attempt to leapfrog other industrialised countries, Mao Zedong 
launched the “Great Leap Forward” in the late 1950’s to advance China’s position in the 
world. Communes were established and resources pooled to maximise grain and steel 
production. However, in the attempt to impress the party leadership, local party leaders 
implemented measures that led to drastic decrease in food output. Local leaders devoted too 
much resources into masquerading fake outputs to meet quotas. For example, tools and 
knives were melted down to make up for iron ore production. Farms devote extraordinary 
resources into creating a false image of bountiful harvest for visiting leaders. When Mao 
Zedong or some senior ranking leader made uninformed remarks about how certain processes 
could be improved or done to increase output, those instructions were carried out without 
questions. In the end, appearances could only be kept up for so long and ultimately the 
charade was up and famine resulted. The famine lasted for more than three years and 




The failure of “Great Leap Forward” damaged Mao Zedong’s standing within the 
party and facing risks of revolt within his party, Mao had to resort to more radical ideas to 
consolidate his power. Mao then launched “Cultural Revolution” in 1966, encouraging 
people to be critical of the system and destroy any remnant feudal mind-set. To remove those 
who undermined him, Mao asserted that bourgeois elements had infiltrated the government 
and called on youths to counter those elements. The slogan of the era was “to rebel is 
justified” and Mao’s Red Guards capitalised on that to terrorise the society. The movement 
might have given some appearance of political participation but essentially was creating 
factions within the party and society for Mao to divide and conquer. The revolution was also 
building up a network of informers and carrying out mob justice on anyone who dared to 
speak out against Mao. The lack of proper judicial and political processes meant abuses of 
power and personal vendetta were rampant. Intellectuals were persecuted and educated urban 
youths were sent to rural regions to be “re-educated”. Prior to “Cultural Revolution”, there 
was also a “Hundred Flowers Campaign” whereby people were encouraged to express their 
criticism of the party and policies. That too ended gravely for many as Mao purged those who 
had opposed his policies. These supposed open to criticism/free speech campaigns against 
imagined enemies of the state did not contribute to building of positive norms and values that 
are associated to free speech. People instead became more guarded, fearful and distrustful of 
those outside their close ties since any critical utterance could potentially lead to persecution. 
Ultimately, the revolution resulted in more abuses of power and further corruption to the 
system; eventually causing the death of half a million to two million people. Herd instincts 
and public lynching do not advance any society and the two decades of scarcity had 
cultivated a generation of Chinese that value personal survival above anything else.  
As a communist society, the CCP managed the people through work collectives.  
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Everyone’s life was dictated by the ‘danwei’ (generic term for work unit) and the CCP 
pushed out policies through the danwei. Each danwei created their own social infrastructure 
of work, housing, healthcare and services. People were bounded by their danwei for life and 
could not freely change employment without permission. Permission was also needed for 
everyday matters like marriage, travel, housing and childbearing. This allowed the CCP to 
hold overwhelming power over the people and deter dissent.  
Another policy that the CCP implemented during Mao’s period to control the people 
is that of the “Hukou” system (household registration system). The hukou concept is not new 
to China and has been implemented to varying degrees in the history of China as a tool for 
population control, economic reasons and mitigate spread of dissent. The CCP however 
utilises the system to a wider and stricter degree. The system ties people to specific locations 
(usually their place of birth) and people are not allowed to move without permission out of 
the location. People moving out of their designated location would have no access to 
government support such as healthcare, education services and housing. When implemented 
in the Mao years, hukou status was categorised into agricultural and non-agricultural status. 
This thus perpetuates the rural and urban divide as much of the country’s resources are 
devoted into urban regions. Be it education services, health services or other social services, 
urban regions are miles ahead in terms of standard. In the earlier years, urban hukou holders 
were allocated housing and provided with rations while rural hukou holders had to survive 
with whatever their own communes could offer at the village level. This led to the majority of 
the famine deaths during the “Great Leap Forward” to be from the rural agricultural regions.  
 
After the death of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping was politically rehabilitated and 
brought back to lead the CCP. Henceforth, Deng started the era of “reform and opening” for 
China that has mostly continued to this day. Deng’s economic policies ran against the 
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ideologies of communism as many aspects involved devolving state production resources to 
private entities. However, in doing so, he argued that the party needed to let some people get 
rich first and when the tide rises, all boats rise together. Whatever the ideology, most people 
are motivated by potential rewards for the work done and transferring modes of production 
into private hands meant that those who put in more effort would likely be better rewarded, 
leading to increased production output. In the words of Deng, signalling his preference for 
pragmatism over ideology, “it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it 
catches mice”. Thus began the retreat of central-planning communism and the (re)emergence 
of market-driven capitalism in China.  
 
With the opening up of the economy, the political system too began to be scrutinised 
from both within and outside the party. Prior to the economic reforms, modes of productions 
were used to control the people. As mentioned previously, “work units” were the most basic 
organisation of people for which the party could control many aspects of people’s life and 
hold them hostage for any possible dissent. With the modes of production being de-
centralised, such direct controls were diminished. Business owners no longer control 
employees like how “work units” could control their members. The priority of business 
owners was profit making and not political control. No doubt new business owners were 
usually party cadres and typically would still abide by party directives. However, when 
people no longer had to seek permission from their place of employment for everyday 
matters, they would be more discerning over what the state or the CCP could interfere with in 
their lives. Coupled with the restart of education after the end of the cultural revolution, more 
people are politically conscious of the problems within the political system and demands for 




Deng Xiaoping made a conscious effort to distance his government from Mao’s era 
and tolerated criticism of policies from Mao’s era in order to implement his reforms. Mao, 
however, was still a symbol of the party and to outright reject Mao and his policies would be 
detrimental to the party. Mao was the one who had proclaimed the establishment of modern 
China. The CCP still needed Mao as a symbol to conflate party and state, in order to ensure 
the longevity of the party. The propaganda that the CCP could rely on was and still is that the 
government, like any human being, could make mistakes and what is important is the ability 
to correct themselves. Much of the blame was also diverted to the “gang of four” senior party 
leaders who had been instrumental for the Cultural Revolution. The four were subsequently 
removed from power after Mao’s death and put on trial for their purported role in the Cultural 
Revolution. Emerging from the shadows of Mao’s, Deng made targeted changes to avert 
another cult personality scenario in China. Key among which was that Deng ensured that 
China would be governed by a collective leadership. Even while he was viewed and treated 
as “the paramount leader” (an informal term rather than an official position) of China, he 
never occupied the position of the president or secretary general of the party. During his time, 
the top four positions in China were occupied by four different persons with Deng himself 
holding only to the position of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The other 
key positions - President of the PRC, Premier of the State Council and Secretary General of 
the CCP were held by others.  
 
The long shadow cast by Mao’s devastation also led to another of Deng’s reforms. 
Convinced that no one should be allowed to rule over China indefinitely, Deng implemented 
the two-term limit rule for which leaders could serve no more than two terms. This limit 
would serve as a safety mechanism preventing another extended Mao-like upheaval. The 
term limit however was only legislated for the state position of the President of PRC while 
party positions of Secretary General and Chairman of the Central Military Commission were 
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left unwritten. Deng also experimented with direct elections, albeit at very low impact scale, 
at the village level for the post of village chief. Since then, counties, towns and villages have 
some form of direct elections for their leaders. The implementation of direct elections 
however had not been expanded beyond the token small scale experimentation. In fact, over 
time, these elections have become more controlled as only those who are approved by the 
party could get on the ballot. There are also media reporting on some elections being 
corrupted by the local candidates through vote buying. These reports tend to portray the 
elections as highly susceptible to manipulation and thus elections should not be the way 
forward for high level positions in the country. Due to the highly managed nature of these 
elections, these elections usually do not garner much attention from the people. In the last 
few decades, there were a few episodes of independent candidates who campaigned for 
positions without the blessings of the CCP but were typically put to rest with harassments and 
threats by the CCP.  
 
Even though Deng Xiaoping gradually implemented political reforms after he took 
power, the political reforms were not progressing as fast as the youths in China had hoped 
for. Students were getting restless and despondent about employment prospects in the 
changing economy in the 1980’s. Jobs were no longer guaranteed by the state and newly 
implemented economic reforms led to rampant nepotism and cronyism, shutting out those 
without connections. Inspired by western educated returning Chinese scholars and 
democratization movements in other parts of the world, Chinese students began agitating for 
liberalization in politics, stronger rule of law, democracy and other democracy related ideas. 
Protests started happening in a few cities in mid-1980’s and got increasing larger until April 
of 1989 whereby the death of Hu Yaobang (former General Secretary of CCP who had to 
resign for being tolerant towards these protests) sparked off sustained protests at Tiananmen 
Square. The student movement spread to many other Chinese cities and the CCP declared 
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martial law to rein in the movement. Eventually the protests culminated in the Tiananmen 
massacre on 4th June as the CCP cracked down on student protests rather than give in to the 
demands of the students. This critical point in history has since been buried and obscured by 
the CCP lest the movement inspire the younger generation. Be it history books or the internet 
within China, the tragedy has been scrubbed clean. Long-time Beijing residents however still 
remember the tragedy but are mostly reluctant to publicly express their opinions about it.  
 
Jiang Zemin rose to power in the aftermath of the Tiananmen student protests. Jiang 
succeeded Zhao Ziyang as Secretary General of the CCP as Zhao was blamed for supporting 
the student protests. Deng Xiaoping’s tolerance toward political liberalization came to a head 
as his allies were removed from leadership positions as other CCP factions pinned the blame 
on Deng’s allies. Deng Xiaoping’s push for collective leadership through the experiment of 
having different people occupying the top state positions and party positions was abandoned 
as Deng faded into the background. Jiang Zemin eventually occupied all the important 
positions of power after taking over as the leadership of China. Jiang might not have been as 
supportive of Deng’s political reforms, but Jiang continued Deng’s “opening up” policy and 
built on Deng’s economic reforms. Jiang supported the integration of China’s economy with 
the global market with his “go out” strategy in 1999 which encouraged state owned 
enterprises (SOE) to invest and undertake overseas projects. Jiang’s economic policies 
culminated with China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001.  
 
Jiang Zemin introduced the “Three Represents” theory/thought in 2001 that was his 
legacy contribution to the CCP ideology. The main point of the theory was that he proposed 
that the party allowed inclusion of people from the private sector, as there are more people in 
the private sector as China progresses. This breakthrough essentially brings capitalism into 
China’s political mainstream. Prior to this, with the exclusion of private sector from CCP 
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membership, it could still be seen by some that the privatisation of state-owned assets were 
merely the CCP’s approach in economic progression and at its heart the party’s ideology was 
still about representing the man on the street. However, when capital owners were being co-
opted into party ranks, the contradictions with communist ideology were getting more jarring. 
Thereby, there were pockets of resistance when Jiang implemented the policy.  
 
In 2002, Jiang Zemin handed over the position of the General Secretary of the CCP to 
Hu Jintao. While the second transfer of power was smooth, Jiang held on to the position of 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission for another two years before handing over to 
Hu. Mao Zedong coined the phrase “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” and his 
next two successors (Deng and Jiang) too subscribed to the dogma as demonstrated by how 
they held on to the control of the military in order to control the CCP. Hu Jintao basically 
carried on the economic growth policy and did not rock the boat. Many see it as a sort of 
maintenance era with Hu mainly emphasizing on scientific processes in policies and 
development.  Hu’s ten year term was seen as ruling by consensus and marked by continued 
high economic growth despite global financial crises. The 2008 Beijing Olympics was seen 
as China’s debutante party for which China exhibited its shiny new buildings, efficient 
system and renowned ability in rallying its people to work for a common cause. This event 
was as much for the domestic audience as it is for foreigners as it contributed to CCP’s 
efforts in building national pride.  
 
In 2012, with the third transition of power happening smoothly and Hu Jintao handing 
over every position without delay unlike what Jiang did with military power, some analysts 
comment that this augurs well for the institutionalization of leadership transition in China. Hu 
Jintao was Vice-President during Jiang Zeming’s second term before taking over. Xi Jinping 
was Vice-president during Hu Jintao’s second term before taking over. The expectation was 
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that stable and predictable power transfer is going to be the norm for China going forward. Xi 
Jinping, however, had his cards close to his heart until he ascended to the top.  
  
Many news reports and analysts have since described Xi Jinping as the only 
“strongman” leader to have emerged in China after Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping had to 
juggle the support of other party elders in the post Mao period, Jiang Zemin had to lean on 
Deng’s clout to solidify his standing while Hu Jintao was deemed to have governed under the 
shadow of Jiang. Since taking over, Xi began taking charge of every major aspects of the 
country and formed multiple committees to which he chaired. The Economist (2016) even 
dubbed Xi as the “Chairman of everything”. Premier Li Keqiang was effectively side-lined 
and no obvious designated leader was appointed. Xi Jinping’s power consolidation 
culminated in the controversial removal of the two-term limit for presidency in 2018. It was 
controversial for the obvious reason that Xi could now hold on to power beyond the usual 10 
years that his predecessors had served for. The justification for the removal was that state 
position should have alignment with party position since the corresponding position of 
secretary general does not have a term limit. Some Chinese public intellectuals had voiced 
concerns about the change but the rubber stamping National People’s Congress passed the 
law with just two objections out of 2964 votes.  
 
The lack of transparency of the CCP leads to much speculation about the inner 
workings of the upper echelons in the CCP. All through the history of CCP, there are frequent 
rumours about power struggles amongst the different factions in CCP. Even for the current 
leadership, despite Xi Jinping having “consolidated” his power within the party with his 
extensive anti-corruption drive, rumours of members who are aligned with Jiang Zemin 
working to oust Xi Jinping would still surface from time to time. The opaque nature of 
politics in China has led to “tea-leaves reading” in policy directions and leadership 
58 
 
transitions. People know that negotiations, discussions and power struggles happen in 
Zhongnanhai (CCP’s headquarters) but what really happen behind closed doors can never be 
properly verified. Commentaries, which page a story is in, what terms are used or 
emphasized, who stands where in a group picture become tea-leaves for which political 
pundits and the man on the street use to interpret what is happening behind the scene in 
Chinese politics. However, it should be pointed out that while Western politics might be 
significantly less opaque, they are no less unpredictable and can be as foggy as politics in 
China. It is just that the media professionals in the West are usually the ones doing the 
interpretation, analysis and guessing as the media professionals have more leeway for 
interpretation. Most Chinese citizens who pay attention to politics know that the domestic 
media are tightly controlled by the party and have little room to deviate from official sources, 
so the people have to carry out their own interpretation.  
 
In the process of consolidation of power, Xi Jinping has also demonstrated awareness 
for the need of popular support in this modern media-saturated age. Deviating from preceding 
leaders, Xi through various media channels attempt to be more personable to the public by 
softening his image. Besides the usual handshaking and “leader looking at things” official 
photos, there are stories and images of Xi doing everyday matters like queuing for food and 
kicking a ball around. There are also Some Chinese media also began to use the nickname of 
“Xi-dada” (loosely translated as “Big daddy Xi” in Chinese dialect) to be more relatable and 
folksier. Although the overuse of the nickname resulted in some push back and restrain 
(Wong 2016). 
 
The only other recent leader who had portrayed a more personable persona was Wen 
Jiabao as he presented himself as a caring grandfather-like person. Wen was regularly 
referred to as Grandpa Wen in the media. Softening his public image was not enough for Xi 
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as the CCP apparatus built a personality cult around Xi. Xi Jinping even enshrined himself 
into the CCP constitution in 2017 in the form of “Xi Jinping Thought”, making him the 
second leader to make such a move while still in office since Mao Zedong. Subsequently, the 
CCP rolled out the “Xuexi Qiangguo” mobile app for members to encourage self-learning. 
The name of the app is a play on words which also could mean “learning from Xi to 
strengthen the country”. Party members have to complete tasks such as reading or articles, 
viewing of videos and taking of quizzes related to party related topics and “Xi Jinping 
Thought”. While there are small incentives (accumulate points to exchange for small 
rewards) to engage with the app, the main push to use the app is because party cell leaders 
require their members to acquire a minimal number of points periodically.  
 
Xi Jinping’s inclination for tighter controls also extend to the private sector. In recent 
years, there are increasing demands that companies based in China have to have party 
branches and more companies are required to allocate boardroom seat for party members. 
(Tai 2018). This thus presents another about turn in ideology and governance in China. The 
years of economic reforms and allowing economic policies to follow the needs of the market 
appear to come to a head. Can enterprises in China be truly private, or do they pursue aims 
other than profit making? The controversies involving telecommunications company, 
Huawei, demonstrate how the interconnectedness of private enterprises and the CCP has 
created mistrust and problems for China-origins companies.  
 
Xi Jinping’s government takes a stricter view and control over propaganda and 
ideology education. Since coming into power, journalists (both local and foreign) in China 
have lamented that the industry has seen stricter controls. Xi is not subtle about the CCP 
having control over the media industry in China and even said that media practitioners must 
be “surnamed” after the party. Therefore, he pointedly indicated that media is an offspring of 
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the party and thus must support the objectives of the party (rather than the country). 
Educational institutes are also closely monitored to ensure that educators adhere strictly to 
party lines without question. For the CCP, reforms are restricted to certain aspects of the 
economy so as to tap on to the global market and resources of the world. Politics and 
ideology will always stay under the control of the party and support the party.  
 
China has now grown to become the second biggest economy in the world and is 
slated to overtake USA in 15 to 40 years’ time, according to different forecasters. While 
China still touts its rise as “peaceful”, it is without a doubt that it is has also been flexing its 
strength and extending its influence beyond its borders. Xi Jinping’s “belt and road initiative” 
has various countries falling in line to be a part of it lest they are shut out of a lucrative trade 
and investment network. Most countries refuse to admonish China even when China has 
detained thousands of Muslims in the Xinjiang region. The economic and diplomatic clout 
that China wields now contributes to the narrative CCP peddles at home. China has risen 
from its lowest point a century ago. China no longer bows to foreign powers. Instead other 
countries revere China and according to CCP’s narrative, only the CCP can keep China on 
this path of progress.  
 
In one generation or so, China has gone from being one of the poorest countries that 
suffers from famine to the second biggest economy in the world that is buying up companies 
all over the world. What we have now is a generation of youths born after 1980 growing up 
accustomed to high economic growth. For many of them, economic security and stability are 
taken for granted since they had only known economic growth. For them, it is easier to feel 
proud about the government when most of what they see and experience are relatively 
positive. Whereas their parents grew up in the tumultuous Mao era whereby fears of 
starvation and senseless persecutions were etched on their minds. For the older generation, 
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stability and progress are paramount. And the progress they have experienced can be 
described as leaps and bounds. Modern amenities like indoor running water, sanitation, air-
conditioning and white goods ownership only became common after Deng’s reforms. Much 
of CCP’s legitimacy thus stems from its ability to keep the country growing and keeping the 
people proud of what China has achieved in such a short time. Many Chinese people thus 
bought into the argument that if under CCP’s authoritarian system could bring about an 
economy that surpassed many other democratic countries then there is nothing wrong with 
the system. For many Chinese, why is there a need to vote for their leader when the existing 
system produces leaders that brought about wealth for so many? 
 
The CCP might term its system as “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (coined by 
Deng Xiaoping for his economic reforms), the reality is that it is in many aspects a 
capitalistic society with short leash held by an authoritarian government. Many aspects of 
China’s economy essentially function according to capitalistic rules with a competitive 
private sector that is profit driven. Unions are weak and companies demand that workers put 
in long hours. The CCP government has also progressively implemented market reforms that 
integrate China’s economy and financial system with the rest of the world. However, in spite 
of market reforms, the characteristic of an authoritarian system means that the rule of law is 
usually weak, and for China the CCP dictates the outcome in many situations. Market rules 
function until the party decides otherwise. The CCP frequently justifies that its actions are in 
accordance to law while failing to mention that the CCP has the ability to set or change any 
law without any resistance. Many who got wealthy benefiting from the economic reforms 
would seek avenues to transfer out their wealth because protection of their property depends 




The last few decades as outlined thus far in this chapter shown that there had been a 
constant flux in what is accepted ideology for China. After the civil war, the CCP has gone 
from communism central planning to socialism with Chinese characteristics to what is now 
functionally capitalistic, the CCP has had to constantly justify and convince the Chinese 
people of the changes. Deng Xiaoping, during his reforms, termed it as “feeling the stones as 
one crosses the river” as he explained the need to make unprecedented changes. The reforms 
however have a schizophrenic effect on the Chinese society as various aspects of economic 
reforms conflicted with the underlying ideology of the political party. The situation is 
exacerbated by the disruption of societal and cultural norms through Mao’s eradication of 
four olds (old customs, old culture, old habits, old ideas) during the “Cultural Revolution”. 
The CCP ripped the Chinese out of their cultural roots and as socialist ideology could barely 
legitimise the harshly enforced policies that affect many aspects of life, the CCP had to rely 
on doublethink and doublespeak to justify the constant changes. The conflict and irony could 
be perfectly illustrated by the clamped down of a student club, Marxist Society, in Peking 
University in 2018. The members of the student club were advocating for the labour rights of 
oppressed migrant workers and were organising unions in different regions. These actions 
stepped on the toes of the government and the student club was shut down and required to re-
register, resulting in an overhaul of the student club having only members who would toe the 
line. So the CCP that was founded on communism ideology is now against collective actions 
through unionisation.  
 
The shift in priorities from collective rights to economic growth at any costs resulted 
in perversions of ideology. From promising to be an egalitarian society to becoming one with 
a high level of income inequality, the CCP could no longer justify its legitimacy solely via 
the communist ideology. The persuasive power from communist ideology is especially low 
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when many party leaders are well off and even the top echelons have been exposed to be 
associated with obscene levels of wealth (The Economist, 2012), while heart-breaking 
poverty can still be seen in some rural regions and many migrant workers in the cities 
struggle to survive. While party messages might stress on achieving a “moderately 
prosperous society” (小康社会) for all by 2021, the reality is that many are merely living 
hand to mouth, struggling to keep up with the rising costs of living.  
 
The party now has to depend heavily on nationalism ideology and conflating party 
with state so as to sustain its legitimacy. The importance of political history for Chinese 
society hence cannot be overstated as the CCP seek to sustain its longevity with a uniform 
knowledge and view of how China has arrived to its present. The next section will cover 
propaganda and socialisation of nationalism through its citizenship education.   
 
 
3.2 Citizenship Education 
 
Citizenship education is critical in the socialisation of a people and legitimation of a 
government. The people have to have common values and expectations of their government 
in order to have a stable and legitimate government. Other than the media acting as a tool of 
socialisation, the other tool would be education, specifically citizenship education. In 
different parts of the world there would be different names for such education. Some call it 
national education, others call it civics education or society education. Whatever the name 
maybe, the general aims are usually to socialise students towards a common view of what a 
society’s values should be, what roles the government play in the society and what are the 
duties of a citizen.  
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From Mao’s destroying of the “four olds” “Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, 
and Old Ideas” to Xi Jinping’s thoughts proclaiming that “the CCP leads everything — the 
Party, the government, the military, society, education, east, west, north and south.”, the CCP 
has always dictate how the Chinese society has to submit to the CCP.   
 
From a young age, school-going children are socialised into wearing the red scarf that 
is both a symbol of the party and patriotism. The red scarf is bestowed on good students and 
held as exemplars together with heroic role models. Propaganda campaigns constantly utilises 
heroic role models such as self-sacrificing PLA soldier “comrade Lei Feng”. When national 
heroes are always CCP members it is easy to conflate the nation with the party. In university, 
students have to study mandatory politics-related courses such as Maoism, Marxism and 
China Modern History. There is also “military education” at middle-school, high-school and 
university levels to cultivate collectivism and patriotism in students. These military education 
camps can vary from a week to a few weeks and would include basic drill formations, 
physical activities and theory classes. Trainees are also required to wear military uniforms 
and put through regimental daily activities. While these training camps are nothing like what 
proper military training entails, they do contribute towards fostering a common experience 
for Chinese students and reinforce the party messages (such as duty and obedience towards 
the party) that they are exposed to throughout their education.  
 
A significant proportion of the citizenship education in China focuses on the “century 
of humiliation” for which ended when the CCP came into power. The main narrative for pre-
CCP period is that China was weak and bullied by foreign forces (specifically Japan and 
Western powers). Disastrous CCP campaigns like the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution were casually mentioned, and their devastating effects were skipped over or 
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played down significantly (Buckley 2014). Rather, Mao’s era is framed and taught as a period 
of unification and pioneering phase for which industrialisation set the stage for its economic 
marvel that China is enjoying today. Deng Xiaoping’s era of opening up to the world is 
framed as learning from the West so as to strengthen China.  
 
Since taking office in 2012, Xi Jinping had frequently utilised on the phrase “Chinese 
dream” in his speeches to rouse and rally the people in supporting the CCP. According to 
party journals, the Chinese dream is not just about personal prosperity but also include 
socialism, collective effort and national glory. While in recent years Xi may have utilised the 
abstract "Chinese dream" that the CCP can help China achieve, a large part of the CCP's 
narrative for staying in power still relies on the "struggles" in society and fights against 
external foes. Xi's message to senior party leaders in 2017 still echoed this strategy: “Our 
party was born under a sense of peril, grew up under a sense of peril and matured under a 
sense of peril”.   
 
Teachers in China have an unenviable task of re-conciliating the conflicting aims of 
the CCP. On one hand teachers have to teach and impart values of creativity and independent 
thinking to their students. On the other hand, they have to explain why then would there be 
such heavy-handed censorship by the government if people are expected to think for 
themselves and exercise critical thinking. The way out or frequently used excuse by many is 
to fall back on “othering”. Censorship is not for the educated people. It is to protect the 
uneducated or lesser educated masses. Many simply fall back on the “China is not ready yet” 
excuse when they need to explain the lack of political freedoms and rights in China. Even 
universal suffrage is explained away in such a manner, arguing that the less cultured masses 




At every opportunity possible, foreign affairs issues are framed as other countries 
trying to trip China and prevent China from rising to its ordained position in the world as a 
major power. Few countries are framed as firm allies of China. Perhaps other than Pakistan as 
China needed Pakistan to counterbalance India. Other authoritarian countries like Russia and 
North Korea are merely convenient allies that China has mutual dependence for strategic 
purposes. Other countries are usually used as comparison for the superior system that the 
CCP has bestowed upon China. India would be held as an example when talking about 
development and progress whereby both countries have very large populations and used to be 
similarly poor but now China is several times the size of India in terms of GDP. North Korea 
would be the bogeyman when talking about the lack of freedoms since China has much more 
freedom as compared to North Korea. Western systems that focuses on individual liberties 
and social safety nets would be framed as weakening the countries. Generous labour policies 
make the people lazy while protests and strikes destabilizes the Western countries.   
 
While China has typically frowned upon mass protests, it does not mean that there is a 
total ban on protests in China, nor does it mean that there are no unsanctioned social unrests. 
The CCP still uses mass protests to sway public opinion and galvanise support for issues that 
suit their causes. For example, there were organised protests that allowed the people to vent 
their anger at South Korea in 2017 because South Korea allowed the USA to install a missile 
defence in South Korea. Multiple protests against Japan had also happened whenever there 
were flashpoints regarding the Diaoyu Islands. These nationalistic protests have also provided 
inspiration for protests of other causes. Localised environmental and labour dispute protests 
have over time grown to be more tactical in framing their protests as being both showing and 
seeking support of the party, and law abiding (Gobel & Ong 2012). Afterall, it would be 




Patriotism can be involuntary, coming from a primordial source inside citizens. 
Human beings are collective animals and essentially patriotism emanates from a sense of 
belonging, a sense of association on a very large scale. Each individual would have different 
levels of feelings and manifestation for patriotism, however as a nation there would be certain 
actions that are more commonly accepted. The CCP drums up feelings of patriotism and 
promotes actions that contributes to its longevity, utilising anything in the past, present and 
future that aids in their indispensability narrative. Most of the world have already put WWII 
behind as history while the CCP still relies on anti-Japanese and anti-foreigners to drum up 
domestic support.  
 
The CCP came into power on the back of revolution and conflict. To declare the 
success of revolution means to lose the party’s raison d'être. Hence, the longevity of CCP 
necessitates the existence of a threat. The easiest is to constantly repeat the narrative that the 
western world had exploited and bullied China in the past. The CCP had saved China from 
foreign oppressors but the western world is still out to oppress China, to keep China from 
progressing. Only the CCP can keep China unified and strong. Fear and victimhood 
narratives are powerful unifying tools for which the CCP would be harnessing for as long as 
possible.  
 
For citizens living in a country that is founded by the ruling party and has never been 
governed by any other party, it is difficult for them to imagine a country with the CCP in 
power. There is also no incentive for the CCP to differentiate the party from the state from 
the country. Equating the party to the state confines the people from thinking the possibility 
of having any other political party. In fact, the current ranking system symbolically places the 
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state lower than the party. The State Council is the state government and it is headed by the 
premier who is ranked lower than the party secretary general in China’s power hierarchy.   
 
From insular communism to the eventual opening up to the world, the influence and 
control from Danwei’s influence no longer as strong as more private enterprises and foreign 
companies were set up. China has become a (mostly) consumer capitalism society whereby 
many aspects of life are no longer strictly controlled by state. For many people, there is no 
more “danwei” that would control their lives. The Hukou system may still be in place but 
many Chinese people move around despite not having the proper paperwork. Being illegal 
domestic migrant is common and many still thrive without access to government services. 
The private sector offers employment, healthcare, education and other aspects of life that 
used to be the exclusive domain of the government. Local governments too do not enforce 
domestic migration laws strictly since they need migrant workers to drive the local economy. 
The power of education in binding the people together starts to dilute once people are out of 
school and as people are not rooted to their work organisation or location, the CCP has to 
depend on the media to sustain and propagate their messages.  
 
 
3.3 Media  
 
Control of communications allows the CCP to control the narrative. As mentioned 
earlier, the CCP depends on the classic external adversary narrative to build upon a sense of 
nationalism that supports the CCP. Drawing from recent history that had China ceding 
territory to various Western powers and Japan, the CCP reminds everyone that China need to 
be united to prevent other countries from taking any bit of China’s land or bullying China on 
the international stage. And by equating the CCP as the representation of China, the Chinese 
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people thus need to stand behind the CCP. Contemporary news events such as the regular 
freedom of navigation exercises conducted by the US navy, territory disputes in the South 
China Sea and Indian borders, NATO bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade are all 
fodder for the CCP to stir up nationalism fervour.  
 
Many people outside of China expected or hoped that as China gets richer, the people 
would bring about political change. A popular thinking follows the typical development 
theory that as the people grows richer and the middle class grows, the people would start to 
demand for more freedoms and political change. After all that is what happened with other 
East Asian societies including Taiwan and South Korea. China’s joining of the WTO in 2001 
was seen as a major milestone for political change brought about by economic change. The 
expected political change however did not come to pass. The political liberation could 
possibly have happened if the CCP did not crush the Tiananmen student movement with a 
heavy hand in 1989. But that glimmer of hope had long been extinguished.  
 
Many were also hopeful that as increasingly large number of Chinese students begin 
to study overseas with the opening up of China. Optimists banked on the hope that overseas 
Chinese students being exposed to more liberal systems (both education and political), those 
students will bring those liberal ideas back home. That may be right initially. The initial wave 
of overseas Chinese students had to interact more with the local students as there were not 
that many Chinese students. They were exposed to local media as there were not much 
content created for overseas Chinese students. However, the later waves of students gradually 
became a lot more insular in their own cliques since there are a much larger number of 
Chinese students. For many universities in the US and UK, students from China contributed 
the most to the international student body. Many Chinese students could thus get by without 
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having to interact with the locals and the transfer of worldviews did not occur as well as 
anticipated. The advent of social media also meant that there are plenty of content created for 
and targeted at overseas Chinese students. These are typically disseminated through Wechat 
and Weibo and those content are not much different from what media in China are like. 
While those in China face barriers in consuming international content, overseas Chinese have 
no problem consuming content from China. Most overseas Chinese students are consuming 
content carried by Chinese internet companies that know that the CCP could punish them for 
dissenting content. Hence, there should not be too much expectation of ideas pollination and 
changes in attitudes.  
 
With the “great firewall” of China constantly reported by various international news 
agencies about how numerous websites (ranging from social media sites such as Facebook to 
search engines such as Google to cloud services such as Dropbox) are banned in China and 
domestic search engines routinely block the results of sensitive search words, one would 
expect that the internet in China to be really dreary. Foreign journalists also constantly 
pointed out the taboo 3 T’s (Tiananmen, Tibet and Taiwan) that they are not to report should 
they want to stay in China (Rowlatt, 2012). However, it would not be accurate to describe the 
communication environment in China as Orwellian. Far from being the totalitarian system as 
portrayed in 1984 that can suppress everyone’s speech, the reality in China is a lot more 
faceted and nuanced than the simple images that many media reports portray. The media 
system in China is both state-dominated and market-dominated. While there is pressure of 
censorship from the government and self-censorship from media practitioners, various media 




China started with commercialization of print media as early as 1979 when the CCP 
ceded total control over the print industry and allowed publications to support themselves 
through advertisements (Shirk, 2010). Following a brief retreat in policy in 1989 due to the 
Tiananmen student demonstrations, the commercialisation of the media industry resumed in 
the 1990’s and further accelerated in 2000’s as China sought to prepare its domestic media 
industry against foreign media companies with its entry into WTO. Today, various forms of 
media from newspapers, magazines, television stations, radio stations and websites compete 
aggressively for audiences and advertising income. Commercialized media products thus 
have a different look and style as compared to “official” products (such as People’s Daily and 
CCTV) that are funded by the state. In contrast to the official sounding language and solemn 
content in official media; commercialized publications tend to focus on infotainment and 
would use lively and colloquial language.  
 
The commercialization of the media was a source of “deep ambivalence” (Qian & 
Bandurski, 2010) within the party itself as while the CCP still want to retain control over the 
media, it also wanted the media companies to grow the media market and generate profits. 
China, after all, is determined to achieve economic growth at all costs. The solution was thus 
a half-hearted liberalization that allowed media companies to make most commercial 
decisions while the CCP dedicated much resource into making sure the content from these 
media outlets would not erode their authority and subvert their rule.  
 
“Media commercialization” in the China’s context is not the same as how most would 
understand the term. While most would equate commercialization with privatization, it is not 
the same with the media industry in China. The government still has stringent control over 
media outlets via a complex system of approvals, registrations and supervisions. What 
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“commercialization” meant is merely that the media outlets are expected to be market viable 
or self-sufficient through revenue streams such as subscription, publication sales and 
advertisements. All media outlets in China are required to have to a “managing institution” 
before they can register with the “General Administration of Press and Publications”. 
According to the regulations, organizations that can be a “managing institution” are all Party 
or government related organizations. The “managing institutions” of media outlets are thus 
usually the party committees of the local areas that the media outlets are based in. Hence, 
control of media outlets remains in the hands of the CCP.  
 
While the control appears to be tight, it does not mean that media practitioners do not 
find ways to navigate around the obstacles. The system of “managing institution” meant that 
while responsibility lies with the local organizations serving as managing institutions, direct 
control is also divested to the local levels. Hence this led to a phenomenon known as “cross 
regional” or “cross level” reporting. To illustrate, a city level newspaper would not report on 
the corruption of government officials within its own city since it is directly controlled by the 
city Party committee. However, the provincial level newspaper or newspapers from another 
province might report on the matter since the provincial Party committee “outrank” the city 
and they do not report to the same “managing institution”. Driven either by commercial 
interests to increase readership or out of journalistic values, certain publications (such as 
Southern Weekend, Oriental Morning Post) are known to be publications that are more 
adventurous or liberal in reporting. These actions or attitudes are known in China as “playing 
edge ball” (Stern & Hassid, 2012), borrowing a term from table-tennis that means keeping to 
just barely within the rules of the game. That said, these actions are not without risks. Media 
outlets had been shut down and editorial teams have suffered repercussions for stepping on 
toes that have enough power. For example, Southern Weekend has had its editor replaced 
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regularly (Shirk, 2010) and Beijing Times had its “managing institute” changed from an 
organization directly connected to the Central Committee of the CCP to the Beijing city 
municipal committee just to cut down on its clout (Bandurski, 2011).   
 
The localised control of media also meant that there are regional differences in 
restrictions depending on the tolerance of the Party committee leader in each area. For 
example, media in Shanghai is seen as being dull due to strict leaders, Guangdong 
publications are known to push boundaries and Hunan is known for their entertaining 
television stations that produce well-received shows that touch on societal issues. Control is 
also perceived to be tougher at the local or provincial level as compared to the national 
Publicity Department as some argue that the Party central sees the media as a control against 
widespread corruption. The inability of the government in Beijing to closely monitor local 
governments (the Chinese proverb “tian gao, huang di yuan”, translated as heaven is high and 
the emperor is far away, is frequently invoked to describe the situation) is a main reason why 
some argue that the central government allows the media more latitude since a less cautious 
media could allow for some contentious issues to surface before they get too serious.  
 
It should be noted that not everything that was non-aligned with the establishment 
was filtered out by the CCP. The CCP do understand that there is merit in allowing some 
outlets for dissenting voices. The value of speaking truth to power is not unique to any 
society and there are many Chinese folklores that exalt such action. The key concerns are 
how widely these voices are heard and who gets to hear these dissenting voices. So long as 
the dissemination is limited and limited to those who are loyal to the party, these dissenting 
voices could be viewed as canaries in a mine. However, how much tolerance the CCP has for 
these dissenting voices ultimately depends on the paramount leader of the day. For example, 
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there were two Communist journals prior to 2001 that provided the platform for conservative 
CCP members to air their differing views on the “reforms and opening” carried out by the 
party. For years, these two journals published articles that criticised the economic reforms as 
the reforms went against communism ideals. These were tolerated as the readerships for both 
publications were small and mainly catered to academics and party officials. It also helped 
that they had the backing of former senior party officials. What ultimately led to the journals 
demise was that they got personal. Rather than critiquing emerging capitalist-friendly 
policies, they published an open letter signed by some former high-ranking party officials that 
accused Jiang Zemin of violating the basic statutes of the constitution and governed against 
the will of the people. Repercussions came swiftly as the CCP suspended the publications 
indefinitely.  
 
Deng Xiaoping’s tour of southern China after his retirement was another example that 
demonstrated that there is some degree of tolerance for non-aligned content in the media. By 
1992 when he embarked on his tour, Deng had already given up any official position in the 
CCP. However, in a bid to push on his economic reforms in the southern of part of China, 
Deng embarked on a month-long tour to reinforce his policies. Since Deng was no longer the 
paramount leader, the narrative was no longer centred around him. Only Shanghai’s 
Liberation Daily carried stories about the tour and Deng’s speeches as it happened. Months 
after however, the tour and the speeches were widely reported. This led to speculation that 
there was political infighting within the CCP and Jiang Zemin eventually had to side with 
Deng’s economic reformation to lean on Deng’s clout and solidify his rule (Zhao, 1993).  
 
In view of all the restrictions, the CCP does show that it understands that political 
communication control has its limitations in this information age and demonstrates attempts 
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to justify its actions. In the period before China opened up its economy, the concept of media 
was simply that it is a function of the CCP to publicise its policies. Communication works 
one way, from top to bottom and hence it was acceptable to term the media as the “throat and 
tongue” of the party (Shirk, 2010). The media’s function in that period would not be unlike 
the newsletters of private organisations nowadays and media practitioners were simply 
government employees. Against this backdrop, many senior CCP leaders still frame the role 
of the media as being the “guidance of public opinion” for the CCP in recent years. However, 
with the economic reforms and commercialisation, information flows more easily into the 
country and the role of media began to evolve.  Increasingly more media practitioners in 
commercialize media began to push boundaries and produce content that expose social 
issues, question policies and advocate for changes. Again, these pushing of boundaries 
ultimately depend on the tolerance of the paramount leader of the day.  
 
As official Party funded publications lose majority of the audience to commercialized 
media, the CCP adapts to the evolving media ecology with a certain level of image 
management, tolerance and justification. Taking for example the “Publicity Department” of 
the CCP that manages the communication policies of China. Although many Western media 
and scholars still refer to it as the Propaganda Department, the organization has changed its 
English name from “Propaganda” to “Publicity” for more than a decade.  (The Chinese name 
remains the same as the Chinese term “xuan chuan” has no negative connotation and can be 
translated as “publicity, “promotion” or “propaganda”) This naming practice may seem trivial 
but it reflects that Chinese leaders are aware that overt actions in public opinion shaping can 
be counterproductive. Certain issues, such as air pollution and food contamination, that 
although may reflect negatively on the government are tolerated since it would be impossible 
to cover up and exposing specific perpetrators for these issues allow these issues to be 
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addressed before further widespread of popular discontentment. Anger and discontent can 
then be directed at specific individuals while the CCP appears to be responsive. The severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic has also been highlighted by some to be a 
turning point for how the government has come to view the media. The playing down of the 
seriousness at the beginning of the epidemic made the official publications lose credibility 
and created a serious conundrum for the leaders when they needed the media to communicate 
important information to the people. At the same time, the SARS cover-up also taught the 
people to search for new and more sources of information beyond the mainstream media. 
Censorship actions are usually justified by the CCP as necessary for the preservation of social 
stability and harmony. However, if the use of communication control exacerbated a crisis, 
future use of controls would likely not be tolerated by the people. Hence, localised issues 
“mass incidents” (euphemism for mass protests) such as those involving labour or 
environment are given greater latitude in reporting than issues regarding civil rights or 
democracy.  
 
The advent in internet brings about a whole new set of challenges for the Chinese 
government. China now has the largest number of internet users in world with 618 million 
internet users (CINIC, 2014). Putting this figure into context, China now has a population of 
about 1.35 billion people and thus the internet penetration rate at the national level is barely 
50%. Given the global trend and China’s steady progression in literacy and economic 
performance, the number of users will definitely raise considerably more. Part of the 
internet's power comes from its decentralised structure and economic diversity. That is to say, 
no one part of the infrastructure or business could dominate and dictate how information 
could be disseminated or blocked. However, that is different for China. The CCP is 
determined that all forms of communication, including the internet, is under their control. 
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While the CCP could not dictate the terms on a world-wide basis, they have decided that 
access to the internet within China is part of China’s “cyber sovereignty”. Any company that 
wants to access China’s more than a billion consumers have to abide by the CCP’s rules or be 
denied access. Hence, the result is a form of internet that is insular, highly monitored and 
controlled. End to end communications, even private messages between individual users can 
be subjected censorship as telecommunications companies in China submit to CCP’s 
demands.  
 
As highlight by Shirk (2010), “censorship of newspapers, magazines, and television is 
largely invisible, but censorship over the Internet is obvious” (p.33). To be aware of the 
controls in the pre-internet era would require a high level of media literacy since the controls 
were exerted directly on media practitioners while the audience would merely be exposed to 
the end product. In the case of the internet, many internet users are content producers as well 
whose content could be censored. Moreover, mainstream media are mainly “push” media 
with consumers being served whatever is pushed out to the public while the internet is a 
“pull” media that consumers knowingly request for content. Hence knowing that something 
exists (such as Google and Facebook) but not being able to access it would heighten the 
awareness of censorship.  
 
Awareness of censorship is not a concern for the CCP as the constant bombardment of 
rhetoric on stability management and ensuring that there are ample sources and supplies of 
entertainment online mitigate the impact of censorship. Many international sites that are 
banned in China have a corresponding China copy. The international community have FANG 
(Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google) while China’s intranet has BAT (Baidu, Alibaba 
and Tencent). Tencent’s Weixin (known as Wechat for the rest of the world) takes the place 
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of Facebook, Weibo stands in for Twitter, Alibaba’s Taobao is bigger than Amazon while 
iQiyi is just one of many video streaming services that can rival Netflix. The Chinese 
government’s ban on foreign internet companies have allowed domestic companies to thrive. 
Beyond thriving domestically, many of the Chinese internet companies are no longer just 
copying American products but are pushed by the intense competition in the Chinese market 
to innovate faster. Platforms like Wechat, Taobao and TikTok now serve a large number of 
international users and could rival against Silicon Valley technology companies. 
 
In the situation of banned websites, some internet users in China have taken the route 
of circumvention. While Facebook may be banned in China, those who are determined can 
still “scale” over the firewall (through the use of VPN) and create accounts to network with 
other users. Ironically, there are even very official looking (but unverified) Facebook pages 
for the Chinese leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang that regularly share photos of them in 
official settings. Being able to “scale the wall” does not mean that everyone in China is doing 
so. Robert et. al. (2011) from the Berkman Center of Internet and Society found that about 
merely 2 to 3% of internet users from heavily censored countries use circumvention tools. 
Based on the 3%, Mou et. al. (2016) optimistically estimated about 18 million users in China 
would use circumvention tools. It appears that the CCP’s propaganda department may have 
taken Postman’s (2006) “Amusing Ourselves to Death” as a how-to guide in controlling the 
people’s use of online media. Provide enough amusement (in the form of sanitised China 
internet substitutes) and few would be perusing objectionable political content. Entertainment 
aside, a huge factor would also be that since most Chinese do not have that many foreign 
friends, there is insufficient motivation to go through all the trouble in using circumvention 




The affordances of the internet, allowing the Chinese people communicate in ways 
previously not possible, have also changed the attitudes towards communication. As pointed 
out by Qiang (2010):    
“The role of the Internet as a communications tool is especially meaningful in China 
where citizens previously had little to no opportunity for unconstrained public self-
expression or access to free and uncensored information. Furthermore, these newfound 
freedoms have developed in spite of stringent government efforts to control the medium.” 
(p.206) 
 
A prevalence of “human flesh search engine” (online vigilantism that involved the 
participation of humans in the search for suspected “perpetrators”) incidents could also be a 
reflection of the lack of proper official justice mechanisms or a perception that the justice 
system is too weak. Many such episodes targeted corrupted government officials (or the 
offspring) while some targeted crimes that were seen to be ignored by the Ministry of Public 
Security. As highlighted by Yang (2009, p.104), “the absence of other avenues of public 
expression makes the internet especially amenable to contention”.  
 
The addition of internet does not just mean an additional channel for communication in 
China. It also creates pressure for mainstream media since their credibility would suffer if 
they refrain from covering anything significant. Taking the example of a fire at CCTV’s 
building in 2009. The television station did not report on the fire that broke out in its building 
but reported on forest fires in Australia. Images of the CCTV fire however spread like 
wildfire on the internet, leading to people questioning the credibility of CCTV (Miao, 2009). 
“Human flesh search engine” episodes that started on the internet had also led to stories being 
covered by the mainstream media. The addition of internet to the environment has altered the 
80 
 
behaviour of other forms of media. Stories, information and communication are not confined 
to the silos of different media but are amalgamized within the Chinese society.  
 
However, as the internet becomes entrenched in Chinese society, the CCP has also 
grown to become more sophisticated in controlling objectionable content. This led to a cat 
and mouse game between the users and censors. Chinese people would attempt to bypass 
censors by using homophones or convoluted phrases. For example, 64 (June 4th) is typically 
used to point to the Tiananmen incident, but as censors caught on, Chinese netizens began to 
use “7-1” “3+1” to refer to the incident. As technology progresses, censorship is no longer a 
tedious task involving humans to comb through content. Currently, in order to satisfy the 
demands of CCP, Chinese technology companies have invested heavily into machine-
learning technology to allow automation of censorship. In WeChat, even private chats 
between peers will be monitored and garner suspension of account or ghosting of messages 
(you think you posted something, but in the end only you can see it) if sensitive content is 
involved. Now even more than ever, Chinese people do not want to mess with the possibility 
of account suspension as mobile apps are needed for everyday life. China has progressed to 
become a mostly cashless society that depends on apps to pay for everything. Even beggars 
on the street rely on mobile payment.  
 
In sum, there are progressive changes in China’s communication environment over the 
last few decades. However, any change in attitude will likely be slow as top Chinese leaders 
still view the media as the Party’s device and are wary of pluralism in voices. In 2000, Jiang 
Zemin was hounded by some Hong Kong journalists at a media event about Tung Chee 
Hwa’s second term as Chief Executive of Hong Kong. Annoyed that the media were framing 
it as “appointment” rather than “support” and pushed hard to reveal his position, he lectured 
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the journalists for being naïve and gave them a cryptic answer “闷声发大财” (loosely 
translated as “be silent and get rich”).  
 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s fate from his advocacy of glasnost also casted a long shadow for 
China’s leaders and as highlighted in Hu Jintao’s speech (cited in Zhao, 2012, p.152), “a very 
important reason from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the 
Communist party there is Gorbachev’s advocacy of ‘ideological pluralism’ and the so-called 
‘glasnost’”. This suggests strongly that liberalisation from within the party ranks would be 
highly unlikely in the near future. The fear of a Soviet Union-style collapse happening to the 
CCP always weigh against any political reform. Before Xi Jinping’s accession as CCP 
Chairman, some political watchers were still hopeful that Xi could be the progressive leader 
that they were waiting for. However, upon taking over from Hu Jintao, Xi proceeded to 




















Singapore is an anomaly in media studies (George, 2012). As a developed and open 
economy with generally free access to the internet, the city state has frequently been rated 
poorly for civil liberties and press freedom by various NGOs. However, trust in media is still 
very high even though information of poor rankings in press freedom is widely known to the 
people in Singapore. It is even common for internet forum users in Singapore to refer to the 
national broadsheet as the “154th” (or whatever the rank was in the Reporters Without 
Borders index for the particular year) paper. The next section will elaborate on the socio-
political situation in Singapore to provide a foundation for analysis.  
 
 
4.1Political History Context 
 
Formerly a British colony, Singapore’s short modern history dates back to just after the 
second world war. The British government reclaimed Singapore from Japanese rule after the 
second world war in 1945 and while the locals welcomed the return of British rule, they also 
kept in mind the level of commitment the British had towards protecting Singapore from 
foreign invaders. The British had surrendered Singapore to the Japanese as they deemed the 
war in Europe to be more important.  
 
Following the return of British colonial rule, local leaders then petitioned for self-rule 
and independence from the British government. Self-government was granted in 1955 and 
eventually Singapore broke away from British rule and joined the Malaya Federation in 1963. 
The merging with other Malaysian states was not without hiccups. Singapore being the only 
ethnic Chinese majority state was led by People’s Action Party (PAP) leader, Lee Kuan Yew, 
who was agitating for a race-blind “Malaysian Malaysia” instead of a system favouring just 
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the Malay ethnic group. Racial clashes started happening in Singapore and the federation 
government was afraid that it would spread to the rest of Malaysia. Coupled with the fear that 
Singapore may increasingly be the power centre for Malaya Federation instead of Kuala 
Lumpur, Singapore was expelled from the federation in 1965. Hence, Singapore did not fight 
for its independence, but independence foisted upon it. How Singapore became independent 
then became a source of legitimacy for the PAP government. The PAP government would 
constantly highlight the vulnerabilities of Singapore but the PAP would work together with 
the people to ensure that Singapore survive. PAP essentially depended on a survivalism 
narrative for its legitimacy.  
 
Since the first post-independence elections in 1968, the PAP has never had less than 
90% of the seats in parliament, allowing the party to make any changes to legislation and 
even the constitution without any difficulty. Through legislation, the PAP was able to 
consolidate its influence on various groups typically seen as opinion leaders in society. In 
1959, after riding into power on the back of labour activism, the PAP amended legislation 
allowing the government to refuse registration of new unions. The PAP then consolidated the 
unions under one umbrella through the formation of National Trades Union Congress 
(NTUC). Since then, labour leaders are co-opted into PAP as members of parliament and the 
head of NTUC has always been a cabinet minister. Importantly, the government diminishes 
the influence of the unions by changing labour laws to allow unions to only deal with limited 
set of labour issues such as wages, benefits and certain work conditions. Other employment 
issues commonly seen as union related such as retrenchment, dismissals and promotions are 




In the 1970’s, the universities were targeted. Student activism was high in the two 
universities. It was especially so in the Chinese medium university as the language policies of 
the government appeared to be putting those students at a disadvantage. In 1976, the PAP 
amended the legislation to limit the structure and funding of student clubs and allowed only 
one student body to engage in political activities. In 1980, the two universities were merged, 
ensuring that student activism could be managed from a single point and students no longer 
had a strong social identity in the form of common language or ethnicity to bind them 
together. The Chinese medium university that had leftist inclinations was thus closed down 
under the guise of a merger. Key social science research institutes were also co-opted into the 
system as former high-ranking civil servants were appointed as heads of these institutes. 
Vocal Singaporean academics were also managed out of Singapore as local institutions were 
unwilling to offer them tenure.  
 
Next to be disciplined was the legal community. In the late 1980’s, after a fiasco 
involving the president of the law society criticising government policies, the PAP legislated 
that the government has the authority to appoint members into the council of law society and 
the law society could only comment on legal matters that the government submitted to it. 
Thus, effectively shutting out any opinions that may run contrary to government position.  
 
Religious groups were also seen to be potential sites for political dissent and were 
eventually fence-lined. Church workers were arrested along with 12 other individuals under 
the Internal Security Act (ISA) for their activism activities in the 1987. They were arrested 
for allegedly involvement in a “Marxist conspiracy to subvert the existing social and political 
system in Singapore”. Following these arrests, the government enacted the Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony Act in 1990. The Act allows the government to place gag orders on 
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religious leaders deemed to be “carrying out activities to promote a political cause, or a cause 
of any political party while, or under the guise of, propagating or practising any religious 
belief” (Chapter 167 A subsection 8 (1)(b)). Since then, religious leaders and groups know 
better than to stray into matters that could be deemed political.  
 
                In the span of a few decades, labour, legal, religious, civil society and student 
communities were all politically neutered. Other than laws targeting specific groups, there are 
also legislations prohibiting organised political activities except by groups registered as 
political organisations. This effectively transforms political discourses into acts that are to be 
sanctioned by the state. Coupled with the less than clear definition of what constitutes a 
political activity, more people would stay away for fear of wandering into prohibited space 
unwittingly. Despite it all, Singaporeans still elected the PAP to power as the PAP 
government delivered on most basic needs such as housing, employment and education. 
Home ownership rate has grown from 60% in 1980 to above 80% in 1990 and has been 
hovering around 90% since. Unemployment rate hovers at around 2% unless there is a global 
economic downturn. The largely affordable education system has been rated as amongst the 
top countries in various metrics. The main issues debated and highlighted during elections 
season are usually about the economy and material needs of the people. Many would agree 
that the social compact in Singapore is that as long as the PAP delivers on material needs, the 
people would stay out of politics. More than just delivering on economic growth, the PAP 
builds an impeccable image of having an incorruptible and capable team in running the 
country. Most of the cabinet ministers graduate from Oxbridge or Ivy league varsities and 
served many years in various ministries or the military before being elected into political 
office. The PAP wants to portray a leadership made up of capable technocrats and not self-
serving politicians. Corruption at any level in the civil service are swiftly and publicly dealt 
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with. Singaporeans rarely come across situations that require greasing of palms. Singapore 
always ranked amongst the top few countries in the “Corruption Perceptions Index”. The 
PAP’s performance legitimacy has thus led to a very muted political environment in 
Singapore. The PAP always winning a super majority of parliament seats indicate that the 
masses have accepted the framework as built by the PAP.   
 
However, from time to time, there would be episodes signalling the PAP’s lost of touch 
in public sentiments. The saga involving a prominent Singaporean novelist, Catherine Lim, 
does offer an example of the occasional deviation in narrative within a limited public sphere. 
In 1994, Singapore’s only broadsheet The Straits Times published a political commentary by 
Lim, “The PAP and the people—A Great Affective Divide”, arguing how the PAP had lost 
touch with the people. Following a subsequent commentary by Lim on how Goh Chok Tong, 
Singapore’s second PM after Lee Kuan Yew, was governing in the shadow of Lee, Goh’s 
press secretary replied sharply in the papers (Chan, 1994), challenging Lim to follow the 
footsteps of Jeffery Archer and join politics if she wanted to espouse her political views.  Goh 
subsequently sent Lim a letter stating why he replied publicly as he had to "set out the out-of-
bounds markers clearly, so that everyone knows the limits of openness and consultation" and 
it does not include “demolishing the respect for and standing of the Prime Minister and his 
government by systematic contempt and denigration in the media” (The Straits Times, 1994). 
The irony of the state attempting to silence critics playing out on the country’s only English 
broadsheet was not lost on Straits Times, prompting an editor to write a follow-up article 
questioning “what constituted political comment and who should be allowed to give it” 
(Fernandez, 1994), albeit in a very docile manner that gave the government more room to 




The Catherine Lim incident may had been very much talked about, but it is not the only 
case of public dissent/criticism. Most people take a conservative approach for fear of being 
seen as anti-establishment and might be blacklisted in their career. A vocal academic, 
Cherian George, had to leave Singapore to pursue his academic career elsewhere as no 
university in Singapore was willing to offer him tenure despite being well regarded by peers 
in his field. There were instances whereby senior career civil servants waited till they are 
almost retired or already retired before dishing out their critiques of government policies. 
After all, not much damage can be done to them since they are already at the end of their 
career.  
 
Finally, there is the use of libel lawsuits as a means to regulate participation in the 
public sphere. Since 1987, multiple lawsuits had been initiated by the PAP leaders against 
media organisations, politicians and political activists. Given that the quantum of damages 
awarded could go upwards of hundreds of thousand dollars, politicians had been bankrupted 
because of these lawsuits. These lawsuits, even if only brought upon a few people, were 
enough to send a warning to the rest of the population that freedom of speech can be very 
expensive, potentially leading to self-censorship when it is not clear what sort of criticism 
could lead to lawsuits. Aside from civil libel suits, the state has also dished out punishments 
for errant speech through criminal defamation, contempt of court and “wounding of religious 
or racial feelings”. As these cases typically involved some form of criticisms of the 
government and most people are not cognizant of the details of each case and the 
accompanying laws transgressed, collectively these factors contributed to a sense of fear that 




It should be noted that in the cases of “wounding of religious and racial feelings”, many 
a times it involves insensitive speech rather than hate speech. The most recent case involving 
Amos Yee in 2015 was due to Yee criticising Christians of being delusional, having no logic 
or being grounded in reality. In the Yee episode, Yee made numerous verbiage diarrhoea, but 
many simply thought that he got into trouble because he criticised Lee Kwan Yew. In any 
other democratic country, speech of similar content probably would be dismissed as a teenage 
rant but Yee was punished with a jail sentence. Religion and race are two issues that the PAP 
government constantly highlight as being sensitive and quite a number of policies are crafted 
with these issues in mind. Public housing policies ensure that each block of residential flat 
has the same proportion of each race according to the national proportion. Compulsory 
military duty tacitly blocks out Malays from serving in sensitive units as the rationale is that 
they could have family in neighbouring countries, and thus are a security risk. Every ethnic 
group have their own government sanctioned “self-help” group to help their under-privileged. 
Some have voiced that the emphasis of race and religion entrenches the differences while the 
PAP defend it as being pragmatic.   
 
Over the years, there are increasingly more people voicing that there should be more 
space and opportunities for different voices to be heard. The 1980’s global economic 
downturn prompted many authoritarian regimes to democratize and Singapore had a minor 
effect from the global push. Singapore elected its first opposition MP to parliament in 1981 
and more people were pushing for an alternative voice in parliament. The PAP does heed 
those calls and implemented some token measures that allow for alternative voices to be 
aired. After years of not having any opposition MPs in parliament, the PAP implemented the 
non-constituency MP (NCMP) scheme in 1984 that allowed the best performing loser(s) from 
the opposition to take up a NCMP seat in parliament. These positions initially had some 
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restrictions on voting rights in parliament but were later removed. The number of seats for 
NCMP was also gradually increased to ensure that there are at least 12 oppositions in 
parliament (either by winning or by being the best performing losers). In 1990, the PAP also 
implemented the nominated member of parliament (NMP) scheme that allows a committee to 
appoint up to 9 individuals who are independent and non-partisan to the parliament. These 
NMP are not allowed to vote on certain bills but are allowed to participate in all 
parliamentary debates. Beside parliamentary changes, the PAP also designated a small park 
as “Speakers’ Corner” that allows for protests, speeches and performances with minimal 
restrictions (McIlvenny, 1996). Speakers and organisers would still have to register their 
events and foreigners are restricted from active participation.  
 
4.2 Citizenship Education  
 
The PAP government has always framed politics as being antagonistic and a 
hindrance to governance. Hence, citizenship education has no place for political awareness. 
Political debates and processes are to be left to the politicians. Singapore’s education system 
has been under the PAP’s influence since independence and the PAP has kept political 
education out of the picture. Alviar-Martin and Baildon (2016) in comparison of Hong Kong 
and Singapore’s citizenship education commented that Singapore’s form of citizenship 
education is depoliticised, emphasizing on moral and utilitarian goals.  
  
While education curriculum might be depoliticised, it does not mean that there is no 
political influence. Many Singaporeans go through kindergartens run by the PAP. These 
kindergartens were first set up in the 1960’s to provide low cost kindergarten education and 
now have expanded to include all preschool levels from 6-month-old infant care to 6-year-old 
kindergarten. While these PAP-run preschools do not have any political content in the 
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curriculum, children attending these kindergartens are exposed to party logos that adorned 
these kindergartens. The effect is especially pronounced during election season as party flags 
would be lining up whatever available space around these preschools. Some of these 
kindergartens also served as sites for which PAP MPs conduct their “meet the people” 
sessions. Thus, there is an association of childhood with the PAP for many who had attended 
the PAP kindergartens.  
 
For primary and secondary school education, citizenship education is packaged under 
character and citizenship education (previously known as civics and moral education) that 
stresses on being a concerned citizen and contributing member in a civic society. As 
mentioned by Tan (2009), civic society is the term used the state and “conceived as a 
depoliticised civil society”. The idea of a civil society is not adopted and taught in Singapore 
as there are connotations of antagonism and challenges the dominance of the state as the 
concept is understood in liberal democratic societies. In Singapore, in a civic society devoid 
of politics, students are encouraged to be engaged in the community and volunteer their time 
for the lesser privileged. Every student has to chalk up a certain number of hours under the 
“community involvement programme”. The citizenship curriculum thus is packed with 
content that encourage values such as harmony, responsibility and respect.  
  
Other components are the development of a national identity and a sense patriotism 
within the students. There are two narratives for which the PAP government constantly 
utilises. One is the sense of vulnerability. It is constantly stressed that Singapore is a non-
Muslim country situated in a Muslim dominated region and thus, without sufficient defence, 
could be easily subjugated by neighbouring countries. Singapore does not have natural 
resources so Singapore could be starved to collapse if supplies to water, energy, food and 
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necessities were to be cut. Internally, Singapore has natural fracture lines due to the 
population’s multi-racial and multi-religious composition. All these challenges then feed into 
the other narrative of excelling despite the challenges that the country faces. Every award, 
accolade, world beating metric would be trumpeted and attributed to the efficient and 
pragmatic PAP government who could rally unified Singaporeans to achieve such results.  
 
Racial and religious differences are frequently brought up to stress on the 
vulnerability of Singapore. Some argue that harping on the differences is a divisive political 
tactic leveraging on identity politics. While others argue that being race-blind is naïve and it 
would be better to acknowledge the differences and then foster tolerance between groups 
rather than hope for integration.  “Racial harmony days” thus are a mainstay for Singapore 
education and schools would have activities for different racial/religious groups share about 
their culture. Major public events would also have leaders from various religious groups 
attending to bless and pray for good weather and smooth developments.  
 
To foster a common experience, every primary school student would have to attend 
and watch the National Day parade once during their primary school education. The parade is 
the annual large-scale performance that the government organises to foster a sense of national 
pride and identity. Typically, the parade would feature contingent marches and mass 
performances not unlike how the opening ceremony of international sports events are like, 
except with a stronger nationalism theme.  
 
Civic engagement and participation in the political process are not part of the 
curriculum since the curriculum is “depoliticised”. Political protests in Singapore were 
framed as “riots” in the history books rather than protests that escalated into violence. Other 
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than the racial clashes in the 1960’s between the Chinese and the Malays, the last large-scale 
demonstration of note was the 1956 Chinese middle school demonstrations. Since then only 
some very small scale protests were held by activists who are concerned with democratic 
issues.  
 
Even for university education, what constitutes as citizenship education typically 
consists of doing community work with the underprivileged or going overseas to build 
schools for the poor. Other than political science students, few other students are exposed to 
concepts about different forms of government, political participation, political processes and 
institutions etc. It is not uncommon to find Singaporeans who have gone through the entire 
education system and not be aware of how the parliamentary system works in Singapore. In 
sum, the idea of citizenship as taught in Singapore does not call political awareness and 







From the above description thus far, we can see the shrinking of the public sphere due 
to the dwindling of spaces for discourse and the withdrawal of opinion leaders. These factors 
potentially reinforce the effects of one another, likely to lead to a “spiral of silence” (Noelle-
Neumann, 1974) in Singapore as people find it harder to know what others are thinking and 
are reluctant to voice out opinions that are not widely reported by the mainstream media. The 
current state of Singapore’s public sphere is predominantly shaped by the actions and policies 
of the ruling party, People’s Action Party (PAP), and thus this section on the media landscape 




In the 1950’s, when the PAP was still an opposition party in parliament, the leader of 
the party, Lee Kuan Yew, knew first hand that a restricted public sphere would pose 
difficulties for those challenging the incumbents and how it could be detrimental to the 
public. Displeased with the colonial laws that restricted the press, Lee argued in parliament: 
“Then an intimidated Press - and some sections of the Press here do not need 
intimidation because they have very friendly owners - the Press and the Government-
controlled radio together can regularly sing your praises and slowly and steadily the 
people are made to forget the evil things that have already been done. Or if these things 
are referred to again, they are conveniently distorted, and distorted with impunity, 
because there will be no opposition to contradict it. [...] When everything becomes 
peaceful and tranquil, complacency sets in, and degeneration begins.” (Singapore 
Parliament Report 4 October 1956 Vol. 2 Col. 323) 
 
After coming into power, the PAP kept the colonial legacy press laws, ensuring that it 
was able to keep the press in check. Newspapers deemed to be influenced by communists 
were shut down and those with overseas financial backing had their licenses revoked. The 
PAP also utilised another colonial legacy, the ISA, to arrest senior journalists in 1971. 15 
years after championing for the cause of press freedom in parliament, Lee Kuan Yew 
changed his stance once he was the one in control and enjoying the benefits of being able to 
control the press, declaring that “Freedom of the press, freedom of the news media, must be 
subordinated to the overriding needs of the integrity of Singapore, and to the primacy of 
purpose of an elected government.” (Lee, 1971) Lee was not coy about his stance as he made 
the speech to an international audience at the International Press Institute. The PAP 
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government did not think that the lack of press freedom would damage the country’s standing 
on the international stage.  
 
In 1974, the PAP expanded upon colonial licensing laws and enacted the Newspaper 
and Printing Press Act (NPPA), setting the stage for what George (2012) terms as “calibrated 
coercion” of the media. The NPPA dictates that only public companies are allowed to print 
newspapers, effectively tying newspaper printing to market pressures. Share owners would 
likely apply pressure on the publisher to place commercial interests above journalistic 
idealism and also that ensuring stability of the country would be paramount. Coupled with 
another important change, which is that newspaper companies are required to have 
management shares that the government can decide who can own, the NPPA ensures that the 
management of the company would always be under the government’s influence even if not 
control. Between 1970 to the early 1980’s, newspapers were either closed down or eventually 
merged with the main broadsheet to form the Singapore Press Holdings (SPH).  In the 
1980’s, the government started appointing former senior government officials into the board 
of SPH and following that, former senior civil servants were also parachuted into senior 
management of SPH. While the various changes had led to some protests within the 
newsroom, the resistance was futile and since then SPH’s senior management have all been 
former civil servants.   
 
The only other local media company in Singapore is Mediacorp, which is 
predominately a broadcaster that operates most of the local radio stations and is the sole 
provider of free to air television. Mediacorp is owned by Temasek Holdings, a government 
investment arm, and so the government has control over leadership positions within the 
company.  Like SPH, former senior civil servants are parachuted into leadership positions in 
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Mediacorp. Foreign media companies are allowed to operate in Singapore but owing to the 
local market size, many simply have a presence to distribute overseas content rather than 
produce locally sourced materials. For the few that do produce local content, they are 
generally focused on trade and business-related topics, hence generally do not ruffle any 
feathers. The PAP government demands the right of reply and publications have to published 
unedited replies from the government to set the story straight when it deems to have been 
unfairly portrayed.  The PAP had in the past restricted circulation or allowed circulation 
without the ability to carry advertisements for those media deemed to have reported the 
Singapore government unfairly.  
 
Aside from restrictions in circulation and advertising, the most prominent and fear-
inducing measure would be through the use of defamation law. Over the years, defamation 
suits had been brought against foreign media (such as Bloomberg and International Herald 
Tribune) due to insinuations that the Lee Hsien Loong had risen to become the third PM of 
Singapore due to Lee Kuan Yew. There were also cases whereby the media (Far Eastern 
Economic Review and Star) was sued for making unsubstantiated claims of corruption. In 
recent years, the ante has been upped whereby criminal defamation law has been used. 
Criminal defamation is a more serious charge since it carries the possibility of a jail sentence 
if convicted. The editor and an author for The Online Citizen were charged with criminal 
defamation in 2018 and the outcome is still pending (as of late 2018). All these cases were all 
widely reported in the media and court proceedings were open to public. The publicness of 
these cases both contribute to the PAP’s assertion of being above board as well as striking a 




Singapore’s mainstream media space, as it is now, still have the reputation of being 
able to report and transmit factual information. According to Edelman Trust Barometer 2013, 
70% of the respondents in Singapore indicated that they trust the media. However, according 
to Freedom House (2012) and Reporters with Borders (2012), Singapore is ranked 150th and 
135th respectively for media freedom. How then does one make sense of the contradiction in 
the assessment of media in Singapore? Some may explain that the lack of dissenting 
information creates a more compliant and trusting populace (Norris and Inglehart, 2010). 
However, Singapore is not a hermit country like North Korea. There are no restrictions on the 
movement of people and information can be accessed readily on the internet. Any blatant 
reporting of inaccurate information would be exposed online easily. It is not the issue with 
accuracy that is the crux but the presentation and representation in information that requires 
inspection. It is the emotions, reactions and differing opinions of the people that may be 
missing in the mainstream media. Most Singaporeans trust that the mainstream media will 
present facts competently. But whether they think their interests and positions will be 
represented in the media is another question. The low rankings in media freedom reflects the 
reservations that media practitioners face when conducting their work but ultimately, the 
pressure exerted influences the framing of news rather than veracity of news.  
 
The PAP takes the view that the media is a conduit for information rather than a space 
for representation and mutual justification of beliefs between the government and the 
governed. According to the PAP leadership, “the mass media can help to present Singapore's 
problems simply and clearly and then explain how if they support certain programmes and 
policies these problems can be solved” (Lee, 1971). More recently, Singapore’s law minister, 
Shanmugam (2010), reiterated that the press “should not join the political fray and become a 
political actor. It should not campaign for or against a policy position.” Hence, for the PAP 
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the role of the gatekeeper or agenda setter lies not in the media but the state. As pointed out 
by George (2012), the “state routinely forecloses debate on a wide range of issues, claiming 
the unilateral right to declare when the time for decision has arrived and when further 
contention is not in the national interest”(p.71). Simply put, facts and information are 
presented but differences in opinions may not see the light of day.  
 
Rather than relying on a free press to perform the function for the collation of 
information on political support, the PAP has relied on direct interpersonal interactions. The 
PAP requires its elected members to conduct regular “Meet the People” sessions whereby the 
constituents could meet with their member of parliament for assistance in solving various 
problems that can be alleviated via government departments (for example application of 
welfare grants, appeals towards minor offences etc.). In addition, the government set up a 
“People’s Association” (See Kimball, 1993 for details) that organises grassroots committees 
and activities, of which the PAP MPs are usually the advisors for each district. Thus giving 
them regular contact opportunities with the people on the ground. This is especially beneficial 
for the PAP as organised outdoor events are strictly regulated, requiring permits and are 
restrictive on political agendas. Events organised through the People’s Association can thus 
be framed as community events rather than political events even when the guests of honour 
typically are PAP MPs. The fear that the less politically engaged would be less likely to voice 
out and in turn not have their concerns addressed are thus mitigated by these touchpoints and 
feedback systems.  
 
The 1990’s opened up new space for public sphere with the advent of the internet. 
Since the introduction of the internet in Singapore, the government has always taken a “light 
touch” (Hachigian, 2002) approach in managing the new medium. Recognising that the 
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internet as key to the knowledge-based economy that the world is moving towards, the 
government has been mindful not to hamper the flow of information that the economy needs. 
The structure of the internet also does not allow the PAP to regulate easily what information 
flows into the country as that of mainstream media. Hence, only a hundred websites are 
blocked “symbolically” to reflect the accepted moral values of Singapore’s society (the list of 
banned sites has never been made public, but banned sites are in general known to include 
pornography sites and racial hate sites). In recent years, in addition to the symbolic list, 
gambling and piracy sites have also been blocked. Hence, practically speaking, there are 
minimal restrictions for the public sphere afforded by the internet. While anybody could 
produce content on the internet, certain websites with content that is related to politics may be 
gazetted and made to register with the regulatory agency. There is no direct control over the 
content produced, content producers of sensitive issues are expected to be responsible for the 
content instead of being able to hide behind anonymity.  
 
In the first decade of the internet, while there was potential for anyone to be content 
producers, there was still the need to establish platforms of distribution. One still needed a 
personal website, a blog or email lists. Then an audience needed to be cultivated so that 
sufficient people would visit these sites or stay subscribed to the emails. However, with the 
rise of social media, people’s immediate friends in social media sites have become their 
distribution network. These online networks are interconnected and one no longer needs to 
specially create any site to spread ideas and messages. A posting on Facebook or a tweet on 
twitter could possibly be disseminated widely without needing to build up a loyal readership.  
 
The internet has thus allowed some to better navigate the restrictive communication 
space in Singapore. Without editorial gatekeeping or commercial concerns, some bloggers 
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could push the boundaries and post dissenting opinions easily. If and when served any legal 
warning, they would simply retract and remove these posts immediately. Similar to “playing 
edge ball” in China, Singapore has its own “OB marker”, a term adopted from golf to indicate 
the area where play is not allowed and in the usage for communications, denotes issues or 
topics which are not permissible for discussion. Issues pertaining to race and religion are 
typically steered clear by most people unless they are in agreement with the government’s 
stance. Other than issues on race and religion, similar to China, boundaries for what should 
not be discussed publicly in Singapore are deliberately kept ambiguous to rein in the 
majority.  For the few who are pushing the boundaries, the rationale is it is easier to seek 
forgiveness than permission.  However the apprehension of straying outside the limits still 
persists for the majority as many would still warn others about “lim kopi” (literally meaning 
“drink coffee” as according to the urban legend of the state interrogating suspects in a cold 
room and serving bad coffee to keep them awake) (Cowan, 2010), alluding to the possibility 
of being arrested and questioned by the state.  
 
However, while the space has been expanded with the advent of internet, the 
availability of wider space without opinion leaders would still result in a sterile public sphere 
where debates and exchange of opinions regarding politics are limited. As reported by 
George (2006), Malaysia which shares many similar socio-politico constraints faced by 
Singaporeans, has a much more active political discourse in cyberspace than that of 
Singapore despite Singapore having a higher level of internet penetration. George attributed it 
to the more active civil society that existed in Malaysia before the advent of the internet. 
Hence, changes or enhancement to communicative space is insufficient in encouraging 
political talk and engagement if there is a lack of opinion leaders. Technological 




As the internet evolves over the years, information distribution and consumption also 
change. More people are moving away from mainstream media as they seek alternative 
voices and compare the news that are available to them. As it becomes much easier to be a 
news provider in the internet-age, the PAP adapted their control to the media environment. In 
2013 then Media Development Authority (renamed and restructured as Info-Communications 
and Media Development Authority in 2016) imposed a new licensing scheme requiring local 
news websites (that have a significant number of readers) to obtain individual licences in 
order to carry on operating in Singapore. Ten websites were identified and of the 10, only 
Yahoo News was not operated by either SPH or Mediacorp. Critically, this licence required 
the operator to put up a performance bond of $50000 that may be forfeited if they run afoul of 
the rules. Key among which is the rule that the website operator would be required to remove 
content that is in breach of MDA standards within 24 hours. The “standards” cover the usual 
ambiguous parameters of public interest, public security, or national harmony that would be 
determined by the authority. Hence, any news website targeting Singaporeans that reach a 
critical mass of readers would be placed under scrutiny and have to consider the possibility of 
losing the performance bond if they are not careful in monitoring their content.  
  
Then with the rise in prominence of “fake news”, the PAP government deem it 
necessary to legislate a new law to mitigate against the problem. In 2019, the Protection from 
Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) was enacted. The main thrust of the law 
is that it allows the government to direct social media platforms to put up correction notice or 
remove any content that it deems to be false and against public interest. One of the definitions 
of public interest within the law is the diminishing of public confidence in the government. 
Social media platforms can also be ordered to suspend accounts deemed to be spreading 
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untruths and disclose information on political content. Websites that repeatedly carry 
falsehoods can also be blocked under this law. All actions within the law can be directed by 
the government media development authority without any independent or judicial oversight. 
Although actions can be challenged in court, it would be onerous and should such actions be 
carried out during time sensitive periods such as elections, judicial reversals of government 
actions could be too late. This marks a departure from the “light touch” policy of the past and 
entrusts the government with immense power in interpreting what is “falsehood” and thus 
subject to blocking by the government.  
 
The influence and meddling by the PAP government in the media used to be a hush 
hush matter that journalists traded war stories only within their circle. However, in recent 
years, retired veteran journalists are more becoming open about such meddling as they either 
blogged or published memoirs about their years in the newsroom (See Cheong 2013 and Balji 
2019). It should be noted that Singaporeans are not ignorant about the influence that the PAP 
government has over the mainstream media. Most Singaporeans would acknowledge that the 
government has influence over the mainstream media even if many cannot articulate how or 
in what form the influence could be. What is happening is not direct censorship. As 
mentioned by George (2012), “overt censorship has been largely replaced by self-censorship, 













A former colony of the United Kingdom for more than 150 years, Hong Kong has 
now reverted to China’s control for more than two decades. Now officially known as Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese 
government had promised to leave much of Hong Kong’s domestic administration and 
politics intact for at least 50 years under the “one country, two systems” principle. The image 
of Hong Kong’s free media system hence offers a stark contrast to the Chinese restrictive 
media system and is a source of political tension both in Hong Kong as well as within the 
Mainland.  
 
5.1 Political History Context 
 
Hong Kong island and Kowloon were ceded to the British after the two opium wars in 
1841 and 1860. Subsequently, a larger swath of land known as “New Territories” was leased 
for 99 years from 1898. Other than a break during the Second World War, Hong Kong was 
governed by the British. These hundred odd years of colonial history thus set up the mixed 
identity of Hong Kong people. More than 90% of Hong Kong people are ethnic Chinese and 
trace their roots to China, and many still have family in the mainland. Sharing a land border 
with Mainland China, Hong Kong has always attracted migrants from Mainland China. 
Mainlanders either migrate to Hong Kong to seek a better future or to flee from trouble in the 
mainland. The Second World War, Chinese civil war, famines and cultural revolution had all 
driven Chinese people to flee to Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s population trebled in the post war 
period due to the arrival of refugees. Hence, while many people in Hong Kong do not identify 
with the political system of the mainland, they are still linked closely with the mainland in 




The development and progress of Hong Kong in the colonial era was very much 
dependent on the governor and many simply maintained status quo in the political domain 
since political reforms would likely result in complications in administration for a colonial 
government. Hence, most governors of Hong Kong focus on ensuring that the laissez faire 
economy remains functional and the people were generally satisfied to being left alone to 
etch out a living. Even Governor Murray MacLehose, who left the most impact in social 
welfare reforms and was still fondly remembered by the people of Hong Kong after many 
years, chose not to pursue any democratic or political reforms for Hong Kong as he believed 
Hong Kong would eventually be under China’s rule (The Telegraph, 2000).  
 
The decolonization trend in many parts of the world after the Second World War 
initially had some influence in the democratization process in Hong Kong. However, any 
talks regarding self-governance was swiftly shut down when the CCP threatened to send 
troops into Hong Kong should it happen. The CCP preferred Hong Kong to remain as a 
colony. For the CCP, negotiating for the return of Hong Kong between two governments was 
more desirable than having to deal with a population wanting to be independent from China.  
 
As the end of the 99-year lease of New Territories neared, Margaret Thatcher and 
Deng Xiaoping negotiated and eventually came to the outcome of “one country two systems” 
deal for the return of Hong Kong in its entirety. Hong Kong would however be allowed to 
maintain its existing system for 50 years after 1997. The relatively more hands-off approach 
of the colonial government in the final decade before the handover in 1997 allowed civil 
society in Hong Kong to flourish and along with it, an active press media. While this led to 
some segments of the society to be openly vocal about social issues, democratic culture was 
not entrenched in the society yet. Many simply expected a hands-off government that do not 
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hinder their ability to make a living. The high level of emigration in the decade before the 
handover suggest than many did not believe in the impending system. People of means chose 
to leave rather than campaign to make changes. Most believe that they were powerless to 
make any significant change to Hong Kong’s political system, existing or future. In addition, 
a significant proportion of the population were first generation migrants from China with 
mixed feelings over the return of Hong Kong.  
 
The final governor, Chris Patten, had introduced political reforms to allow more 
people to vote but the short period was not sufficient to change attitudes. As shown by the 
low voter turnout in the 1995 Legco elections of only 35%, many Hong Kong people did not 
think it was important to vote. Some argued that the lack of democratic desires stemmed from 
the colonial government’s lack of interests in building a democratic culture or institutions and 
the lack of universal suffrage. Nevertheless, the lack of participation did not mean that the 
people were not paying attention. Lau and Kuan (1995) labelled Hong Kong people “attentive 
spectators” as the vibrant media environment had kept the population aware of political 
developments. The press was given ample freedom during the colonial years because much of 
the content were focused on China issues given the close ties many Hong Kong people still 
maintain with the mainland. Hong Kong's culture of protest grew in the aftermath of 1989 
Tiananmen incident. The colonial government did not shut down the protests as the annual 
protests were not directed towards their rule. There was no reason to shut them but allowing 
the protests help in directing attention and any dissatisfaction away from the colonial 
government.  
 
The heads of government in Hong Kong were never directly elected and popular 
election of legislators was only implemented a decade before the handover. Hence, political 
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interests and participation amongst a large segment of the people were not high prior to 1997. 
After 1997, the head of Hong Kong (Chief Executive) continued to be a position that is not 
decided by the general public but is elected by a select group of 1200 people (chosen by 6% 
of eligible Hong Kong voters) and then approved by the Chinese government. Lacking the 
mandate of a popular election, many people in Hong Kong thus saw the Hong Kong 
government as a proxy of the Chinese government rather than their own representative 
government. Hong Kong’s legislature has a hybrid regime with half functional constituencies 
and half geographical constituencies. Functional constituencies refer to seats held by 
members representing various industries and special interest groups. These seats are voted by 
members or organisations within that community. Typically, functional constituency seats are 
held by pro-Beijing representatives as these business interest groups stand to gain with 
friendlier Beijing relationship while geographical constituency seats are held by pro-
democracy candidates. Therein lies the problem of lower perception of legitimacy of the 
government. The people cannot elect the Chief Executive while the CCP has undue influence 
over half the seats in Legco. Fundamentally, the Chief Executive serves two political masters, 
the CCP and the people of Hong Kong, of which the CCP has a greater say on whether the 
Chief Executive can stay on the job and what forms of economic support the mainland could 
offer. While the interests of these two sides may not always be in opposition, frequently their 
interests do not align as the two sides have different perspectives of what is important.  
 
The negative association of the Hong Kong government and Chinese government was 
exacerbated by the unfortunate coincidence of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. After taking 
over the rein from the last Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten; the first Chief Executive of 
Hong Kong, Tung Chee Hwa, had to steer Hong Kong out of the financial crisis. Hong 
Kong’s economy did not recover fast enough while under Tung’s watch and his first term 
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was also plagued by a series of hastily implemented polices that lacked proper consultation 
with the people. Hence while many were cautious about politics during the transitional 
period, the negative perceptions of an incapable and unresponsive government that was 
hamstrung by the CCP had already started to set in.  
  
A key event that shaped Hong Kong’s current political landscape was the proposed 
“Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23” which sought to prohibit activities pertaining to 
subversion, sedition and secession. It also proposed prohibiting involvement of foreign 
organisations in Hong Kong politics. Introduced in 2002 just after Tung Chee Hwa’s “re-
election”, it generated a wide and intensive response from the Hong Kong people as it was 
seen as giving the government too much power and the concepts of government and state 
were used interchangeably in the proposal, hence perceived to prohibit opposition towards 
the government too. Together with other issues (bungling the containment of the SARS 
epidemic, faltering economy and general disapproval of Tung Chee Hwa), an estimated half a 
million people took to the streets to protest against the government on the anniversary of 
Hong Kong’s handover in 2003. This was seen as the event that triggered more people in 
Hong Kong to be “repoliticized” and become poltically aware (Lee, 2005).  
 
In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to push through a patriotic national 
education programme but was met with strong opposition. Many thought that it was a 
propaganda programme pushed by the Beijing government. The opposition of the programme 
then led to youth activism and was also what led to the prominence of Joshua Wong as a 
youth activist. The plan to introduce the programme was eventually suspended. Then in 2014, 
youths again led in political activism in Hong Kong as they staged a protest that occupied 
parts of Hong Kong for 79 days. The protest later became known as the Umbrella Movement 
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for the frequent use of umbrella as they fought for true universal suffrage in Hong Kong. The 
crux of the protest was that Beijing had veto power over who could be on the ballot in the 
election of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. The protests in 2012 and 2014 were generally 
seen as events that awakened the political consciousness of Hong Kong people as the large 
scale and sustained protests made political news and discourse unavoidable. People had to 
express their position on support or disapproval. People had to find out more so as to be able 
to come to a position on the protests.  
  
Some had drawn links to Hong Kong’s status as a former British colony as a source of 
discontent towards the current SAR government. The Union Jack was also carried by some 
protestors at times. But it should be noted that the political awakening cannot be attributed to 
the colonial history. Hong Kong people never had the ability to choose their governor in the 
colonial days and many of these student protestors were either not born or too young to 
remember how Hong Kong was like during the colonial government. Others point to 
economic pains as the source for low support of the government. Wages in Hong Kong are 
depressed due to influx of mainlanders while cost of living is high.  
 
Another socio-economic problem is the inability or difficulty in getting on the 
property ladder for many ordinary Hong Kong people. Hong Kong has the world’s priciest 
home market and the average home costs 18 times the gross annual median income in 2016. 
This meant that an average person in Hong Kong has to work 18 years and not spend a single 
cent of that income to afford an average home. For comparison, Singapore’s average home 
price is about 5 times gross annual median income. Hong Kong faces a property crunch not 
because a lack of land but because of land use laws and land developer interests. Hong Kong 
has a land area of 1106 square Km as compared with Singapore’s 716 square Km. Hong 
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Kong has about a million more residents but does not have to allocate land for military uses 
that Singapore need to. With a smaller land mass, property is still much cheaper in Singapore 
and Singaporeans in general have larger homes than Hong Kong people. The problem for 
Hong Kong is that much of the land is being hoarded by developers, zoned for non-residential 
use or reserved for nature. The Hong Kong government depends significantly on land sale for 
revenue and thus has no motivation to change policies that would drive down land price. Any 
significant fall in land price would disrupt the Hong Kong government’s budget. Hong Kong 
may have a lower income tax regime but the premium paid towards property would be heftier 
for Hong Kong’s middle class aspiring to own a home.  
 
Years of stagnant salary growth coupled with soaring property prices has led to 
youths losing hope for the future. When there is nothing or little to lose, more of them would 
join in the protests seeking changes to the government. Hence, resulting in mass protests such 
as the 2014 Umbrella movement. Many youths turned to protests in 2014 demanding more 
transparent elections and a direct election of the Chief Executive rather than having one pre-
selected by the CCP.  
 
While Hong Kong is known for being a system with strong rule of law, the CCP still 
has influence over its legal system and is increasingly exerting that influence. Key amongst 
which is that China’s National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) holds the 
final “power interpretation” of the law. While this power has been used sparingly (five times) 
since the handover till 2017, it gives the CCP sway over political issues. For example, the 
most recent usage of the power was in 2016 over how pro-independence elected lawmakers 
modified their oaths when swearing into office. The CCP essentially barred the elected 




Under the one country two systems principle, Hong Kong is supposed to be self-
governed in most aspects of its system other than foreign and military affairs are to be within 
the control of the Beijing government. However, the reality on the ground is that many 
aspects are being encroached by the CCP. As the Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR is pre-
selected by the CCP, it would be difficult for any semblance of self-governance to occur. 
Some young people in Hong Kong in recent years are starting to seek independence from 
China. However, the realpolitik is that Hong Kong would never be able to gain independence 
so long as China’s political system does not change. Besides the obvious challenge that such 
a call for secession would be a threat to China’s sovereignty and might inspire other 
autonomous regions to seek such a move, Hong Kong depends on mainland China to survive.  
No leader in Hong Kong, freely elected or otherwise, would be reckless enough to declare the 
territory independent from China as Hong Kong depends on China for energy, food and 
water. Cutting off any of these essential supplies would plunge the territory into chaos and 
the CCP has shown that it is willing to use economic mechanisms to exert pressure on 
political issues. Moreover, China currently depends much lesser on Hong Kong for economic 
growth than Hong Kong is dependent on China for economic growth. The size of Hong 
Kong’s economy is now less than 3% of China’s as compared to more than 20% before 1997. 
International companies had based their Asia headquarters in Hong Kong because Hong 
Kong serves as a gateway to China. There are increasingly more avenues for which 
international investments and trade could be conducted with China without the intermediary 
of Hong Kong. The CCP could possibly and easily starve off Hong Kong’s economy should 





For Hong Kong, it has been “one country two systems” since being ceded to the 
British. Before 1997, it was a colony functioning under a system different from the UK. After 
1997, it is a special administrative region under a different system from China. For more than 
a century, Hong Kong people have had to grapple with identity issues and a local government 
that takes order from a distant higher authority. From being apathetic about politics to regular 
protests and agitation for the right to elect their Chief Executive, the political attitude of the 
Hong Kong people has evolved significantly after 1997. The next section will examine the 
citizenship education and how it contributed to a more politically engaged younger 
generation.   
 
 
5.2 Citizenship Education  
 
For Hong Kong, issues of identity and citizenship permeates beyond the curriculum of 
citizenship education. One of the more contentious issue is the medium of instruction. Before 
1997, most schools used English as the medium of instruction. However, after 1997, the 
education bureau mandated schools to adopt Cantonese as the medium of instruction, with 
some exceptions for those schools proving to have capabilities to teach in English. Hence the 
education system went from about 80% English-medium schools to about 75% Cantonese-
medium schools in the transition years.   
 
 The main reason for such a change was that education experts advocated that the use 
of mother tongue for instruction would enhance learning and improve performance in school. 
Some argued that another reason was to build an identity breaking away from the colonial 
period. The adoption of Cantonese in turn created a different identity problem that Hong 
Kong faces now as language becomes a point of contention between those who are pro-
mainland and those resisting the influence of mainland. After more than a decade of 
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relatively widespread adoption of Cantonese, the government started pushing for teaching to 
be conducted in Mandarin and simplified characters in 2008. This push for change in 
language then resulted in protests regarding the language policy as for many Hong Kong 
people, the use of Cantonese and traditional characters forms their identity and differentiate 
themselves from the mainland. For many of them, switching from English to Cantonese was 
natural as it was their native language that many uses in daily life. But the new change was 
about accommodating the demands of China and a repression of their culture and identity. 
Hence, now in Hong Kong, there is an older generation educated in English, a younger 
generation educated in Cantonese and a newer generation contending what language to be 
educated in.   
 
Cantonese and Mandarin are both of Chinese origins which can use the same Chinese 
characters. In written form there are some differences but user of one would be able to 
understand the meaning of the other most of the time. In spoken form, both languages are 
very different, and speakers would not be able to understand each other without training. 
Simplified characters are derived from traditional characters but with lesser character strokes. 
For example, “country” is 国家 in simplified characters and 國家 in traditional character. The 
transformation of Chinese characters to the simplified version was introduced by Mainland 
China in the 1950’s and 1960’s in a bid to improve literacy rate in China. Since then, 
traditional characters are more widely used in Taiwan and Hong Kong while the rest of 
Chinese speaking world uses simplified characters. For some, rejection of simplified 
characters is thus seen as a rejection towards the CCP system.  
 
  A key contribution to Hong Kong’s citizenship education is the subject termed as 
“liberal studies” that secondary school students between the ages of 15 to 17 have to study 
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for. Liberal studies was first introduced in Hong Kong’s education landscape by the British 
colonial government in 1992 to promote students’ social awareness and to somewhat allay 
the concerns leading up to the eventual change in government. There were only slightly more 
than 10% of the secondary schools adopting the subject in 1997. It was only made mandatory 
in 2009. The subject is meant to broaden students’ knowledge and covers content such as 
“Hong Kong today”, “modern China”, “globalisation” and “public health”. Under “Hong 
Kong today”, students learn about rule of law, socio-political participation and local identity. 
The intent of “liberal studies” is to foster independent thinking and develop multiple 
perspectives on contemporary issues.  
  
Since then, the subject has been blamed for radicalising youths and causing the mass 
protests in 2014. While it may be a stretch to deem liberal studies as being the root to 
political radicalisation, it could be argued that it contributed to developing the political 
consciousness of Hong Kong’s youths. Being exposed to different political systems and 
encouraged to think about the system that they are in meant that they are equipped with the 
vocabulary and analytical tools to participate in political activities if they choose to. In 
general, the youths in Hong Kong in the recent years are not as politically apathetic as the 
previous generations. They are more critical and demanding of the government. For many, it 
is no longer acceptable to simply keep the heads down and work for a living. Whether liberal 
studies has anything to do with the changes in political attitude is debatable.  
 
Identity is an important factor in the legitimation process when the government is 
perceived to be serving Chinese interests rather than the interests of Hong Kong people. Even 
while Hong Kong is a Chinese territory, when the people do not identify with the Chinese 
flag, the Chinese anthem and the Chinese political system, the Hong Kong government would 
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face an uphill task in legitimising their rule when they have to submit to the decisions of the 
CCP. The regular survey conducted by Hong Kong University regarding how the people of 
Hong Kong identify as showed that the Chinese identity reached a peak in 2008 at 38% and 
had been decreasing since. Most people, particularly the young, surveyed identify as “Hong 
Konger”.  
 
Even though the youths have never lived in colonial governed Hong Kong, the 
possibility of being directly governed by the CCP is sufficient to drive many to imagine that 
the colonial government was better. There is also the positive reinforcement that the UK 
government is much more democratic as compared to the CCP. Be it a colony or special 
administrative region, the people of Hong Kong had forged a unique local identity for the last 
century and it would be an uphill task for a distant political master to foist their will on the 




5.3 Media  
Hong Kong’s free media system however is a relatively new development as 
compared its colonial history. Going back to the beginning of colonial rule, the colonial 
government enacted various restrictive laws in order to secure its rule. Seditious Publications 
Ordinance was enacted in 1907 while Printers and Publication Ordinance was enacted in 
1927 to prevent publications from printing materials that were against colonial rule. In the 
post-World War II period, the struggle for control of China between the Nationalists and 
Communists spilled over to Hong Kong and the colonial government enacted Emergency 
Regulations (Amendment) Ordinance in 1949 and Control of Publication (Consolidation) 
Ordinance in 1951 to rein in the media. There was fear that the spread of nationalism in 
China could influence the people in Hong Kong to demand for independence. Despite these 
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laws, the close proximity to China meant that many publications still dealt with Chinese 
political issues although most were still market driven and dedicated to providing local 
infotainment (See Lai 2007 for additional details). The colonial government generally left the 
press alone to cancel out the influence between different factions supporting either the 
Communists or Nationalists as long as they did not question British sovereignty in Hong 
Kong.  
 
Following the plateau of the political struggle between the Nationalists and 
Communists in the 1970s, the commercial focus of the media gradually became the operating 
principle. In addition, prior to 1960’s, a large portion of the population comprised of refugees 
from China and thus interests were high for news regarding China. However, with the locally 
born baby boomers maturing, the media shifted its attention away from China’s politics since 
fewer people were interested.  
 
In the transitional period after 1997, the media, as with the majority of the people in 
Hong Kong, took a cautious approach and avoided being “too political” and “critical” due to 
uncertainties over what the Chinese government might do or how they might react to an 
overcritical media. Most media outlets became “depoliticized” and devoted more coverage to 
social and economic issues (Lee, 2005). However, with the show of solidarity by so many 
through the annual 1 July demonstrations, the press responded and as Lee (2005) noted: 
“Since 2002 the role of the press has become more important. It is relied upon by Hong 
Kong people to channel their discontent, scrutinize the government, and to set a policy 
agenda for the government. On the other hand, a weak HKSAR government, backed by 





The majority of media outlets in Hong Kong are privately owned and operated for 
profit while a few special-interest media are supported by the Chinese Communist Party or 
NGOs. Newspapers supported by the Chinese Communist Party have very low circulations 
and are mostly read by government officials and businessmen “for reference” (Lee, 2005) of 
the CCP’s position on important issues. Hong Kong has a public broadcasting media that is 
funded by the HKSAR and is not subjected to market pressures. Based on the model of 
British Broadcasting Corporation, its editorial decisions are independent of the government 
even though it receives public funding. However, the transfer of its director in 1999 following 
a controversial story on Taiwan led some to believe that the government was sending a 
message to the station to toe the line (Lai, 2007). Other than direct funding of publications, 
some argue that the Beijing government has also exerted influence on privately owned media 
outlets. In 2003, business owners of a few newspapers were co-opted into the CCP and their 
newspapers started to show a pro-China and pro-Hong Kong government stance in various 
issues such as Article 23 and the performance of the government.  
 
However, even with the “repoliticization”, many are still not interested in politics and 
according to Lee (2005, p.85), “the majority of the audience simply does not care about the 
political stances of the media. People will buy media that provide what they perceive as good 
entertainment and soft information to meet their needs, regardless of whether they are pro-
Beijing or anti-Beijing”. With this in mind, many media outlets simply pander to the bases 
and “some media are not as ‘civil’ as some liberal theorists would like to see” (Lee, 2005, 
p.81). Three of the newspapers with highest readership were focused on gossips and 
sensationalistic news. The culture of paparazzi is prevalent in Hong Kong and with a healthy 
(albeit declining) movie/TV industry; many publications zoom in on the private lives of the 
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celebrities. The decline in standards and pandering towards lowest denominators with 
paparazzi type of sensationalistic news prompted the HKSAR government to propose a press 
council with powers to regulate the media. However, the industry opposed strongly and the 
compromised was reach with the setting up of a self-regulatory press council in 2000 that 












































Taipei is most liberal and open amongst the four cities studied in this thesis. The 
inclusion of Taipei in the study would offer a valuable dimension to the analysis as it 
progressed from an authoritarian regime to its democratic circumstance now. Taiwan’s 
economy was once amongst the fastest growing in Asia but now has matured and slow 
growth has placed pressure on the government. Influences from mainland China, from both 
the past and in the future, would also be important to how the Taiwanese perceive the 
government.   
 
 
6.1 Political History Context 
 
The island of Taiwan has seen a multitude of invaders and colonists in the last few 
centuries that had contributed to the Taiwanese identity, particularly the Japanese. The 
Japanese took possession of Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and ruled over it for 
50 years. Japanese influence is still strongly felt in many aspects of Taiwanese society but 
despite Japanese occupation over so many decades, there is an absence of bitterness amongst 
Taiwanese that is common in mainland China. The Taiwan government does not tap on 
antagonism towards neighbouring countries like what the CCP depends on. Rather the 
bogeyman that some Taiwanese politicians rely on is the CCP, which still sees Taiwan as a 
breakaway province to be brought back into China’s rule.  
 
Since the end of Second World War in 1945, Taiwan has been governed as the 
Republic of China when Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) took over the governance of 
Taiwan after the war. The initial decades under the rule of KMT had been tempestuous as the 
KMT set about to establish itself in Taiwan. The prior Japanese colonist government had 
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been strict but brought about much development in Taiwan. Hence while many welcomed the 
KMT’s arrival in Taiwan from a historical Chinese roots view, the KMT’s legitimacy was 
short-lived as a liberator once it was apparent how corrupt and incompetent the KMT was.  
 
KMT’s post-war rule started an influx of mainlanders seeking refuge in Taiwan as the 
Chinese Civil War raged on. The large influx of new immigrants meant replacing locals in 
the government and civil service as many in the new KMT government were from the 
mainland as well. Friction nonetheless was created between the new arrivals and the 
established residents as the KMT practised political patronage. Corruption was rampant and 
inflation was high with economic mismanagement, leading to widespread resentment of the 
KMT government. The resentment lead to widespread protests and eventually a violent 
clampdown by the military in 1947 (also known as the 228 massacre) that resulted in 
(estimated between 5 to 28 thousand) thousands of death.  
 
The KMT’s full retreat into Taiwan in 1949 increased the influx of mainlanders to a 
few millions and also triggered the start of martial law as the KMT was guarding against the 
influence of communist and early settlers who were resistant towards KMT rule. For nearly 
four decades, martial law was imposed on Taiwan and the early period was also known as the 
“White Terror” period for its draconian laws and harsh treatment of political opposition. 
Opposition parties were banned, and the media was totally under the control of the KMT. 
KMT ruled under the one-party state ideology that Sun Yat-sen had founded the party on. 
The KMT could legitimise its oppressive rule through this period as there was CCP China at 
Taiwan’s doorstep which was still raining artillery on one of Taiwan’s far-flung islands on a 
regular basis. When a country faces existential crisis, a heavy-handed government who would 
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do everything it could to stand against the invasion would seem acceptable. Taiwan needed to 
stand behind a government who would deter the invasion from China.  
 
The KMT also relied on dividing and conquering to manage the people. While more 
than 95% of Taiwan’s population are Han Chinese, there are still perceived differences. 
Within the majority Han Chinese ethnic group, there is the distinction of “Waishenren” 
(loosely translated as “outsiders” or “from outside province”) and “Benshenren” (loosely 
translated as “locals” or “from this province”). The distinction basically separates those 
earlier Han Chinese settlers who arrived in Taiwan before the Japanese occupation (there was 
a restriction on immigration during the Japanese occupation) from those later Han Chinese 
settlers who arrived during KMT’s retreat to Taiwan. The earlier settlers tend to be Southern 
Chinese while the later settlers were more likely Northern Chinese. It should be noted that 
other than usage of different Chinese dialects, one would not be able to easily tell the two 
groups apart other than asking them about their ancestry. The KMT leadership then stacked 
the government and civil service with “Waishenren”, marginalising “Benshenren” in the 
process. Keeping a large group happy while letting the sub-groups pit against each other 
allowed the KMT to governed through pork barrel politics. The remaining population are 
made up of aborigines of about a dozen different tribes who had been on the island a few 
centuries before the arrival of the Han Chinese. These tend to be supportive of the KMT as 
the KMT patronage system capitalised on the animosity that the aborigines had against the 
Benshenren when they first settled in Taiwan.  
 
 While there was widespread cronyism during KMT’s rule, the grease kept the 
economy going and the KMT also brought about rapid economic development in the 60’s and 
70’s. The KMT initiated many infrastructure projects that gave Taiwan’s economy a boost 
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and brought about investments that helped grew the export-oriented manufacturing industry. 
Taiwan’s middle class grew significantly during the 70’s and with the growth, many middle-
class citizens began to push for democracy in Taiwan. This coincided with Taiwan’s crisis on 
the international stage as it lost its seat at the UN to China. Therein, it precipitated the 
changes in diplomatic ties as many countries ditched Taiwan for China. Taiwan’s diplomatic 
ties become informal as embassies become informal “trade offices” to serve consulate 
functions. The KMT now had to justify its rule externally as well so as to gain the support of 
democratic countries. Hence, as Chiang Chin-kuo took over the leadership of Taiwan after 
the death of Chiang Kai-shek, the younger Chiang initiated gradual democratic reforms to 
legitimise KMT’s rule to both citizens internally and audiences externally.  
 
The first opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was formed in 1986 
and allowed to run in the elections in that same year. This marked the beginnings of the 
“blue” vs “green” politics that Taiwan sees today. Pan-green parties are led by the DPP and 
consist of parties that run on localist and pro-independence ideas while pan-blue parties are 
led by KMT who adopt a pro-unification stance. With the passing of Chiang Chin-kuo, Lee 
Teng-hui carried on the democratization reforms and eventually won the first direct 
presidential elections in 1996. Lee was the first to acknowledge KMT’s wrong doings during 
the white terror period and worked to reverse many of the policies that caused resentment 
amongst the people.   
 
 While Lee Teng-hui was open to political reforms, the KMT was not ready to cut 
Taiwan off from China. In 1992, the governments of both China and Taiwan met for the first 
time in decades and came to an outcome known as “1992 Consensus” that affirms there is 
one China. However, both sides’ interpretation of China is different. Henceforth sets off a 
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see-saw relationship between the two governments as Taiwan elects different parties into 
power. Chen Shui-bian became the first non-KMT president in 2000 and his presidency put 
the cross-strait relations on hold as Chen was not align with the view of one China. Chen’s 
presidency saw more emphasis on growing the Taiwanese identity and advocated for the 
independence of Taiwan. The CCP saw Chen as creeping towards declaration of Taiwan’s 
independence and .  
 
Following Chen’s presidency, KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou came into power in 2008. Ma 
resume regular interactions with China again as he focused on establishing trade links with 
China. Ma Ying-jeou’s pro-China policies eventually led to discontent amongst many youths 
as they see the policies as undermining their sovereignty and identity. Economically, there is 
also the issue that wages in Taiwan for fresh graduates had been depressed for years and 
closer ties with China would open up to keener competition with millions more mainlanders. 
As the KMT attempted to fast-track a trade agreement with China through legislature, a 
protest movement (known as the Sunflower movement) led by students stormed the 
legislature building and occupied it for weeks, demanding the government withdraw from the 
Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement. Just before stepping down, Ma Ying-jeou met with Xi 
Jinping in Singapore. That was the first time two leaders from China and Taiwan met since 
1945. The meeting resulted in mixed reactions from Taiwan as some see it as an opportunity 
to further develop economic ties while others see it as a yet another betrayal of Taiwan’s 
sovereignty by Ma.  
 
 On the back of popular discontent towards KMT’s pro-China policies, DPP’s Tsai 
Ing-wen was elected in 2016 as the first female president of Taiwan. Again, Taiwan swung 
away from China and took a more pro-independence stance. While Tsai was careful not to 
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spell out directly, her policies indicate that she wanted to reduce dependence on China’s 
economic clout and pushed for more presence on the international front. China began to 
squeeze Taiwan through poaching of Taiwan’s few diplomatic relations and shutting out 
Taiwan from international organisations. China also began a charm offensive for Taiwanese, 
welcoming Taiwanese to work and live in China with minimal paperwork needed.  
 
Like Hong Kong, Taiwan depends significantly on China for economic growth. Be it 
tourism or trade, China’s market size is the main factor for Taiwan’s growth. The CCP has 
shown that it is willing to use China’s economic clout for political gains. Organisations from 
all over the world ranging from airlines, retailers, manufacturers and education institutes have 
had to bow to CCP’s pressure in taking the position that Taiwan is not an independent 
country. Media artistes too have to toe the line regarding comments on Taiwan and Hong 
Kong as many have been banned from performing in China for espousing pro-independence 
views. Now just a handful of countries recognises Taiwan as a country and its status in the 
world is precarious. China would always factor into the legitimation of Taiwan’s government 
and the local media would be a multiplier of influence in the mix.   
 
Taiwan was last ruled by a mainland China government more than a century ago 
under imperial China. The history and connection with the current CCP government is so 
distant that some in Taiwan reject the term “reunification” and argue that it is “unification” 
that China is seeking since Taiwan has never been governed by CCP. The spectre of China’s 
influence will always be around even as Taiwan’s national identity has grown stronger over 
the years. The allure of China’s enormous consumer market is simply too much to be 
ignored. However, as the CCP exerts a tighter hold on Hong Kong, even those who are 
motivated by economic gains are taking the position that it would be difficult to seek 
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unification but would prefer friendlier relations with China that maintain the status quo of 




6.2 Citizenship Education  
 
The loss of civil war and retreat of KMT sets the stage for Taiwanese politics and 
shapes the media and education landscape in recent history.  KMT governed Taiwan under 
martial law after the retreat, still holding on to hopes of reuniting with China eventually. 
Some of the main policies of the government in that period were to prevent the spread of 
communism and to build a common Chinese identity with mainland China. This mentality 
then set the national policies for media and education. Books and songs were then tightly 
control to meet the guidelines. School textbooks taught the history and culture of China rather 
than Taiwanese history. Taiwan’s history was taught as a subset of the history of China until 
1997.  
 
During the early KMT martial law years, there was also an emphasis to undo the 
influence of Japanese colonial years. The Japanese occupation had left a deep impact on the 
local culture as the Japanese had governed efficiently and fairly. While Taiwanese did not 
want to be ruled by the Japanese, there was no deep-seated resentment. The Japanese rapidly 
expanded the industries for which to benefit Japan but the same policy helped to grow 
Taiwan’s middle class as well. With that, there was sufficient interactions for the various 
aspects of Japanese culture to diffuse into Taiwan. To solidify KMT’s rule, KMT adopted 




KMT’s narrative in the early years was that Taiwan was a province under Republic of 
China and KMT was building up to unify with mainland China. The people of Taiwan hence 
needed to identify as Chinese and have national identity as Chinese rather than Taiwanese. 
Much of the curriculum centred on inculcating in students a sense of responsibility of 
recovering the lost territory of mainland China and fighting against the communists to free 
their fellow compatriots on the mainland. In trying to promote a national identity that stems 
from mainland China, the KMT ended up marginalizing local cultures. The unification 
focused education meant that Northern Chinese language and culture took an outsized role 
than overshadowed local culture. This marginalized a significant group of Taiwanese and 
bred resentment towards the KMT.  
  
 Post martial law period, because of Lee Teng-hui’s background as a Benshenren, the 
government began to downplay nationalistic and ideological content that centred around 
China. Instead, focus shifted to creating local identities and exploring local issues and 
characteristics. Taiwan’s history and study of Taiwan society no longer subsume under the 
big China umbrella. In the most recent changes, citizenship education broadens its scope and 
allowed schools to partly develop their own curriculum to suit local needs. The overall aim is 
no longer about nationalism but developing students’ critical thinking and social skills.   
 
Like Hong Kong, Taiwan faces contentions regarding language policies. In the 
1950’s, when KMT was consolidating its influence in Taiwan, there was a ban on the use of 
dialects in the media and official settings. Mandarin is known as “common/standard 
language” in China while in Taiwan it is known as “national language”, signifying the level 
of emphasis the KMT placed on Mandarin. The ban on dialects was only lifted in 1991 and 
although Mandarin Chinese is still the official language, there are more efforts in promoting 
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and conserving local languages/dialects in recent years. The vibrant political culture has also 
fostered a drive to be as inclusive as possible for politicians and thus more resources are 
devoted into emphasizing and preserving of local and aborigine culture. Taiwan Min-nan 
language (southern China origin) has also been designated as an official language 
 
Over the years, the distinction between Waishenren and Benshenren has gradually 
faded with fewer Taiwanese being originally from Mainland China. Even offsprings of 
Waishenren who should be categorised as Waishenren do not identify with that label. There 
are also more efforts in promoting and acknowledging ethnic minorities in Taiwan since the 
turn of the century so as to create a more inclusive society that acknowledges differences. 
The issues of identity and citizenship is now becoming a generation issue as the younger 
generation generally identify as Taiwanese (Jiang, 2017). 
 
 
6.3 Media  
As previously mentioned, Taiwan was under martial law from post-World-War-II 
until 1987 when then-President Chiang Ching-Kuo lifted the draconian rule. The martial law 
period was marked by numerous political upheavals both domestically and internationally 
that pressured Chiang to introduce political reforms and liberalization so as to legitimize the 
Taiwanese government both domestically and internationally. Through gradual liberalization, 
as the ban on political parties was lifted, publication of newspapers was liberalized and 
elections to various public offices were implemented.  
 
As highlighted by Hallin and Mancini (2004), a society’s media system and its 
politics are usually closely related. Taiwan’s media landscape too is shaped by its polarised 
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politics. Taiwan’s polarised politics is not divided along the usual left versus right wing 
ideologies but along perceived ethnicity difference that is historically charged.  
 
Similar to how the KMT controlled the use of dialects in education, TV and radio 
programming were also restricted in the use of Taiwanese dialects and only Chinese 
Mandarin could be used. This is due to KMT’s view that Taiwanese dialects are associated 
with independence inclination and KMT’s aim was to promote a closer culture with mainland 
China, still holding hope of returning to governance in mainland. As the KMT loosen its grip 
on the media, Taiwan’s media has developed and changed along with the building of national 
identity (Hsu, 2014b). Dialects regained its use in the media as Taiwanese stressed on their 
national identity.  
 
In terms of media control prior to 1987, while publishers did not need to seek 
approval prior to printing, the “National Mobilization Law” during the martial law period 
allowed the government to seize printed newspapers if anything printed was considered to be 
threatening national interests. “Publication Law” also regulated the registration of 
publications and number of pages that could be printed. In terms of electronic media, 
“Broadcasting and Television Law of 1976” controlled ownership, finance and structure and 
programming. The government essentially controlled all the television stations, radio stations 
and main newspapers through ownership prior to 1987.   
 
The loss of the UN seat to China in 1971 and student movements campaigning for 
democracy in 70’s and 80’s pressured the government to gradually liberalize so as to 
maintain its legitimacy. Since the political reforms after 1987, the transformation of the 
media landscape has been astonishing fast. The number of radio stations grew from 33 before 
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1993 to 174 in 2003. The number of newspapers stood at 514 in 2003 and there are four 
national television stations and hundreds of cable channels available to the people (Rawnsley, 
2004).    
 
While it is apparent that the media landscape prior to 1987 was highly controlled and 
lacked freedom, it did not mean a total lack of alternative voices in that period. There were 
various outlets that transmitted messages that were not permitted by the government and 
Taiwan built up a culture of alternative media in that period. Alternative media grew in part 
due to the lack of mainstream media avenues for opposition political parties. Rawnsley 
(1998) pointed out that “to clearly understand the role of the dissident media, it is crucial to 
appreciate that since 1951 the KMT did allow at least a semblance of electoral democracy to 
flourish, albeit only at the local level and subject to strict political control” (p.111). The 
regulations in that era denied access to mainstream media for those in the opposition parties. 
The lack of access to mainstream media meant that many of the local politicians running 
against the KMT had to rely on underground media. These include political journals, 
magazines and underground radio stations. There were even underground television stations 
that broadcasted locally in different counties and cities.  
 
Alternative media was also able to grow because there was a certain level of tolerance 
from the KMT government as long as these media did not attempt to organize collective 
actions against the KMT. As “although they articulated views which were prohibited by the 
myriad of laws created and administered by the KMT, their publication was tolerated until 
they began to engage in more concerted and organized activity, such as the formation of 
parties. Then the government would intervene and suppress them, often gaoling the 
publishers or contributors” (Rawnsley, 1998, p. 112). While the government would close 
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down these operations on a regular basis, financial support from political supporters from the 
pro-independence camp meant that they could play the cat-and-mouse game with the 
government without worries about market pressure.  
 
The practise or culture of seeking alternative media was cultivated and has remained 
been strong in Taiwan. For example, in 1988, a street demonstration in Taipei that turned 
violent was portrayed as rioting of farmers and students by the main newspapers and 
television networks. However, camcorder recordings by two NGOs suggested that the police 
and soldiers had started the riot by provoking and attacking the protestors. Videotapes were 
made, circulated and widely viewed amongst the people, providing an alternative 
representation of what happened (Rawnsley, 1998). This event later led to calls for reforms in 
the media with many demanding that the KMT withdraw their involvement with the 
television networks.  
 
In January 1988, the restrictions on publication of newspapers were lifted and many 
new publications sprouted out in response. However, newspaper printing is still dependent on 
market demand and many of the new independent publications folded due to inability to 
attract advertisements and readers. This led to a consolidation of the newspaper market to two 
main groups. This also led to a creation of 2 groups with different ideologies and bias in news 
coverage from both camps (Chen, 1998). The polarised political scene created two market 
segments which the media reacted to accordingly.  
 
Freedom House finally classified Taiwan as a “completely free” country in 1997 and 
since then Taiwan has regularly been held up as an example for smooth transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. Freedom of the press, however, does not 
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necessarily equate to quality or trustworthy content. A free media market meant an intense 
competition for eyeballs and advertising dollars. On top of bias coverage according to their 
subscribed ideologies, many media outlets also resorted to yellow journalism in a bid to 
attract readers and viewers. The deluge of yellow journalism in a free media environment is 
not unique and is similar to what Thompson (1995) described as he criticised Habermas’ 
idealistic version of public sphere that failed to take into account the “scurrilous and 
sensationalistic content of many of its products” (p.72). Rawsley (2004) also pointed how the 
media saturated environment led to personality-focused politics rather than focusing on issues 
and policies. Even with a seemingly free lack of real dialogue and participation by the people.  
 
Another key chapter in the overhaul of the media industry was when the first non-
KMT president, Chen Shui Bian, was elected in 2002. Chen directed the government to 
examine ownership in television companies and mandated that political parties and 
politicians are not allowed to hold significant shares in television companies (Rawnsley, 
2004, p.8). Other than direct ownership, the KMT was also seen as influencing the media 
market via advertising budget of the state as only KMT friendly media outlets were given 
government contracts.  
 
As pointed out by Fuchs (2014), “while mainland China, Taiwan’s cross-strait rival, 
continues to keep a tight leash on its media, Taiwan’s freewheeling television, print, and web 
media — and their penchant for superficial reportage — are causing antipathy among a 
growing number of its inhabitants”. Hallin and Mancini (2004) too noted the antipathy, 
observing that “Polarized Pluralist systems, finally are characterized by unequal consumption 
of public information, with a fairly sharp division between the politically active population 
that heavily consumes political commentary in the press, and a politically inactive population 
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that consumes little political information” ( p.298). For the Taiwanese, it would appear that 
the media is not merely a neutral site for politics to be mediated. Media itself is a political 
issue that requires reform and professionalization.  
 
As can be seen with the initial examination of the countries, restrictions can take 
many forms and media freedom for the sake of freedom may not naturally yield the positive 
effects that many have theorised. While both China and Singapore have restrictive 
environments, Singapore relies more on self-censorship through uncertainties and 
perpetuating of “control parodies” (Stern & Hassid, 2012). China on the other hand has a 
more direct approach that would be keenly felt by the people. Perceptions towards the 
political communication control thus might be vastly different.  
  
Whereas for Taiwan and Hong Kong, while they are categorized as free for their 
media environment, the freedom did not naturally translate into the positive outcomes that 
many liberal theorists preached about. Allowing the market to solely decide what will be 
produced will likely result in a race to satisfy the lowest denominator with sensationalistic 
content. The freedom from control frequently leads to commodification or commercialisation 
that may not necessarily be beneficial to the public sphere (Dalgren, 2001). As can be seen by 
UK’s Leveson Inquiry, regulation of the media is contentious but many still think that some 
form of regulation is needed for the media to act responsibly. Even the free market that 
capitalists preach about requires laws to regulate behaviours, so expecting the media to act 
responsibly in the absence of regulations would be too optimistic. A closer examination of 
perceptions of communication environment other than degree of freedom would be 
necessary. More so for Taiwan is the issue of media company ownership and influence of 
foreign agents in the media. As the CCP seeks to unify with Taiwan, one strategy that the 
131 
 
CCP adopts is shaping the narrative in Taiwan’s media through indirect ownership of media 
companies or advertising dollars (Hsu, 2014a). Being susceptible to foreign influences is a 






















7.1 Introduction for research design 
Much of the research in political communication tend to be conducted in the Western 
context and from the deliberative democracy perspective whereby freedom of expression is 
typically assumed. Any government in the Western industrialised countries that attempts to 
diminish freedom of expression would likely suffer a loss of support from the populace. In 
the literature for democracy, many have written on the importance of free speech for 
citizenship. The unencumbered discussion of public affairs in public sphere is argued to have 
a positive impact on citizenship. Commonly given rationales are that freedom of expression 
allows the governed to participate and communicate their needs to the government (Norris, 
2000; Scheufele, Shanahan, & Kim, 2002) and it could also act as a counterbalance towards 
those in power by being able to expose corruption and misuse of power (Siegle, Weinstein, & 
Halperin, 2004; Chowdhury, 2004; Norris & Inglehart, 2010). However is the process only 
applicable for democratic societies or would the process of open public discussion that is part 
of the foundation of democracy also result in positive impact in different governance systems 
or is it an inculcated value that only democratic regimes favour? 
In many Asian countries, however, governmental control or manipulation of the 
media landscape is common and appears to be tolerated by the citizens. Freedom of 
expression thus might be viewed differently in different societies since political systems, 
cultural and historical backgrounds, and demands for democratic processes may be different 
from the West. In a quantitative analysis of 44 states, Norris and Inglehart (2010) found that 
the people in states with restrictive media environment tend to be more supportive of their 
government as there are no opposing messages that the people in pluralistic environments 
would face. Chen and Shi (2001) on the other hand found that the single editorial policy in 
China had a negative impact on trust in government in the period after the Tianamen incident. 
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In other words, while the Chinese government could quell unrests and dissenting voices 
forcibly, their propaganda policies failed to shore up support for the government.  
Pointing to the examples of South Korea and Taiwan, there are some who expect that 
as countries and its citizens become wealthier, there would be a natural demand for more 
personal freedoms and political change. However, the demand for change does not seem to be 
similar for every country and China’s infamous Great Firewall is still standing despite its 
citizens becoming much wealthier over the last two decades. Reporters Without Borders and 
Freedom House both reported increasing governmental control of the media in many Asian 
countries while the most recent study on internet filtering by OpenNet Initiative (2011) 
reported that in Asia, a “trend of increasing controls in the context of growing connectivity is 
emerging in the region as a whole” (p.233).  
With increasingly more voices (see “The Economist,” 2016), both outside and within 
Asia, calling for more freedom of expression, there is thus a need for closer examination of 
perceptions of political communication control and how it could impact on governance within 
the context of Asia. Keeping in mind that countries in Asia consist of different regime types, 
an analytical approach via the commonly used liberal democratic lens would thus be 
incongruous. While political systems might be different in the different countries, however, 
regardless of the type of regime, many would agree that all contemporary states are based on 
or influenced by the principle of popular sovereignty that requires the consent, explicit or 
otherwise, of the people to stay in power. Based on this view, popular perception on the 
legitimacy of the government would affect the stability and efficacy of governments. 
Perception of legitimacy is also theorised to increase compliance with government policies 
and studies have found empirical data supporting the claim (Levi & Sacks, 2009; Tyler & 
Huo, 2002). As for contributing factors of political legitimacy, “good governance, poverty 
reduction and provision of civil liberties” (Gilley, 2006, p.518) are some of the factors found 
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to have an impact. Some theorists (Scharpf, 1999; Backstrand, 2006) differentiate 
contributing factors into input and output factors, with input legitimacy pertaining to 
judgement of processes in governance and output legitimacy pertaining to judgement of 
performance such as economic growth and provision of services. Few would doubt that the 
remarkable economic performance over the last few decades in Asia contributed to the 
support and stability of the governments. However, as economic low hanging fruits had been 
reaped and industrialisation has reached a mature stage for many countries, economic growth 
can no longer be expected to maintain at such high levels. As demonstrated by history, no 
country can enjoy perpetual high economic growth and will eventually taper off to low 
growth. With that inevitability in mind, it is all the more important to examine the input 
factors (governance and civil liberties) rather than merely relying on outputs factors 
(outcomes of the economy) for legitimacy. While it may seem that political communication 
control is only one dimension out of many others in the process of governance, political 
communication control may also influence perceptions on other dimensions since information 
dissemination and opinion formation on other dimensions are affected by political 
communication control.  
This study aims to examine the relationship between perceptions of freedom of 
expression and political legitimacy within East Asia. Using four Asian cities (Beijing, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Taipei) as case studies, they will be comparatively analysed as these 
societies have different levels of governmental control of speech/media while having 
similarities in terms of economic development and cultural roots. Importantly, the media 
environment in the societies to be analysed provide a large contrast and are often ranked 
vastly different by international civil society organizations. To illustrate, Freedom House in 
2015 ranked China 186th, Singapore 149th, Hong Kong 76th and Taiwan 44th out of 199 
countries in terms of press freedom (Freedom House, 2016).  
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While political systems may be different for the case studies in this thesis, the 
rationale for this study is that in the contemporary world, regardless of political system, the 
principle of popular sovereignty is universal (Beetham, 1991a). Popular sovereignty is the 
principle that the legitimacy of the state is conferred and sustained by the will of the people. 
Even though not all the cities examined in this study have the practice of universal suffrage, 
their claim to power and authority is still based on the will of the people. Taking China as an 
example, China’s constitution reflects the claim in Article 2 which states that “All power in 
the People's Republic of China belongs to the people”. This is also a point that is 
acknowledged by the Chinese leaders, as affirmed by Wen Jiabao in 2011 with his quote “国
之命在人心” (translated as “the fate of the nation lies in the hearts of the people”) becoming 
a catchphrase in China (Bandurski, 2011). Political legitimacy as conferred by the people 
would also be valued by political elites across different political systems since it lowers the 
cost of enforcing compliance and implementation of public policies. Hence, studying the 
relationship between popular perceptions of legitimacy and political communication control 
would be of greater relevance to a wider audience than examining freedom of expression via 
a democracy lens. 
The descriptive view of political legitimacy is predominantly influenced by Max 
Weber whereby he argues that legitimacy is not a moral or normative judgement made by the 
investigator but an empirical report on the beliefs of the relevant agents concerned. As stated 
by Weber (1968, p. 263):  
“In general, it should be kept dearly in mind that the basis of every authority, and 
correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of 
which persons exercising authority are lent prestige” 
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Weber identified three sources that fuel the beliefs of legitimacy, namely: rational-
legal, traditional and charismatic. While Weber has considerably influenced the study on 
legitimacy, some (Dogan, 1992; Pitkin, 1972) pointed out the inadequacy of stripping the 
concept into merely sources of belief in contemporary society. Moreover, the approach is 
inadequate in explaining how or why regimes lose their legitimacy over time. Beetham 
(1991a) builds on Weber’s work and argues that the three sources of legitimacy as theorise by 
Weber are inter-related rather than different sources. In his view, legitimacy consists of three 
dimensions that are all required to be present for legitimacy to be conferred. According to 
Beetham, power is legitimate when all three dimensions are met (p. 16):  
“ i) it conforms to established rules 
  ii) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant  
 and subordinate; and 
iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation.”    
 
Differing from Weber’s sources of beliefs, Beetham’s multi-dimensional framework 
allows one to look beyond a “source” and examine closer the different dimensions in regimes 
that would strengthen or erode the perception of legitimacy. Beetham’s approach is still 
rooted in the perspective of the people, as emphasized by Beetham (1991b, p.42) “Legitimacy 
is something conferred and confirmed by the actions of relevant subordinates”.  Beetham’s 
framework, by breaking the concept down to three dimensions, allows one to examine how 
changes in perception of legitimacy might come about in the different dimensions and what 
structural or cultural factors may be relevant in the different dimensions. This 
conceptualisation of legitimacy is relevant to this study since public communication within 
the political process is needed for justification of rules and signalling of consent.  
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Rather than simply thinking and discussing legitimacy simply as a virtue or quality 
that someone has as how Merelman (1966) defines as “a quality attributed to a regime by a 
population”, legitimacy should be analysed as a procedural concept that requires constant 
appraisal. When viewed as a quality, there is a tendency to view it as a solely dependent on 
the organisation that possesses it and in a dichotomous manner of either possessing it or not. 
However the dimensions of justification and consent that are propounded by Beetham offer 
support in thinking of legitimacy as a procedural concept. As a procedural concept that exists 
through interactions, the processes involved would matter as much as the constitutive 
attributes. Justification via common beliefs and consent are processes rather than attributes. 
These processes in turn are dependent on the communication environment of a society as 
information is disseminated and beliefs are contested amongst the people. Johnson, Dowd 
and Ridgeway (2006) highlighted that legitimacy when viewed as a social process could 
explain why inefficiency and inequality in groups could exist and still maintain social 
stability. Habermas (1996) also pointed out that the process of deliberation and 
communication can be a legitimating force and serve a “socially integrative function” (p.304) 
while Huntington (1968) argues that government actions “are legitimate if they represent the 
outcome of a process of conflict and compromise in which all interest groups have 
participated” (p.27).  
Having examined how the perception of legitimacy could be formed procedurally, 
how then could the perception of legitimacy manifest or be measured? The complexity of the 
concept means that there is no commonly accepted form of measure. Similar to how 
democracy is measured, researchers compute a series of items for which adhere with the 
theory they are investigating. The input/output legitimacy framework proposed by Scharpf 
(1999) is an approach that can provide guidance and is also similar to how some others had 
examined and measured legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to procedural fairness, 
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participation of the people in policy formulation and transparency while output legitimacy 
refers to performance assessment of the government. Weatherford’s (1992) model is based on 
multiple factors that can be grouped into two dimensions, namely “judgements of system 
performance” (output legitimacy) and “personal/citizen traits” (input legitimacy). Tyler 
(1997) examined legitimacy from a psychological perspective and identified two models 
which emphasize on different causal factors. In the resource-based model (output), 
instrumental factors such as favourability of outcomes and degree of influence over decisions 
are identified as causal factors. In the identity-based model (input), social status and 
intergroup relationship between dominant and subordinate are keys to the perception of 
legitimacy. Tyler highlighted that many had tended to focus on the resource-based model and 
there should be as much attention for the identity-based factors as when “people feel valued 
and respected, they defer to group authorities” (p.338). These measures are fundamentally 
proxy measures for which researchers theorised as the causes of legitimacy. Gilley (2006) too 
investigated these measures while also looked into the effects of legitimacy which include 
factors such as political stability, lower military spending and government support. Gilley 
utilised proxy questions from the Worlds Values Survey which pertain to support for the 
people in office and confidence in the government as measure for government support.   
This thesis takes the descriptive view of legitimacy that is accorded by the people; 
that is how each individual view their own government. It would not be sensible to simply 
ask respondents whether they think their government is legitimate given that it is a largely 
academic concept that the average person would not think about. The questions used by 
Gilley (2006) are also not ideal as one may not support the people in office and still deem the 
government as legitimate. Following the guidance of literature, suitable proxy measures are 
thus used to demonstrate acceptance and support of the political system they are in rather 
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than specifically on the government in power. The survey questions used will be elaborated 
in the methods section.  
Political communication and the media would then play an important role in this 
continuous process since the political actors involved would need to communicate and justify 
their decisions. When political communication is limited to state institutions and citizen 
participation is low, the performance of the government in delivering economic needs will 
play a greater role in the legitimation process. It would also mean that performance failures 
will be attributed to the state to a higher degree since policy making is no longer a negotiated 
outcome that involved the citizens or different communities within a country. There would be 
no sense of ownership or responsibility for the citizens for any policy. The involvement of 
citizens in policy formation or the provision of space for political participation could be a 
legitimizing process for governments. When policy making is conducted transparently and 
open to citizen participation, there could be a shared sense of responsibility of the outcome 
even if the outcome may not meet expectations of the citizens.  As Searing et al. (2007) 
argued, “those who still disagree with public policies may nevertheless accept them because 
of their satisfaction with having been involved in discussions about these matters (p.588).”  
Habermas (1997, p.46) also pointed out, “consensus and majority rule are compatible only if 
the latter has an internal relation to the search for truth: public discourse must mediate 
between reason and will, between the opinion-formation of all and the majoritarian will-
formation of the representatives.” 
All things considered, the role of political communication could be an integral 
mechanism in the legitimation process since both the state and the polity needs information 
and discursive space to enable the assessment of legitimacy. Whether it is the conformation 
to laws, mutual justification of beliefs or the display of consent, all these require 
communication. Governments have always sought to influence the perceptions of the people 
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to strengthen their legitimacy through communication and authoritarian governments 
throughout history have always sought to control the mass media outlets. However control of 
the media has never guaranteed control of the people, as evidenced by political revolutions 
throughout history. Taking over of broadcast stations and shutting down of internet could 
only delay political revolutions and not prevent it. Some regimes with restrictive media 
environment may have a supportive populace but support may not be due to the lack of 
opposing messages. Rather, the support could be due to other causes and with the support, 
allowing them to wield control of the media. The different approaches in the treatment of 
media space that the four societies take in this study could provide insights on how the 
mechanism of political communication control works in the legitimation process as other 
contributory factors for legitimacy are taken into account.  
While many have argued normatively the value of political discussions for legitimacy, 
few have empirical data to show the impact. Searing et al. (2007), through self-reported 
survey, showed that the “more that citizens discuss topics of public concern in public 
contexts, the more they are likely to see their government as accountable, attentive and 
legitimate.” This finding supports the view that legitimacy can be viewed as a continual 
process that can be strengthened with a conducive communications environment for the 
citizens. This study however, was conducted in the US and UK, which are liberal democratic 
in nature. It would be meaningful to examine whether inclusive political discussions in 
different governance systems would yield similar impact. The level of political 
communication control would have an impact on the people’s attitude and ability to discuss 
public issues (legitimation process), thereby providing this study with the theoretical impetus. 
For the context of this study, it would be timely to examine the concept of legitimacy 
and its perception within East Asia as the global economy begins to slow. After the Second 
World War, the legitimacy of governments in developing countries is widely viewed as based 
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on economic growth and the ability to bring about wealth creation to the masses. This is 
evidenced in China’s fixation on economic growth rate (Thompson, 2009) and the level of 
emphasis that the Chinese government places on communicating that to the public. Many 
other developing countries too depend on providing or achieving a certain level of economic 
growth so as to justify their rule. However, fast growing economies will eventually slow 
down and when that happens, regimes which are unable to respond appropriately and in a 
timely manner could face political instability. As can be seen with China, it “presented 8% 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth as a threshold below which the country's economy 
could not fall, if it hoped to maintain social stability” (Rein, 2013). No country in history, 
however, had been able to sustain high rate of growth perpetually and when the slowdown 
eventually begins, governments would have to manage unfulfilled expectations and the socio-
economic problems associated with slow economic growth. As maturing countries face 
increasing levels of unemployment and income disparity, legitimacy that is dependent on 
economic performance would weaken. Hence it is important to understand legitimacy as a 
continuous process on which the relationships and expectations between the dominant and the 
subordinate is formed, justified and communicated. 
In order to compare the case studies meaningfully, the societies selected comprise of 
predominantly population and culture of ethnic Han Chinese descent. This could minimise 
effects that could be due to cultural and ethnicity differences. In education research, these 
societies are also frequently grouped together as “Confucian heritage cultures” for the 
purpose of analysis and comparison (e.g. see Watkins & Biggs, 1996). Inglehart and Welzel 
(2010) constructed a “global cultural map” using data from the World Values Survey study 
and these societies are grouped together under the “Confucian” culture category. Based on 
“Traditional/Secular Rational” and “Survival/Self-Expression” dichotomies, these societies 
are “cultural neighbours” that score high on secular-rational and survival values. “Survival 
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values” place emphasis on economic and physical security while “self-expression values” 
give high priority to participation in decision-making in economic and political life. It should 
be highlighted that according to Inglehart and Welzel, scoring high on “survival” meant that 
respondents of these societies valued “self-expression” lesser.  In terms of economic 
development, based on Human Development Index, all these cities are classified under the 
“very high” category. Together, these demonstrated that the four case studies have many 
similar features, thus allowing for a more meaningful comparison.  
While cultural values and economic development in the four cities are on a 
comparable level, the freedom of expression situations in the four cities provide for contrast 
across the spectrum as mentioned previously. The massive media market of China creates an 
appearance that China has a vibrant and varied sources of information but all mainstream 
media outlets are directly or indirectly controlled by the CCP. (See Zhao, 2004). Many urban 
Chinese are aware of the controls that the CCP has on the media. The CCP is not coy about 
the control and openly declares that the media serves as the mouthpiece of the party. This is 
aligned with the Marxist view on the role of the press. Chines president, Xi Jinping, just 
recently reminded that the media must be share the same surname as the party, which means 
media is of the same family and under the direction of party leaders (Bloomberg News, 
2016). Chinese citizens are also well aware of censorship and many has rationalised the strict 
control as essential for the harmony of the society. In fact censorship and harmony has 
become a sort of a synonym since public officials often justify the policy as essential for 
maintenance of social harmony. While all local media outlets are connected to the CCP in 
one way or another, the massive market does provide variation to some extent in terms of 
willingness to push the boundaries of control. Many have the impression that media outlets in 
southern China are bolder in their reporting and Hong Kong-based Phoenix Television is 
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appreciated for deviating from the usual CCTV-like all positive content. This study focuses 
on the city of Beijing for comparison as it is the political capital for China.  
Hong Kong has usually been regarded to have a free media environment and was 
ranked favourably in terms of media freedom. The colonial government had not placed much 
restrictions on the industry and free market had allowed the media industry to flourish with 
multiple newspapers and broadcast stations. However, in recent years the image of an 
independent media has changed. While the local government has not placed any direct 
restrictions on the industry, Hong Kong residents are worried about the influence of China 
and are wary of the surreptitious actions that the Chinese government might take. Most 
recently, incidents such as the acquisition of the largest local English broadsheet, South 
China Morning Post, by a businessman from mainland China and the detaining of book 
publishers added to the apprehension. Freedom House’s latest report on media freedom 
highlighted Beijing’s “creeping control over Hong Kong media”. 
Singapore’s small media market meant that it could not support many media 
companies and over the years, two main companies have emerged. One company is directly 
owned by the government while the other is public listed with management shares that may 
only be transferred with the approval of the government, giving the government control over 
key management positions. Aside from local companies, foreign media can operate without 
much interference but faces threats on curtailment of circulation or advertisement if it runs 
afoul with the government. Libel suits were more common in the 1990’s while licensing 
schemes that require substantial monetary bonds are the new way to ensure media toe the 
line.  
Taiwan has the freest communication environment of the four societies studied. Other 
than common decency laws and influencing through advertising dollars, the government does 
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not impose much restrictions on the media. However, similar to Hong Kong, Taiwan’s media 
also face influences from China in recent years (Hsu, 2014) either through advertising dollars 
or pressure on media owners who have economic interests on both sides of the straits. It also 
suffers from the perception of low brow journalism that is based on scandals, sensationalism 
and gossip. Many Taiwanese think that the local media panders to the lowest denominator, 
concentrating their coverage on personalities, scandals and violence while lacking an 
international perspective in their content. This study focuses on the city of Taipei for 
comparison as it is the political capital for Taiwan.  
The next section will report on a survey conducted with university students in the four cities. 
Survey items include questions that relate to both performance and process legitimacy to help 
illuminate how the different communications environments affect people in the four cities.    
 
7.2 Survey Method 
This research conducted a survey (n=830) of university students from the four cities. 
The survey was conducted over 6 months between November 2014 to April 2015 via a paper 
and pen self-administered method. Student assistants were placed at public areas of 
universities (such as cafeterias and library entrances) in the cities to recruit respondents. No 
personal identifier information were collected to ensure the privacy of the respondents and 
only basic demographic information such as gender, family income and academic major of 
respondents were collected. Respondents are filtered to ensure that they have resided in the 
respective cities for at least 10 years and are currently studying in a university. 
The demographics of the survey respondents can be referred in Table 1. There are 
more females than males as is common in most survey studies. This could also be due to a 
gender gap with more females enrolled in universities. The mean age of respondents in the 
four cities are close to each other and Singapore has the highest mean age as male 
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Singaporeans have to undergo 2 years of compulsory military service before starting 
university education.  
For the measure of perception of legitimacy, the questions “Over the long run, our 
system of government is capable of solving the problems our country faces”, “A system like 
ours, even if it runs into problems deserves the people’s support” and “I would rather live 
under our system of government than any other that I can think of” are used. It is 
acknowledged that legitimacy as a concept is much more complex than could be captured by 
a few survey questions. However, as mentioned in the literature review, there is no common 
measure for political legitimacy and researchers rely on proxy measures that conceptually 
(for example willingness to pay taxes and adhering to laws) that fits their theoretical 
reasoning. This thesis takes the position of descriptive legitimacy that focuses on it being 
accorded by the people and, hence, questions relating to support of the political system 
provides the most suitable proxy measure for descriptive concept of legitimacy. Cronbach’s 
alpha for these three items is 0.751, which indicates acceptable internal consistency.  
7.3 Findings & Analysis  
Table 3.2 presents the mean and standard deviation values for survey items that this 
chapter will discuss on and regress against perception of legitimacy. As indicated in the table, 
assessment of political system, frequency of political talk and assessment of media freedom 
are computed from the sum of two to three items.  Assessment of economy (both for the 
country and own family) is included to account for output or performance legitimacy for 
which many commonly attribute as a key reason for political stability. For the examination of 
freedom of expression, items include whether respondents believe media freedom is 
important and assessments of how free and representative the media are. Other measures 
include commonly examined constructs of political interest, political efficacy, authoritarian 
orientation and individualist/collectivist attitude.    
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The lower mean values for assessment of media freedom in Beijing and Singapore 
corresponds with media freedom rankings according to Freedom House and Reporters 
without Borders, verifying that respondents are aware of the controls. This signals that 
respondents on the whole are quite aware of the level of media freedom that they have and 
are not living in a bubble created by the strict controls. In this current information age, it is 
unlikely students in higher education would be entirely clueless about the controls. It is why 
they accept or rationalise the lack of media freedom that needs to be further explored. Table 
3. shows the percentage of respondents in each city choosing a more liberal position for 
questions relating to freedom of expression. When the question is framed to include 
consideration of political stability, Hong Kong and Taipei shows a larger drop in respondents 
in choosing a more liberal position. This suggests that more respondents in Beijing and 
Singapore has already internalised the justification that media control is needed for political 
control even without prompting. Comparing between general control of ideas to be discussed 
in society and control of media, Beijing and Singapore show a difference of about 10% more 
respondents thinking that the media should be free while Hong Kong and Taipei shows a 
jump of 24 to 28%. This shows that in the consideration of control of communication, more 
respondents in Hong Kong and Taipei think that the media plays a more important role.  
In Table 4., results are presented for linear regression examining correlation of 
perception of legitimacy in the four cities with the explanatory variables in Table 2. 
Standardized coefficients are reported with standard error in parentheses. There is no variable 
that is significant in all four cities. Assessment of country’s economic condition, authoritarian 
orientation, assessment of media freedom and assessment of freedom of speech are 
significant in three of four cities. First in examining performance based legitimacy, 
assessment of economic conditions mattered at the country level for Beijing, Singapore and 
Taipei. Assessment of own family’s economic condition is not a significant variable across 
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all four cities, indicating that respondents do not judge the government based on personal 
circumstances.  
Commonly examined concepts such as political interest, political efficacy and 
individualist/collectivist orientation were not significant in the cities other than for Hong 
Kong. Curiously, authoritarian orientation is significant for every city other than Beijing.  
A contradiction, appears to occur with Beijing’s respondents as a preference of lower media 
freedom (as shown by a coefficient of -0.273) and better assessment of freedom of speech 
(coefficient 0.204) predicts better perception of political system. 3rd person effect (Mcleod, 
1997) can be explained here in that people are upset when they feel that their ability to freely 
express their opinion is curtailed but for the media, they think that some control in the mass 
media is good for the society as others may require the protection from misinformation. This 
research has also collected focus group data which corroborated with this inference that there 
is a 3rd person effect for a substantial number of respondents in Beijing.    
Another contradiction pertains to Taipei’s negative correlation between assessment of 
media freedom and perception of legitimacy (See Table 4.). It would appear that there can be 
too much media freedom if media professionals do not perform responsibly within an 
unrestricted environment. As pointed out by journalist, Chris Fuchs (2014), “while mainland 
China, Taiwan’s cross-strait rival, continues to keep a tight leash on its media, Taiwan’s 
freewheeling television, print, and web media — and their penchant for superficial reportage 
— are causing antipathy among a growing number of its inhabitants”. When asked whether 
the media in their city should have more or less freedom, Taipei is the only city with many 
more respondents selecting the “lesser” option (See Figure 1.) while other cities mostly 
answered stay the same or more.  
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The hypothesis as set out by Searing et al. (2007) that as the more citizens discuss 
social and political issues, the more they would see their government as accountable and 
legitimate did not pan out in this study. None of the cities show significant correlation 
between frequency of political talk and perception of political system, suggesting that simply 
having more frequent discussions is not going to aid in improving perception of the political 
system. It should also be noted that imposing a restrictive communications environment may 
not necessarily tamp down on political discussions as mean values of reported frequency do 
not correspond with rankings of media freedom. In fact, respondents from Beijing reported 
the highest frequency while Taipei has the lowest frequency for political discussions.   
Perception of how representative the media is shows significant correlation with 
perception of political system for Hong Kong and Taipei. The difference in not showing 
significant correlation for Singapore and Beijing is not likely due to freer media being better 
at representing the people’s voices as the mean values for perception of how well the media 
represent their opinions are similar across the four cities. This suggests that perception of the 
role of the media could be different between cities that enjoy a higher degree of media 
freedom and those that do not. Focus group interviews conducted by this study indicate that 
respondents from Beijing and Singapore frame mainstream media as merely sources of 
information while respondents from Hong Kong and Taipei do mention providing a voice for 
the people as one of the functions of mainstream media.  
The model of input/output legitimacy appears to fit in the cities of Beijing, Singapore 
and Taipei as assessment of economy and assessment of freedom of speech are significantly 
correlated. As for Hong Kong, the transitory nature of its political system that incorporates 
elements from both authoritarian and democratic systems has led to a conflicted populace. 
Respondents who are least interested in politics and most authoritarian leaning have the most 
positive perception of the government. However, Hong Kong also has the highest demand for 
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freedom of expression. Having experienced years of freedom of expression and still being 
able to progress with stability, it is less likely that many people in Hong Kong would agree 
with the justification that media control is needed for political stability. The widespread 
student protests in 2014 on electoral reforms probably contributed to differences in how 
respondents ascertain legitimacy of their government as compared to respondents from other 
cities.  
7.4 Conclusion 
It must be acknowledged that the survey data collection process is not ideal. However, 
there is no currently available data set that addresses the issues on hand and to conduct a 
representative survey would be beyond the financial capability of a PhD project. Comparing 
the responses from this project with the data from wave 3 of Asian Barometer that share some 
of the survey items does show similar patterns. Hence while the data may not allow us to 
make wider and representative conclusions, it does illuminate the issues at hand and provide 
a basis for future research.  
Assessments and reports on media freedom are normally written by academics and 
media elites who may experience first-hand the impact of communication control, be it 
censorship, libel suits or loss of income/employment. However, for the ordinary citizen, such 
impact are more likely heard or read about than personally felt. Only when they feel that they 
personally need to restrict themselves in whatever situation do they bring it home or draw a 
connection to the government. Otherwise, such communication restrictions could be deemed 
as necessary or at the very least justified as beneficial for maintaining social harmony and 
stability in the country.   
Given that respondents who view they have freedom of speech are more likely to 
view the political system favourably, the question some would be asking is whether it is 
possible to control individuals with opposing views while allowing the general public to feel 
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that they are personally unrestricted. In reviewing China’s recent strategies in public opinion 
management (See King et al. 2013), some measures are clearly in alignment with this 
chapter’s findings. For example, online postings were mostly left alone except for those that 
were widely shared. This calibrated approach could well point to the Chinese government 
understanding that restricting expression would hurt their legitimacy and thus they only 
restrict it to those few who are able to reach a wider audience while leaving the vast majority 
alone. The large domestic market also meant that the Chinese government can afford to block 
out international services while cultivating home-grown services that are willing to conduct 
such controls on behalf of the government. Coupled with the fact that most communication 
happen online now and technology is able to help dole out restrictions with subtleties and 
sophistication according to how influential each individual is, it is all the more likely that 
such controls would sustain without hurting their legitimacy too much since the average 
Chinese can go about their daily activities without feeling any overt restrictions.   
Based on the literature, there was an intention at the start of this study to explain that a 
freer communication environment could lead to more political talk and consequently 
legitimizes the political system as communication about and with the government allows for 
justification of government policies and actions. However, the data has shown that it would 
be wishful to think that many more would be participating in discussions of policies with a 
freer communication environment. More freedom of expression does not mean that the 
average citizen is suddenly going to read more and discuss more about the government and 
policies, as demonstrated by Taipei’s low reported frequency in political discussions. While 
the data indicates that actual or more frequent political talk is not the mechanism that 
contributes to better perception of the government, the data still suggests that not placing 
restrictions on expression in general would be beneficial to some extent.  
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Rather than seeking personal rights for expression, it would seem that many are 
concerned about creating a more conducive environment for everyone in general so that those 
who are more willing to participate can express themselves. At the end of the day, the free-
rider mentality probably exists and most would not be paying more attention to government 
policies and actions other than in “not in my backyard” situations whereby their interests are 
directly affected. Similar to how Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) describe the demand for 
“stealth democracy” in USA whereby Americans want democracy but are not prepared to 
devote the personal effort in contribution and participation, it would be fair to suggest that 
citizens in this part of the world demand freedom of expression not particularly for their own 
expression but to allow for the possibility that other citizens could keep the government in 
check.  
While there is an obvious demand for more freedom of expression in cities with 
stricter media control (see Figure 1.), the data from Table 2. showed that respondents from 
Beijing and Singapore would be willing to sacrifice the freedom for political stability. Hence, 
it would suggest that freedom of expression is important but given the right persuasive or 
sufficient justification, stability is much preferred. This study also conducted focus groups as 
part of the study and found that Singaporean respondents tend to compare their situation with 
China while Chinese respondents compare themselves with North Korea and then concluding 
that their own situation is not that intolerable. This shows that what matters is whether such 
communication policies can be justified and whether the people agree with the justification. 
That being said, the resources needed for calibrated communication control could be put to 
better use with the loosening of controls and involvement of citizens in governance processes.  
NGOs championing for freer media should also take note that simply asking states to 
relinquish their control of the media is not going to be effective. A free media does not equate 
to a responsible and representative one that is beneficial to society. Resources should also be 
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allocated for professional training and building up of public service media that are 
responsible and ethical. Otherwise, free media that practices yellow journalism would only 






















8.1 The Paradox of Media Freedom 
For many, it seems like a straightforward question, given a choice, people would 
prefer to have a media not limited by state control. However, when asked whether the media 
should have more freedom, less freedom or the same amount of freedom, Taipei surprisingly 
has a large percentage of respondents asking for lesser freedom in the media. Comparatively, 
Beijing and Hong Kong have about 5% asking for lesser or a lot lesser freedom for the media, 
Singapore has just 1% while Taipei has 28.4% asking for lesser or a lot lesser freedom.  
The two cities (Hong Kong and Taipei) with freer environment have higher mean 
values when asked whether they think it is important for the media to be free to publish news 
without government control (4.06 for Hong Kong and 3.95 for Taipei). Comparatively, the 
mean value for Beijing is 3.31 and the mean value for Singapore is 3.19. When the question 
on media freedom is posed as a dichotomy between the media having the right to publish 
without government control and government having the right to prevent the media from 
publishing things that it thinks will be politically destabilising, the result is similar as Beijing 
and Singapore have mean values of 2.88 and 2.86 respectively while Hong Kong and Taipei 
score 2.07 and 2.35 respectively. (See Table 4.2 for details)  
From these 2 questions, it is apparent that respondents in Hong Kong and Taipei place 
a higher importance on media freedom as compared to Beijing and Singapore. However, 
respondents from Taipei seek less media freedom as compared to the other cities. The cities 
that have lesser media freedom and did not place as high a value on media freedom however 
seek more media freedom. So how do we explain this conflict in belief? 
The media freedom paradox also manifests itself in the difference between content 
producers and content consumers. Referring back to Table 4.1, on aggregate, for all four 
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cities, more survey respondents think that the government should have oversight over the 
media as compared to the government having the right to decide what the people can access 
on the internet. The difference in expectations could indicate that many are of the view that 
the mainstream media have a larger responsibility and have an effect on the people and thus 
the government should have oversight over it.  
A key to understanding this paradox is not to view the puzzle in terms of absolute 
freedom. Rather, it is about the level of freedom for which the people can tolerate and agree 
with. The people have to be in agreement with the government that control is necessary. The 
perception that there is gradual change and progress is also important in having the people 
agree with the control. This would be shown in the focus group data. People think that 
compared to past, it is better. People also agree that some level of control of necessary.   
How control is being framed is as important as how much or what is being controlled. 
Most respondents who agree that control is necessary think that there are others in society 
which needed the control. Those that needed to be regulated could be irresponsible media 
practitioners or ignorant public members who are easily influenced. The unifying theme is 
that the respondents have framed themselves as being capable of responsible and independent 
thoughts while others might require additional guidance. This conforms to the third-person 
effect hypothesis in media studies. While this research did not set out to investigate on third-
person effect, many of the respondents gave responses and explanations that adhere to the 
third-person effect hypothesis.  
Going along this line of thought, this chapter would examine the responses through 
how they position self, government and media in the issue of media control. This chapter will 
first elaborate on the focus group design and process. Following that it would be a general 
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description of the findings for each city and finally a thematic analysis. The conclusion would 
then examine the overall acceptance of communications control across the four cities.  
8.2 Focus Group Method 
The focus groups sessions were conducted in the 6 months’ period between 
November 2014 and May 2015. Given that the topic would be politically sensitive in some 
cities, the focus groups were intentionally kept small to an average of four participants in 
each session. This thus reduce fears of speaking in front of a large group. See Table 4. 
The sessions were conducted in the spoken language for which respondents were most 
comfortable with. Hence Mandarin was used for participants in Beijing and Taipei, 
Cantonese for participants in Hong Kong and English for participants in Singapore. In 
Beijing and Hong Kong, there were student assistants from the same university that the 
respondents were from to help with the conduct of the sessions. For Hong Kong, the need for 
student assistants was mainly due to language as the author is not proficient in Cantonese. For 
Beijing, the use of student assistants was to put the participants at ease. The topic discussed 
was considered sensitive and there would be reservations in expressing their opinions if the 
only person asking questions were a foreigner. The perceived social environment would be 
less formal and friendlier with someone of similar age group asking most of the questions.  
All sessions were audio recorded for analysis. Participants were briefed before each 
session and consent was sought for the recording. Participants were also assured that they 
could opt to stop or withdraw from the focus group at any point during or after the session 
should they feel uncomfortable with the questions. Each session lasted between 60 to 90 
minutes depending on how much the participants respond to the questions.  
The aim of the focus group sessions is to elicit viewpoints on what the respondents 
think are the roles of the media and what they think about media control. Respondents were 
asked directly what they think should be the role of the media and what the role the media is 
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playing now. Leading on from roles of the media, they were asked whether the media play 
any role in helping them assess the performance of the government. They were also asked 
how controlled do they think their media are and whether there should be changes to the 
situation. It was also anticipated that it might not be easy for some to discuss the issues 
conceptually or in abstract terms since for many, the media is simply resources for 
entertainment and information. Notions of media freedom and representation in media are not 
what people are concerned with if the political culture has no such emphasis. Thus the focus 
groups were designed to include some thorny scenarios to assist participants in thinking about 
how the media would/should function in those scenarios.   
The first scenario explores the “not in my backyard syndrome” that any society would 
face. It is intended to help respondents think about representation in media and voicing 
concerns to the government. Respondents were presented with the scenario that the 
government has announced that it plans to build a nuclear power plant just outside the city 
which they reside in. The scenario was chosen as it has obvious risks and benefits that the 
society needs. It is also sufficiently general enough as any society has demands for energy 
and carbon-based energy is commonly known to be finite. The risks for nuclear power plants 
are also well known as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear accident happened in 2011 and was 
widely reported globally. For the scenario they were asked whether they would agree or 
oppose to such a plan and what they would do if they oppose. Then follow up questions 
included what role do they think the media would play in such a situation, whether the 
government would consider the public’s opinions and whether they would be willing to 
express their views to journalists should they be approached on the street. Respondents were 
also asked whether it would make any difference whether they were interviewed by local or 
foreign media.  
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The second scenario asked the respondents to describe how they would seek more 
information should they hear about a rumour of a local hospital being quarantined and 
possibility of patients dying from flu-like symptoms. The scenario examines views on 
censorship and information control. This scenario also examines the perception of 
transparency of government communication in times of public crisis.  Many parts of Asia had 
been through this type of public crisis with SARS in 2003 and H1N1 pandemic in 2009. 
Most, if not all, respondents would have had some experience with such a serious public 
health crisis. Respondents were also asked whether they think the government would cover 
up such an incident and whether the media would be influenced by the government in how 
they report the incident.  
The third scenario examines whether respondents view the media as a form of 
supervision of the government. Respondents were asked if they would expose government 
officials to the media should they come across evidence of corruption. Whistleblowing of 
government corruption is the clearest and most direct example of acting as a check on 
government. Follow up questions include whether they would instead post such evidence 
online, share on social media or simply report to the relevant government authority. The three 
scenarios thus cover the common functions/roles that a free media environment that would in 
theory contribute towards the legitimising of a government.   
The transcripts were coded and analysed were guided by the strategies as described in 
Corbin and Strauss (2008). Responses that relate to concepts of media and expression were 
coded and then categorised into themes related to process legitimacy.  
All cities had three sessions except for Beijing with 4 sessions. Beijing had an 
additional session as the participants in the first session was relatively quiet and reserved. 
Hence the decision was made to arrange for an additional session. For each city, there would 
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be one session for students from sciences/engineering faculties, one session for students from 
arts/humanities/social sciences faculties and a session for students from a mix of both. This is 
to ensure that this study draws the opinions from students of different academic backgrounds. 
It was also intended to have an even mix of male and female participants in each city and in 
general it was quite balance except for Hong Kong.  
8.2.2 Limitations of the focus group method 
In some of the sessions, there were some signs of hesitation for some questions, so 
some respondents might be withholding their true or deeper sentiments. While respondent 
might have been briefed and assured before the start of the session that their identity would 
be protected, the questions asked during the session could still be unsettling for some.  
The average person does not use language or choose words with precision. It is not 
always possible to clarify on the spot during the conduct of the focus group sessions as to 
clarify every ambiguous statement would hinder the flow of the conversation. Sometimes it 
could also be that only in the transcribing and coding process that one realises a statement 
could be ambiguous. Hence while as far as possible this research would code to the most 
relevant meaning/reference that the respondents may make, there is still some substantial 
amount of subjectivity in the coding and analysis. This is an inherent weakness in the focus 
group method.   
The ingrained patriotism in China makes it hard for the respondents to criticise the 
government. The rhetoric in China is that the party equals the government which equals the 
country. To many, criticising the party is akin to criticising the country and being critical of 
the country is unpatriotic. Culturally, there is also the tendency to “Hu Duan”, which means 
to shield shortcomings and forbid others from criticising one’s kinship. Hence, to be critical 
of the government or country to foreigners would not be something many would do. As one 
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Chinese respondent puts it, “Domestically, I may be saying whatever I have to say, if it is for 
foreign media, I definitely would still protect the image of China.” 
At various points during the focus group sessions, when it appears that the questions 
would elicit responses that reflect China negatively, some respondents would intentionally 
add in justifications on why certain policies or point out that other countries face the same 
issue too. For example, a Beijing respondent points out “Maybe there are some things 
becomes too messy once you insist on it being a particular way. I feel that this question is not 
a China's problem”. Respondents from other cities however do not show any signs that they 
held back in criticising their government.  
8.3 Findings and Analysis  
Analysis is focused on the content of speech and not on the non-verbal speech 
elements. Hence, non-verbal speech elements such as hesitation, changes in tone, volume, 
speed are not analysed. Although it is acknowledged these speech elements would contain 
vast amount of information, they are not analysed as in many instances it would require 
subjective interpretation. However obvious sarcasm and jokes which a respondent may say 
and other respondents reacted to are noted and analysed accordingly rather taking the literal 
meaning of the words uttered.  
 
General Observations and Perception of the Government 
In every session, respondents would portray themselves as media literate and savvy. 
No one indicated that they or the people around them needed the government to tell them 
what news to read or what media to consume. Interest and awareness in socio-politico issues 
and information is quite varied amongst the respondents. Across all four cities, there are 
respondents who expressed apathy towards politics and would not want to have anything to 
do with it if the issues do not concern them. This is especially apparent for respondents from 
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China and Singapore. It may seem like the respondents are only concerned about their 
immediate surroundings and self-interests, which as described by Lerner (1958) is being 
“backward”. Lerner’s view is one of many views on modernization and many theories of 
modernization focus on socio-economic development which theorised that as societies get 
richer, there would be a change in people’s values to become more concerned with the wider 
society. However, the lack of empowerment and civic engagement in these societies could be 
a better explanation.   
All the respondents are all born after 1990 and the youths in all these 4 cities would 
have experienced life that is relatively well-provided for. What is different would be the 
political climate for which they are brought up in.  The political liberalisation in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong in the 1980’s and 1990’s had been aided by top down liberalizations to some 
extent. The colonial government of Hong Kong and Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan had taken 
steps to liberalized the political landscapes.  On the other hand, the governments in China and 
Singapore clamped down on bottom up growth of civil society in the 1980’s.  
The behaviour of the respondents thus could be a reflection of what they could 
possibly do in the kind of political context that they are in. When caring for matters that only 
indirectly concern them carries the possibility of severe repercussions, it is not unexpected 
that lesser people are willing to stick their heads out. Some may argue that these community 
sentiments are learned as those in more liberal societies are exposed to more of such actions 
and activities, however, the growth of such activities could also be due to the lesser costs 
involved in the more liberal societies. Perception on the socio-politico climate in the cities 





Respondents from Beijing generally think that they do not have any influence on the 
government. However, it has to be noted that while most people do not think that they have 
any influence over the government, it does not mean that the CCP can govern without care of 
the people’s opinions. The absence of a revolving door politics also mean that those in power 
have to be mindful of longer term politics. The loss in support of the party would equate to 
the collapse of the system. It is not like there is any other political party ready to take over the 
governing of the country once the people lose confidence in the ruling party.  
When voters in USA vote in a non-traditional politician to lead the country or the UK 
vote to leave the EU, many narratives in the media were that the people are tired of the 
politics as usual and want to throw in a spanner to disrupt the system. For them it is different 
as institutions exists with sufficient stability and independence from political parties to keep 
the countries functioning. This not the same for China as the CCP is embedded in every 
institution that makes decision in the country. Both the government and the governed are well 
aware that the CCP losing support and legitimacy is not going to be simply a change to 
another party but would likely be a system collapse. Both know the consequences would be 
disastrous and would rather take the path of gradual change within the CCP, even if change is 
going to be at glacial pace. What matters is not the human rights or the freedom of speech 
that the Western media constantly report about. Those matters do not feature in their daily 
life. For the average person in China, it is about finding ways to achieve what they need and 
want, without making any turbulence in society. This is the same for Singapore as many of 
those who expressed aversion towards PAP’s controls would also lament that there is no 
viable alternative in opposition that could take over the reins.  
Generally, Beijing respondents based their assessment of the government on what 
they can personally see and experience or what their family relate to them. In other words, 
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“lived experience” forms their opinions. However, there were more than a few confused 
looks when queried how they assess the performance of the government. This reflects that 
culturally, the people do not think about judging the performance of the government. After 
all, there is not much anyone can do even if one is not satisfied with the performance of the 
government. There may be small scale elections for some villages and small towns but at the 
urban city level, there is no election mechanisms to change out the people in government and 
poor performance is not breaking the law. One Beijing respondent however did mention 
about a teacher in high school making her class examine the targets that the local government 
posted at the beginning of the year and then compare what was actually achieved by the end 
of the year.  
While the respondents may think that they cannot influence the government, they 
would frequently come to the conclusion that the government would not let negative 
outcomes happen. According to them, problems happen because local governments do not 
follow instructions from the central government or there are simply too many low quality (see 
“suzhi” below) people breaking the rules. For them, even when unpopular measures are 
carried out, there would always be reasons for the collective good for which those measures 
are carried out. This shows that while China is ruled by an authoritarian government, the CCP 
is still mindful of public opinions. Much of what it does still aligns with what the masses 
want. Perry (2015) also argues that the CCP is a populist government and much of what it 
does reflects the people’s demand for economic progress and national pride.   
Populism as a concept does not have a definition that is widely accepted. However, in 
general, it has been commonly used as a negative label for manifestos and policies that appeal 
to certain large groups of citizens while in most situations would not be beneficial to the 
whole country. Classic examples would be tax cuts that could result in budget deficits or 
expenditure on infrastructures that do not have sufficient demand. Other common policies 
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include race biased welfare policies that favour a certain portion of the population or 
subsidies for inefficient industries that have oversized voting power. In essence, populism is 
not based on any particular ideology but conforms according to whatever policies that could 
garner support. From this perspective, the CCP can arguably be seen as a populist 
government.   
Respondents from Beijing frequently bring up the term “suzhi” (“素质”) when 
explaining why they think China needs to control its media. “Suzhi” can be loosely translated 
as “quality” or “human quality”. It is not quality in a biological or eugenics sense but quality 
seen in terms of a person’s behaviour. It is about whether one is civilised and cultured, or not. 
In general, many Chinese use the term to justify for more control over the people as the 
“suzhi” of many in China has not reached a level for which their behaviours are good for 
China. (See elaboration on “suzhi” in Kipnis 2006) 
As explained by a Beijing respondent, “Currently, China's society is not perfect, the 
quality of the people has not reached a certain level, so to put it in not a nice way, the quality 
of a large proportion of Chinese people is still low, that is, those with higher education is still 
in the minority, so there are few people who could handle those information, only a small 
part of the population has the ability to make rational judgements. Most people still appear 
to just follow suit, or would show extreme reactions. So current work on the control of public 
opinion is still necessary, after all, now the situation in China is not particularly optimistic.” 
The thinking that many in China lack “suzhi” means that many thinks that the internet 
is a wild west that needs to be controlled. Given free reins, the vast majority of internet users 
in China might result in social instability. As one respondent said, “And then if the so-called 
public opinion is too much or what, I think the internet would be up in arms, because Chinese 
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internet users are very easily incited, and then I feel that it is easy for them to get angry over 
anything.” 
Another reason that is frequently brought up by Chinese respondents is “guoqing” 
(“国情”). This refers to the “national conditions” that the country faces. It is an imprecise and 
catchall term for any condition that could explain why the government did what they did. It 
could refer to economic conditions, human development factors, political system etc. 
Basically, this is an echo of the government stance as the term has been used in much of the 
CCP’s propaganda when arguing for not liberalising the country. Many Chinese has thus 
internalised the term and use it to justify and defend the government’s policies. When 
unknowns or whatever possible scenarios are juxtaposed with the existing difficulties that the 
country faces, it would appear to most Chinese that status quo may not be that bad. After all, 
why rock the boat or try to do something different that could possibly make the situation 
worse of. A few respondents did wistfully indicated that they hope for more 
freedom/liberalization in China but will nonetheless come back to the point on “guoqing” and 
then conclude that it is not possible for the moment.  
A related “guoqing” factor is that there are simply too many people. Chinese 
respondents would frequently fall back on this reason when explaining why control is needed. 
For them, there are too many people for the media to represent everyone’s views. One 
respondent lamented about not being able to vote for a representative in government but 
almost immediately would say that the sheer number of Chinese people would make logistics 
for voting impossible. There are simply too many people for elections to take place. They 
have to be part of a unity. Individual and private views are looked upon as self-interested 
while public opinions are simply subsumed under national interests.  
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Finally, it must be pointed out that China is a high-context society and in the 
discussion of politics, much are left unsaid but merely implied. First proposed by Edward 
Hall in 1976 (See Kim, Pan & Park 1998), the high-low context culture concept refers to 
differences in the amount of information conveyed in communication practices for different 
cultures. A low context culture depends less on contextual cues and require people to convey 
more information during communication while a high context culture convey lesser 
information and expects the other party to know the background information required to 
make sense of what is communicated.   The concept does not put different cultures in a 
continuum but depends on a set of factors and could be applied to different foci across 
nations.  China is a high-context culture for which the subject matter of politics is very high 
in context. One is expected to know the background and reasons for key events or be brushed 
off using the commonly used phrase “ni dong de” (translated as “you should know it” or “you 
should understand it”). A significant amount of what was discussed in the focus groups thus 
are deemed as ambiguous and open to interpretation.  
 
Hong Kong 
The political landscape in Hong Kong is struggling through a transition now as the 
younger generation attempts make sense of their identity in the one country two systems 
arrangement. Many in the younger generation received education that included citizenship 
education that highlighted importance of civil society and participation.  
However, a large swath of the Hong Kong population is still averse towards politics 
and would avoid political activities. Some respondents indicated that their family are not 
supportive of their participation in protests or other activities as they are politically. It is not 
only due to parental pressure as many respondents also indicated that they are themselves 
cautious about getting into discussions on politics lest conflicts occur due to differences in 
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viewpoints. So many would rather avoid talking about politics unless they know the 
interlocutor well.  
Respondents still have a high level of confidence with the Hong Kong civil service 
but that appears to be eroding according to some respondents. Many acknowledge that the 
Hong Kong government is constrained by the mainland government. So even if the Hong 
Kong people expressed their views and opinions, the Hong Kong government may not be 
able to carry it out due to the pressure from mainland. Overall, their anger and dissatisfaction 
is generally directed towards the mainland government.  
Singapore 
Many respondents from Singapore expressed lack of interest in politics and 
government policies. For many of them, political issues do not concern them. The political 
landscape in Singapore is probably the most predictable and staid in the world. A respondent 
from Singapore explains why apathy or ambivalence develops, “I thought ambivalence 
includes more like, more like don’t care rather than you fear. Cos like, if you are going, 
ultimately since there’s a consequence right, so if there’s going to be a consequence then I as 
well like don’t care what. Right? But then if there’s no consequence then maybe people will 
start formulating, like thinking about it more, cos there’s no consequence and I can voice my 
opinions, so I will think about the matter more. If I know there’s a consequence then, might 
as well I just don’t go there.” 
Most think that the government would simply do what it thinks is right regardless of 
what the public think. Most think that public consultations are merely going through the 
motion as the government would always just do what they had planned or announced. Many 
cited the building of the casinos in the last decade as an example of the government’s lack of 
concern of public opinion.  
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However, after more than 50 years of single party rule, many Singaporeans may have 
already accepted the system that has been shaped by the PAP to be unable to produce a 
government formed by other political parties. The extended period of rule that has brought 
about consistent economic growth has also convinced many of the capability of the 
government, with one respondent simply saying “They know what is best for us.” Many of 
them would also compare the level of development in Singapore with other neighbouring 
countries, especially Malaysia, in order to justify their unquestioning trust of the government.  
Respondents from Singapore would also frequently mention the rapid change in 
education and literacy over the years. The mean years of schooling for Singaporeans above 
25 years old was 4.7 years in 1980 and 10.7 years in 2016. The change within one to two 
generations for which the average education received was merely primary school level to the 
current tertiary level is immense. This means that many respondents have parents and 
grandparents who have had very few years of education, if any. Many respondents thus 
emphasized that their generation is different from their parents’ generation and even more 
different than their grandparents’ generation. The large gap in educational level could then 
cause many young people to think that many in the older generation lack the literacy and 
skills to be critical of information. This attitude is especially heightened given the frequent 
discussions on how the younger generations, as “digital natives”, are different from the older 
generations who are “digital migrants”. This view of large difference in literacy informs how 
they talk about media control amongst different generations in Singapore.  
 
Taipei  
Taipei’s liberal political and media landscape allowed the people much space to 
express themselves. All the respondents were open about their thoughts and would even 
express embarrassment about the chaotic nature of their politics and media. Except for a few 
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who indicated lack of interest, most demonstrated that they are politically aware and 
informed. Many also indicated that the younger generation are not like the older generation 
who are more party biased. Most of them indicated that they base their support on the 
candidate and the platform for which they campaign on.  
Criticism about the government seems to be accepted and respondents do not have the 
tendency to defend the government or government actions. People may indicate distrust of 
the government but that does not mean they do not want the government involved in their 
lives. Many would still want the government to do many things as they know that provision 
of public goods would require a central authority. Pew Research Center (2015) too found that 
Americans may indicate distrust in their government but would still want government 
intervention in many aspects of their life.  
Perception of the Media  
China has the most restrictive communications out of the four cites and it is definitely not that 
the Chinese are unaware of the controls. As one respondent said, ”CCTV News definitely would not 
(trust), because everyone says that if you feel that your life is blissful, then you are living inside CCTV 
News.” Some respondent would also mention that the CCP control the media through framing of 
issues and usage of more positive language. However, not trusting it does not mean that they avoid 
these sources totally. The reality on the ground is that most people know that they have to take the 
information disseminated with a large pinch of salt. Most people are not watching and reading the 
news as it is. Many people are reading and watching the news in an attempt to decipher what are the 
leaders in CCP want or plan to do. Other than that, they would still watch CCTV as it has become a 
family routine for which their family would spend time with.  
Beijing respondents are clear about the government’s position on the role of the media in 
China. A respondent puts in across bluntly, “The role they actually play, then actually, media you also 
know, they are the throat and tongue of the party, the role they play is to let you know what the party 
wants you to know, they tell you, that’s it.” The respondents also demonstrated that they are aware of 
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the extent of the controls as when asked what media outlet is official government media (and 
therefore controlled by the government), a respondent replied that “actually everything that you see, 
basically are all official”. While it is not wrong to all media are controlled by the government, there 
is a need to clarify the type and level of control. Allowing the government to remove content is not 
the same as reproducing everything the CCP propaganda department churns out. There are official 
media outlets such as CCTV and People’s Daily that function solely as the voice of CCP and are 
completely funded by the government. Many other media outlets (while still having to be supervised 
by provincial authorities) function as market driven media outlets that depend on advertising and 
readership to sustain themselves. Hence while the media landscape is firmly within the control of the 
government, there is still differentiation of content and some media outlets do try to push the 
boundaries in a bid to fight for eyeballs. Some For example, Southern Weekly (some translate as 
Southern Weekend), a publication based in Guangzhou, China has a reputation of having a more 
liberal stance and had numerous run-ins with the government for publishing controversial topics.  
Many respondents also gave the example of Phoenix TV as an outlet that has a more objective 
voice. Phoenix TV is a media company based in Hong Kong and is permitted to broadcast in 
mainland China. The company is partly owned by CCTV, which according to the company’s CEO is 
to signal that the company would not go against the CCP (Pan 2005). While not entirely independent, 
Phoenix’s news channel has a better reputation of being more objective and truthful than other state 
media in China.  
The lack of trust for almost every media meant that many respondents from Beijing end up 
saying that they rely on their social circle and many respondents mentioned “friends around me” when 
asked about where they would get information. Relying on social circle for information obviously 
have severe limitations since most people would not have the social connections that afford access to 
timely information. This would mean that many would be relying on hearsays and rumours. However, 
saying that you trust your family and friends for information would not appear as gullible as saying 
one depend on mainstream media for information when everyone knows that mainstream media is 
controlled by the government.   
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This lack of trust in almost every media shows that the CCP does not have to convince the 
Chinese people that state run media are always right. They merely need to seed doubts in the Chinese 
people towards other information sources. This simple strategy of muddying the entire information 
environment is sufficient for them to able to do relatively well in shepherding public opinions in 
China in this internet age. No one in China believes everything that the government or state-run media 
proclaim. But when many people in China doubt the intentions and objectivity of foreign media, it 
creates a deficiency of information sources for which the Chinese people could turn to. Now all that 
the CCP needs to do is to convince the Chinese people that even when Chinese state media lie or hide 
something from the public, Chinese state media did it for the common good. 
However, a controlled media that is not prompt in informing or would not inform the people 
creates an environment that is susceptible to the spread of disinformation since they know that the 
possibility of the government blocking the media is high. Although the respondents indicated the need 
to be wary of gossips or baseless information, the lack of credible information in the mainstream 
media would still drive many towards their social circle. There are indications that there are efforts to 
educate the people about being wary of fake information/fake news but the lack of credible and 
reliable sources does not help the people navigate through the communication landscape. Rather it 
seems that it is more about cultivating a general sense of scepticism so that when state apparatus is not 
trusted then no other source is trusted as well. The level of scepticism towards all forms of media 
would work to CCP’s advantage since even reputable international news agencies would be doubted 
by the Chinese people. Hence even news stories from international news agencies that exposed the 
wealth of Chinese leaders would be looked upon with some scepticism.   
Responses on whether there is any difference in speaking to local or foreign media reveals the 
differences in how respondents view the role of the media. Even when respondents from Beijing 
know that their local media would censor content, they indicated a preference in talking to local media 
rather than foreign media. According to them, it is safer to talk to local media as they would edit out 
anything that is not appropriate. Hence having their voice heard is not important. What is important is 
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not getting into trouble or portraying the country in a negative light. Truth is not as important so long 
as the country is stable.  
 The differences in values could also be a factor in the poor perception of foreign media. Civil 
rights violations tend to be higher on the agenda of western media even if it is just affecting one or 
two persons. However, for many Chinese, they would not think of it as too much of a problem if the 
scale is minimal. “I think foreigners' views toward some of the things in China. This is a problem, but 
they will see this problem as something very major. In fact, in our view it is actually a small problem, 
but I do not know through what ways, they will portray this matter very seriously. Because I went to 
this class, foreign teachers for English classes, sometimes they will talk to us regarding some of these 
matters, I will sometimes feel that they are too exaggerated, there is no big deal, but I do not know 
where they got this information.” Some of these impressions could also be due to the rebuff towards 
highlighting of shortcomings in China. For many Chinese, they subscribe to the Chinese proverb of 
“the family’s shame should not be known to the public” 
Ironically, even as international media report on the oppressive nature of China’s government, 
many Chinese tend to think that they have it better than people in many other countries, especially 
compared to the minorities in USA. For most media outlets around the world, “plane landed safely” is 
not news but “plane crashed into the river” is. So news from around the world tend to lean towards the 
negative aspects of life. As with people from around the world, the types of news that the Chinese 
people comes into contact with for news regarding other countries tend to highlight the violence and 
other negative issues. Those negative reports and images then contribute to how Chinese perceive 
how people in other countries live. At the same time, comparisons on crime rates and personal safety, 
for which China performs relatively better than most countries, would result in a somewhat positive 
assessment of the Chinese government in its ability to protect the people.  
Being exposed to all the negative news coverage of other countries while assessing their own 
country based on their own life experiences would thus result in a biased and micro view. Given that 
the average Chinese person is not going to be an activist and locked up like Liu Xiaobo, they would 
naturally think that, on the whole, life in China is quite good.  
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For Singapore, it would appear that the balancing act of control and credibility by the 
government has served the government well as many respondents still express (qualified) trust of the 
media. The awareness of the government’s control juxtaposed with the efforts of the government’s 
efforts to maintain credibility of the mainstream media results in a nuanced trust of the media. Many 
indicated that other than political topics, they generally trust the mainstream media. A respondent 
sums it as “I would trust the facts but probably not their opinions”.  This is a common response from 
Singapore. Many think that the mainstream media would not be too harsh on the government. Another 
respondent expressed such scepticism of the media, “ maybe if you say something controversial to the 
Straits Times, they will like water it down and then put it in the news.” 
Respondents from Hong Kong and Taipei all expressed that they do not expect any media to 
be balanced in their reporting. For them, they think that polarisation of the media is normal and 
represents the interests of the media owner. At the same time, the polarisation also help the consumers 
identify the type of publication they want. Most respondents are thus able to point out which are the 
blue-leaning or green-leaning publications in Taipei while respondents from Hong Kong can point out 
which publications are friendly towards China’s policies.  
Many in Taipei and Hong Kong do not trust the media too but the lack of trust is due to 
different media outlets acting irresponsibly. Many of think that the media practitioners do not behave 
professionally and are prone to sensationalism or adopt paparazzi attitude. It is not a systematic 
control of information as what is done in China. Hence, while being sceptical of some media outlets, 
the reality that there is competition between media outlets and there is competing information enable 
the respondents from Hong Kong and Taipei to conclude that government cannot hide information. 
Chinese respondents on the other hand conclude that the government can hide information as they 
know that the media has to follow the government’s orders.   
 
Internet  
In all four cities, there are respondents who cite Yahoo! News as an information source that 
offers independent or alternative information. (Note that Yahoo! had shut down its web portal for 
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China since 2013) Yahoo! News is predominantly a news aggregator that serves repackaged news 
stories from local and international news outlets. Yahoo! does localise content for different markets 
and create some original content through its local hires. However, the bulk of its content is still 
syndicated. Yet, the act of curating content from multiple sources with just a dash of original local 
content has given Yahoo! the image of being independent. 
While people in China are practically surfing the internet as if it is a China intranet, it is not as 
if the Chinese people are living in their own world. The Chinese are aware of the major popular 
services in the rest of the world such as Google, Facebook, Youtube, Instagram, etc. It is just that 
many have come to terms with the blockage of overseas services while local alternatives serve their 
needs as just well, if not better, with the localisation features. The pain is usually for newer services 
that do not yet have local alternatives. A few complained about the sudden blockage of Instagram 
after garnering quite a number of followers. Some may attempt to “flip over” the firewall with VPN 
but the constant additional effort and the inconsistency for VPN services meant that many would 
eventually give up using those blocked services.    
Many scholars have extolled on the advantages and potential of the internet as a borderless 
supercharged public sphere that would allow people to come together and voice their opinions. As a 
respondent from Singapore described how anonymity online afforded her space to express herself, 
“It’s like easier to talk about it on like, if you think that you are doing it anonymously, on tumblr, like 
to a person who doesn’t really know you in real life.” It should be noted that other than this one 
respondent from Singapore who mentioned about the anonymity that Tumblr affords her allows her to 
talk more freely, no one else mentioned about how the internet allows them to express what they 
might not express offline.  
It is also precisely of the internet’s public nature and precisely of its ability to tear down walls 
that cause some to be more cautious about expressing their opinions. The adage of “on the internet, 
nobody knows you are a dog” is no longer relevant. Anonymity is no longer a given. Morozov (2011) 
already warned that technology can work against the people too and governments have more 
resources to ensure that technology works for the government. This message is one that the Singapore 
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government wants to deliver to the people. While the government is fully aware that it is impossible 
to filter or block speech online, it is more than willing to demonstrate that as long as the government 
knows your IP address, your identity would be known. Another respondent from Singapore recounted 
how the news reports of those who got into trouble for online speech made her more cautious, “I 
didn’t feel it as acutely like that I would be held liable for the things that I say, as aware as I am now. 
I was wondering how would they track one person down. Now I know better. So I wouldn’t do it 
again.” The conclusion is that there were and will have people who would be punished for careless 
speech. Just the prosecution of a few and the mainstream media having a field day over these 
instances would remind the masses that no one can hide behind the screen on the internet.  
In terms of information from the internet, most respondents from Taipei indicate a high level 
of trust in online forums such as PTT. Even when questioned directly whether they fear the 
information might be fake, many would say that because of the open nature, those who post fake 
information would be rebutted. The posts with evidence (pictorial or convincing narratives) would 
then be pushed to top by everyone. While many respondents from Taipei appear to have a high level 
of trust in PTT forums, respondents from other cities are more wary about astroturfing. For 
respondents from Beijing, a few mentioned internet “water army” and “Wu Mao Dang” as possible 
nefarious causes for which they are wary of. Internet “water army” (See Chen et al. 2013) typically 
refers to commercial astroturfing for which commercial entities would pay people to post reviews, 
comments and other user generated content that would be beneficial to their business. “Wu mao dang” 
(loosely translated as “50-cent party”) refers to people hired by the CCP’s propaganda department to 
post content that are aligned with the CCP’s agenda. Researchers estimated between a quarter million 
(Mou, Atkin & Fu 2011) to two million (King, Pan & Roberts 2017) of these hired commenters are 
actively posting online.  
Hong Kong expressed similar fears about “wu mao dang”, indicating that they are afraid of 
the influence from CCP rather than what the Hong Kong government might do. In Singapore, these 
astroturfers are known as the internet brigade. This practice of having commentators who post 
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anonymously to defend the policies of the government was started in 2007 when the PAP realised that 
most online comments had a negative attitude towards the PAP (Li, 2007).   
 
Perception on Media Control  
For all the media reports about Great Firewall of China and lack of freedom of speech, the 
reality is that many do not feel that it is all that overwhelming. A Beijing respondent said, “from my 
personal experience, I feel no effect”. It suggests that some have already gotten used to the controls 
and learnt to live with it. However, this sentiment is not shared by all and some do feel the negative 
impact from the controls. As a Beijing respondent puts it, “It is because the news is a very important 
channel for the access to information for the public, if the news is not highly reliable then would feel 
that, we live in a very opaque environment.” 
There is also a tendency for Chinese respondents to compare their situation with North Korea, 
pointing out that they are not kept in the dark like the North Koreans are. While this may appear to be 
trivial or superficial, it also means that the Chinese people would not tolerate a reversal into 
totalitarianism. A comparison with North Korea would bring South Korea to mind. The separation of 
the Korea peninsular onto two different paths would serve as a reminder for the Chinese people what 
might have happened to the Chinese themselves had China remained closed off to the world.    
Being used to the controls does not mean that they are not upset when they experience the 
controls. Negative sentiments usually surface when respondents could not explain why certain 
services such as Instagram or content such as subtitled US dramas are banned. To many of them, these 
are just harmless entertainment that would not jeopardise the security or stability of the country. A 
respondent ranted, “This form of control, it is not something the government should do, like, uh, the 
media, you want control, you can, you just go and control the People's Daily, Xinhua news agency or 
what. For others, you should stop this unified management. If the people wants to listen to you, 
naturally they will buy your daily newspaper.” While many have internalised and justified the 
controls, a few respondents from Beijing do challenge the justifications and think that the controls in 
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communications is not beneficial and describe the impact as “confining thoughts” and “limiting the 
development of people”.  
The Singapore government is not shy about its media control policies and would openly 
justify its actions. In an interview with BBC in 2013, Singapore’s Minister for communications and 
information, Yaacob Ibrahim, justified that the changes in regulations for online news sites were to 
“protect the interests of the ordinary Singaporean” and ensure that Singaporeans “read the right thing” 
(See BBC 2013c). In the face of criticisms about its lack of media freedom, Singapore’s leaders 
constantly tout that the internet infrastructure in Singapore is not subjected to any form of government 
control. Other than the symbolic hundred banned sites to demonstrate the government’s stance on 
what is not tolerated, the internet access in Singapore is practically unrestricted. This diverts attention 
away from the government’s strategy which is to instil a fear in expressing rather than denial of 
access. The ability to access the internet freely does not mean risk-free as Singapore operates a 
minefield control rather than a great wall control. There are areas for which the ambiguous application 
of laws would likely deter some people from expressing themselves online. An example would be the 
charging of Amos Yee for obscenity for a caricature that most people would find it as merely crude or 
tasteless.  
 
The effectiveness of mines and minefields is not about being able to fill up an entire field with 
mines. Rather, it is the ability to send the signal that there are mines that are lethal enough and there is 
no information on where the exact positions of mines are. The feeling of unknown mines is as 
powerful as having the entire field filled up with mines as only the most courageous or the most 
stupid would dare to venture into the minefield.  
Nobody wants to be the next Roy Ngerng or Amos Yee. When discussing about expressing 
opinions in public, respondents from Singapore frequently mention these examples that are widely 
reported in the mainstream media. Amos Yee is a teenage blogger who is known to produce and 
upload social commentary videos on Youtube. Most of Yee’s videos featured himself talking about 
socio-political issues in an opinionated and animated manner. Following the death of Lee Kuan Yew 
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in 2015, Yee uploaded a video titled “Lee Kuan Yew is Finally Dead” in which Yee likened Lee Kuan 
Yew to Jesus and opined that both are power hungry and malicious. Subsequently, Yee also drew a 
caricature of Lee Kuan Yew engaging in anal sex with former UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher, 
justifying that he was normalizing the acts of criticising and making fun of political leaders. For the 
two actions, he was charged and convicted for religious hate speech and obscenity. Yee was sentenced 
to four weeks’ jail for the conviction. The following year, Yee was again convicted for religious hate 
speech, this time for a video about Islam. Yee subsequently flew to the USA and sought political 
asylum there.  
Roy Ngerng is an activist who blogs about the socio-politico issues. In May 2014, Ngerng 
wrote a blog post titled “Where Your CPF Money is Going: Learning From the City Harvest Trial”. In 
the post, Ngerng described the relationships between the Lee Hsien Loong and the various 
government organisations that impact on the national retirement fund (known as Central Provident 
Fund, CPF) and how the relationships appear similar to the City Harvest criminal breach of trust case 
that was ongoing then. The City Harvest case involved church leaders misusing church funds to 
support the pop song career of the church founder’s wife. By drawing the link, Ngerng was thus sued 
for defamation by Lee Hsien Loong as it alluded that Lee was misappropriating monies Singaporeans 
paid into the national retirement fund. Ngerng lost the lawsuit and was ordered to pay damages of 
SGD$150,000 in December 2015. Unlike previous defamation cases, Ngerng was able to negotiate an 
instalment plan for the damages and avoided being bankrupted. Since August 2016, Ngerng has not 
posted anything on his blog.  Following a string of politicians who had been sued and bankrupted for 
defaming Singapore’s political leaders, Amos Yee and Roy Ngerng are the current exemplars for 
people who got into trouble for talking too carelessly.  
The impact of these high-profile cases on the pubic psyche and how these cases create a 
chilling effect is reflected in how one respondent from Singapore describe how widespread self-
censorship is in Singapore: “I feel like there’s a lot of self-censorship in Singapore. So like, even if I 
think that that is true, unless I have hard evidence, I wouldn’t dare to bring this out, cos it might get 
me into trouble.” 
178 
 
While some respondents may say that they know where the “line” for which they should not 
cross, it would be more accurate to say they know where the minefields are. Most people in Singapore 
just agree vaguely that the topics of religion, race and the Lee family are off-limits. The incorrect 
impression that some respondents from Singapore think that Amos Yee got into trouble due to libel 
showed that many simply do not think critically about what was wrong about what was said. In 
addition, going by the respondents’ hesitance in expressing their views in public or to journalists, it 
shows that they need to have utmost confidence that they are not near any minefield before voicing 
out their opinions.  
There is also the delineation of public and private spheres for which one may be able to opine 
in a freer manner privately. In short, some are pointing out (gladly) that the Singapore government do 
not or has not reached the surveillance level that is similar to George Orwell's 1984. This emphasis on 
delineation of public and private sphere was also observed in respondents from Beijing. Respondents 
from both Beijing and Singapore would point out that they would be comfortable talking about 
political topics privately but not in public.   
There appears to be a very simplistic understanding of freedom of speech for some 
Singaporeans. To them, it seems that freedom of speech is merely the ability to say something. There 
is a lack of acknowledgement that the ability to say things without fear or repercussions is the key. 
This is part of the internalisation that is inculcated by political leaders. There are many occasions 
when political leaders are questioned about the freedom of speech situation in Singapore and those 
who asked the question would be deflected with the question about whether they are being stopped 
from asking the question or stopped from saying anything. So for them, since they do not personally 
feel any of the repercussions, they do not think critically about the issue. As one respondent puts it, 
“But it doesn’t affect my life. So I don’t really find anything wrong with it.” 
The internalisation is then further solidified with the constant emphasis that only "sensitive" 
topics have to be avoided and they think that they are well aware of where the out of bounds markers 
are to avoid getting into trouble. No respondent from Singapore questions the wisdom of avoiding 
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"sensitive" topics and whether avoidance is really effective or the only approach towards cordial 
relations between different ethnic and religious communities.  
The extensive controls in Singapore, while more nuanced than China’s, have also caused the 
public to be sceptical of the mainstream media to some extent. As one respondent from Singapore 
puts it, “I think there should be like less control because right now, I mean currently what they are 
doing, like people still have this scepticism that it is too controlled and like whatever that the media 
reporting, it is like, you know, just trying to paint the government in a good light. So I think this 
scepticism is very unhealthy, like we tend to not really believe news sources.” 
Respondents from Hong Kong are less concerned about direct controls from the government, 
be it Hong Kong’s government or China’s government. There is an air of optimism that press freedom 
has been entrenched in the Hong Kong society and thus the people would not tolerate government 
censorship. Coupled with the pervasive use of internet, most think that it would not be likely that the 
government can block any information. However, as the bulk of Hong Kong’s media industry is 
privately owned rather than government controlled, most respondents think that commercial interests 
are the main source of influence. Even without direct government control, some media companies 
would still toe the line as China’s government could influence advertising revenues and restrict their 
operations within mainland China.   
Many respondents thus expressed disappointment with the changes they observed with TVB. 
TVB is the most established free to air TV station in Hong Kong and it is regarded as a key source for 
which the Hong Kong people shape their cultural and collective identity. However, following the 
1997 handover, many thinks that the management of TVB is bowing to the pressures of the Mainland 
government and the news content on TVB are now sympathetic towards mainland China positions. 
Many now refer TVB as CCTVB, referencing to the China’s government media CCTV.   
However, even when they expressed lack of trust in most media outlets, there is more overt 
disdain for those outlets that are particularly friendly with China’s positions. As one respondent 
explains his position when dealing with media that they lack trust, “Not necessarily all true is better 
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than nothing, better than you watch CCTVB, the news on it has been edited”. This is a key reason 
why respondents from Hong Kong are not as keen about government intervention as compared to 
Taipei even if they too expressed concerns about the lack of professionalism amongst media 
practitioners. They are experiencing first-hand what government intervention can do to their beloved 
TVB. A cultural icon which they grow up with is now perceived ad becoming the throat and voice of 
a distant government in Beijing.  
 
Transparency  
In times of crisis, short of implementing martial law and restricting the movement of the 
people, the most valuable currency would be the credibility of the government and the channels for 
which the government’s messages are disseminated from. Trust in the information disseminated 
would be vital to managing and overcoming the crisis. Except for Beijing, the responses from the 
other three cities indicate that they think that their government would not or could not cover up 
information regarding major public crisis.  
While Singapore’s government is not exactly a poster boy for transparency, there is still trust 
that whatever information that is released to public is factually correct. What may differ from the 
responses and expectations from Hong Kong and Taipei is that some respondents from Singapore 
think that information might be withheld back for some time so as to allow the government to prepare 
the necessary resources needed to handle such crisis. Hence, it is not like the cloud of uncertainty that 
many Chinese people experience.    
In China, natural disaster and public health crisis cover-ups are common and almost every 
respondent mentioned that the numbers of victims are probably under-reported in many instances. 
(For example, see Li 2017). All of them do not believe the government would be truthful about such 
information but would still be careful about expressing their doubt. One Beijing respondent explained, 
“Anyway I feel that the information released by the government cannot be fully trusted, but can be 
regarded as having basic reliability, and then can only be said to be basic. And then if it is the flu, if 
the government says that the infection is not serious, I think the seriousness may possibly may be 
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slightly more, but it also is not too much serious, and then just take precautions on our own, that is, as 
an ordinary person, maybe can only do this.” 
For some of them, they have given up any hope of knowing the truth. As one Beijing 
respondent said, “feel that there is no expectation of personally knowing what the truth of the matter 
is. In any case, it is just being more careful on our own. For example, the spread of Ebola virus, then 
you just have to be careful, pay attention to all aspects. For incidents, such as Xinjiang armed 
assaults kind, you just do not go to those places with many people. Anyway, it is always right to be 
more careful, also don’t think about the need to know how serious the matter really is, or what the 
truth really is.” 
However, despite knowing and acknowledging that cover ups happen frequently, a few 
respondents would still defend that they would trust the information disseminated from the 
government. One went as far as to argue that it does not make any difference whether it is reported as 
a thousand victims or more than 10 thousand victims given the number of people in China.  
 
Voice and representation 
Respondents in China frequently mention internet comments or social media comments as a 
source of information and think of the comments section as reflection of public opinions.  It appears 
that these internet comments offer an alternative source of information that mainstream media could 
not provide. It could also be that they see these comments as more authentic since many of these 
comments could be posted and viewed before censors delete them.  
The CCP, it would appear, has however cracked the problem of how to wrest back the control 
from such diffused communication. The impact of comment systems could only reach their potential 
when people believe in its authenticity. By flooding the systems with state directed comments, it 
creates doubt in whether the comments are genuine and it also distracts the public from the issue at 
hand (King, Pan, Roberts 2017). While many respondents brought up comment systems as sources of 
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alternative information, these same respondents would also highlight that they are wary about the 
credibility of such comments and bring up the possibility of the 50-cent party.  
As mentioned earlier about “suzhi”, many respondents question the suzhi of “others” and 
think that many “others” lack the responsibility and ability to think through issues. Even in 
representing themselves, they question whether “others” are responsible enough, as a Beijing 
respondent puts it, “I think we should seek the views of the public, but in the process of seeking public 
opinion, I think there will not be a lot of people who would treat this matter seriously, maybe they 
would say their point of view, they would also feel that it is not credible, but still they would say it, it 
would give those above who are making the decision some difficulties. I feel that Chinese people, well 
saying their own opinion is just lip service, but they don’t think through seriously, that is, what the 
outcome would for policies, so it would give a lot of trouble to those decision makers, so some things, 
if you do not seek the views of the people it is easy to resolve, and if seek the opinions, the thing may 
just end up not done.” 
A frequent defence that Beijing respondents give for the lack of representation in the media is 
that there are too many people in China. This uncritical defence could be a result of education in 
China that is ingrained in Chinese that for a society with so many people, there is no space for 
individual expressions. However, whether it is a city of 5 million or a country of 1 billion, no media 
would be able to reflect so many individual views. Representation does not equate to having each and 
every individual’s views printed. It is simply having sufficient views of a particular issue so that most 
people would be able to identify with some of the views published. The reality is that for every issue, 
dominant or significant views are a mere handful, many could even reduce to just 2 sides of a coin. 
There may be nuances in each view but nobody’s complete nuanced opinion would be reflected in the 
press.  
 
There might be a tendency to simply think that those in restricted environments are 
brainwashed and herded around by the government. However, the reality is that the respondents were 
mostly concerned about getting on with their lives and making the most out of the situation they are 
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in. Many young Chinese people are also pressured by societal norms that emphasizes on career and 
family building (Liang, 2017). For the majority of them, this is not a matter of whose voice gets to be 
heard or represented. This is not the governed fighting against the government, rather each is simply 
trying to function within the system and keeping the system functioning. While the focus group data 
has not shown that they are actively supporting the system, there are also no signs that they want to 
dismantle the system. After all, the system has brought their family and them (middle-class urban 
youths) considerable progress over the years. 
From the responses that indicate their belief that they have very little impact on what the 
government does, it shows that throughout their lives, these youths have been conditioned to lead their 
lives around the policies created by the government rather than to change or influence the policies. 
They think that they are too small and insignificant for the government to pay attention to their voices. 
Those even further away from the political centre would be even less concerned about these vague 
concepts of representation or voice. After all, if those at the capital do not believe they have any 
influence over the government, what influence could those in the other provinces have?  
Singaporean respondents tend to privilege elite views. They want expert views that are 
independent of the government. This privileging of elite views has also affected how respondents 
view public opinions in that they indicated that there is a lack of NGOs giving views rather than 
indicating that the average Singaporean’s views are not taken into account. “we still lack certain 
institutions which reflects the views of the people”. What they want is the for someone else to speak 
for them rather than wanting to speak for themselves. Most think that the government would do 
whatever they think is right instead of what the people want anyway and thus there is little returns in 
trying to get their voice heard.  
Respondents from Taipei and Hong Kong do think that there is some sort of representation in 
the media, albeit not their exact thinking, there is usually something close enough. The multitude of 
media offerings in Hong Kong and Taipei gives the impression of representation of different voices in 
the cities. However, many would still complain that the voices of people are not heard unless there is 
a large number of people pushing for it. This demonstrate a common misunderstanding regarding how 
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representative the media is. The reality is that no media can represent every single unique voice. What 
is possible is simply being able to represent the majority of dominant voices.  
Most respondents from Hong Kong while acknowledging the necessity of voicing their 
position to the government are unwilling to speak to the media. Unwillingness to speak to the media is 
not expressed outright but framed as due to fear of being edited into memes, loss of privacy, 
misrepresentation, lack of knowledge etc. This is likely due to the aversion of being seen as politically 
active publicly since many of their parents are against it.  
There is free rider mentality common in all four cities. Many would acknowledge the 
necessity of the people in expressing their opinions to the government but many would leave it to be 
done by other people or other experts. That is, others should express their opinions but they would 
not. To some extent, it is similar to “stealth democracy” in the USA. As reported in Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse (2002), the people in USA are supportive and desire the processes that facilitate 
participation from the people but are unwilling to do it themselves. There is just too much effort 
needed.  
 
Check and Balance 
 In China’s recent history, various CCP documents and leaders had mentioned about the media 
playing the role in “public opinions supervision” (see Zhao & Sun 2007), albeit within the confines of 
relevant rules and under the supervision of the leadership. However, as can be seen from the focus 
group sessions, this role has obviously not taken root in the society as none of the Beijing respondents 
mentioned the media playing such a role. Nor does any of the respondents signal the willingness to 
report malfeasance of government officials to the media. No one thinks that it would be effective and 
some expressed worries that reporting such matters to media might have possible backlash. According 
to some of them, reports on corruption in the media are directed by the government itself and it is 
mainly due to fights between factions within the party. As a respondent describes, “feel that there are 
two possibilities out of this, the first one is that it is driven by the government, that is, the government 
gave the media information or a channel to let the media expose this thing. There is also a possibility 
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that it may be a struggle between factions, one faction would like to undermine the other faction, they 
can use this way. So most of the domestic media I feel is that they are a government propaganda 
channel, there is a feeling that the media seems to be still standing on their side more.”   
 
The view that media serves as a watchdog is not strong in China. It is not common for the 
public to contact the media to whistleblow on government wrongdoings. Political culture in China is 
not a culture of checks and balances. It is a culture of accountability (Chien, 2010), in that the 
government is accountable to the people. Although the system of accountability is not direct as 
government officials at different levels are answerable to their superiors and then ultimately 
answerable CCP’s top echelons. At the central of CCP, the leadership understands that the CCP has to 
keep the people satisfied in order to stay in power. The kind of accountability that the CCP offers to 
the people is that the government is akin to parents being accountable to their children. The education 
system and the media build and reinforce the paternalistic commitments from the CCP to the people. 
Similar to how one would view relationships in a family, one does not expect checks and balances in a 
relationship between parent and child. However, there are expectations of accountability and ensuring 
that the child’s interests are protected to parents’ best ability.  
 
 For Singapore, the perception of corruption within the government is not high. According to 
Transparency International’s report on perception of corruption, Singapore was ranked 7th in the 
world in terms of lowest rate of corruption. (For comparison, Hong Kong was ranked 15th, Taiwan 
31st and China 79th) Corruption cases are dealt with swiftly and heavily and the few cases of 
corruption were well reported in the media. Trust that the authorities would be impartial in the issue 
of corruption is thus high and most indicate that they would choose to report to the relevant 
government authority rather than the press. Only one respondent out of 12 mentioned that the media 




Respondents from Hong Kong and Taipei shares very similar views on the media acting as a 
check on the government. Most think that the media would expose any wrongdoing within the 
government. Respondents from both cities also mentioned that the openness of the internet meant that 
there is no way government can cover up any information. A Taipei respondent pointed out, 
“Currently in Taiwan, if the government purposely want to cover up anything, it always ends up being 
exposed or whistle blown. For example, on PTT there are many examples or some are information 
that counter the government’s information.” Respondents from Hong Kong and Taipei would also 
explicitly point out that the media should have the right and responsibility to inform.  
 However, Hong Kong respondents show a higher level of trust in the authority as more 
respondents from Hong Kong mentioned that they would be willing to report to the government 
authority. Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption has a good reputation amongst 
the Hong Kong people since cleaning up the rampant corruption within the civil service in the 1970’s. 
This reputation has sustained till now but since the handover, there has been questions on the 
independence nature of the commission.  
 
Views on Dissent 
Many would be up in arms arguing that the space for civil/public discourse would be reduced 
when the state place restrictions on freedom of the press or freedom of speech in general. However, 
other than the overt restrictions, there are also cultural factors that would reduce public discourse. An 
important factor would be how the society frame or view disagreements or dissent.  
If the mere act of expressing disagreement is frowned upon or has to be carefully couched in a 
roundabout manner, no one would be expecting these youths to be participating in any protests or 
demonstrations any time in the future. While there are many instances of street protests in China as 
observed by researchers (Lee 2007, Perry & Selden 2003), it should be highlighted that many of these 
are due to workers’ disputes, property ownership conflicts or pollution in their immediate 
environment. So these are mainly self-interested episodes that are due to local issues and can be 
contained locally as long as concessions are made by business owners or local governments. These 
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protests are about enforcements and concessions within the existing governance or legal structure. 
There is no intention to agitate for political change. Beyond those self-interested protests, there were 
also some nationalistic events that are triggered by international events such as the US bombing of 
China’s embassy in Belgrade or territorial disputes regarding islands in the South China Sea. Again, 
these are not due to dissatisfaction directed at the government and hence do not require the 
government to change any policy.  
While street protests are usually due to self-interests, Yang (2013) observed that there is 
growing participation in online activism concerning the wider public. The affordance of the internet 
might allow activists to reach out to a larger number of people but most people are still apathetic 
about these civil society activities. When respondents were asked whether they would sign online 
petitions or participate in protests, all they are willing to commit are merely “likes” on posts that 
might appeal to them.  Activism online has not migrate to the physical space. Tracing the numerous 
times for which university students served as the foundation of protest movements, Perry (2014) noted 
the lack of campus unrest in China in the last two decades.     
The reality is that few protests in China are due to idealistic or political causes that are akin to 
Hong Kong’s protests for universal suffrage or Taiwan’s LGBT rights marches. Protests are non-
existent in Singapore, let alone merely self-interested. The large-scale protests in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong are the kinds of protests that require changes in legislation or government policies. These are 
the kinds of protests that have long term repercussions. This difference is manifested in the focus 
group data as respondents from different cities expressed different attitude towards signalling 
disagreement with the government. Taipei and Hong Kong have a stronger protest culture and 
respondents from these two cities have a more positive attitude towards participation in protests. 
While not everyone from Hong Kong or Taipei said that they participated in the most recent large 
scale protest, most indicated some level of support. However, for respondents in Beijing and 
Singapore, protesters are seen as “creating trouble”.   
Protests are public display of disagreement or demands for actions. One can have 
disagreements and still be supported as a leader of a country. You can have protests and still function 
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and exist as a government. Hong Kong and Taipei have managed to carry on with life despite the 
frequent street protests. Some protests will no doubt cause inconveniences and at times may even 
break the law. A healthy protest culture develops the people’s understanding of dissent and persuasion 
as demonstrated by the 2014 protest in Hong Kong. The young protesters understood that they needed 
the people on their side and even when causing major roads to be shut down, the protesters cleaned up 
the areas they occupied, set up recycling points, managed distribution of food and water and even 
gave tuition to the younger protesters. These positive acts amidst disruptions showed a more nuanced 
view of protests, indicating that protestors know that what they are doing is not just a public display of 
dissatisfaction but is also to win over the support of the public. Protests are not necessarily subversive. 
Showing disagreement does not mean wanting to overthrow a government. These protests are as much 
targeted at the wider public as it is targeted at the government.   
 
It’s not for me, it’s for them.  
Many research have shown that most people would think that they are mature enough, 
responsible enough or have the intellect to handle any kind of information. Rather it is the 
problems of “other people”, who need protection from these negative information that the 
state needs to set limitations on what kind of information is allowed to be transmitted freely. 
This is the common theme that exists in all four cities. The respondents think that their fellow 
citizens can be easily influenced by the media and need to be protected with regulations. This 
phenomenon is known as the “third-person effect”.   
First proposed by Davidson (1983), the third-person effect hypothesis describes the 
situation for which a person thinks that persuasive communication has a greater influence on 
other people than on himself.  Following which, many studies have been done to examine the 
hypothesis in various dimensions such as different types of content and media users (See 
Perloff 2009 for review of studies conducted on third person effect). Third person effect was 
found in both positive (such as public service campaigns discouraging drink-driving) and 
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negative (such as pornography and violence) content. More pronounced effects were 
observed in negative content and comparative contexts whereby the description of “others” is 
more vague and more different from themselves. Third-person effect is generally explained 
by the general tendency to perceive the self in ways that make the self appear better than 
others. Other explanations include attributional biasness and the belief and need of self-
control.  
Third-person effect does not require a restrictive communications environment to take 
effect. It is simply the manifestation of a form of bias in human nature. Many people tend to 
have bias when they occupy different position as an actor or an observer in a situation. The 
reality is that no society allows for the complete unbridled transmission of any and all forms 
of information. Any country or society would have some level of limitation on the media. 
Many societies have restrictions according to the locally accepted level of decency/morality 
and probably all countries, if not all, have restrictions on the spread of information that could 
harm national security. Some also disallow speeches that may be blasphemous or lese-
majesty. Some others protect the general public against the spread of personal private 
information. The reality is that many forms of limitations exist around the world but the 
average person would not be aware of these unless they research on it.  
 How third party effect manifest in the four cities are different according to how 
restrictive the communications environments are. Beijing and Singapore share similarities 
while Hong Kong and Taipei are similar. In justifying their controls of information, 
authoritarian societies tend to be much less specific and much more general in their 
justification for controls. Both China and Singapore would rely on social harmony as the 
justification of control. Data from the focus group sessions show how the respondents from 
Beijing and Singapore have accepted or rationalised the control that they are subjected to. 
The explanations or rationalisations given by the respondents on why control is needed 
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correspond with the justifications from the government. Beijing respondents would cite 
“suzhi”, “guoqing”, too many people and national security while respondents from Singapore 
would talk about race, religion and national security. For them, their fellow citizens required 
control from the government lest they become affected by all the negative content that would 
cause the society to be unstable. Respondents from both stricter cities mentioned about how 
those with lower level of education and older generations are less critical about information 
and could be easily influenced. Hence, even as Beijing respondents lament about how the 
great firewall of China caused them inconveniences, they would still defend such controls. To 
some extent it is also a remedy to the cognitive dissonance that the participants may be going 
through. People often have to rationalise within themselves so that they can accept an 
unpleasant situation. On one hand, they are affected by the censorship, on the other hand, the 
strong sense of nationalism hinders them from criticising policies. So, they have to tell 
themselves that it is for the good of “others”.  
It may intuitively appear to most that people from freer countries would then be 
against any form of control. However, responses from Taipei and Hong Kong demonstrate 
how even for a free environment, there would be people who still want some level of control 
or regulation. A freewheeling media that races to uncover the latest scandals and panders to 
the lowest denominator is not what most people want. Free market forces may have spurred 
the growth of what many deemed as trashy publications, it does not mean that it should be 
left unfettered. This is an aspect whereby many respondents from both Hong Kong and 
Taipei think that the government should step in and control. They think that the demand for 
sensationalistic content by their fellow countrymen is unhealthy and there should be better 
quality content.  
However, as compared to Taipei, only a few respondents from Hong Kong thought 
that control is needed. Hong Kong does not have as strong a demand for control because 
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there is a fear of intervention from China. Those who do not think that control is needed 
would point out that they already feel the interferences in TVB and the increase in pro-China 
publications. Such resistance towards China’s interference makes them more wary of 
additional government control even if they are unhappy about the sensationalistic and 
unprofessional media practitioners. The more varied and presence of more international 
media in Hong Kong as compared to Taipei also meant that there is lesser dissatisfaction over 
content.  
8.4 Conclusion  
This chapter attempts to explain why people accepts communications control and why 
people in freer communications want more control. Third-person effect could explain most of 
the time why respondents in the four cities support communications control. Many of them 
think that the rapid changes in society has left a large portion of the population ill-equipped to 
handle the complex information landscape. Hence, it would be acceptable to have controls 
even if they themselves are subjected to the controls. Similarly for those in freer 
communications environment, they think that the excesses and sensationalistic media have to 
be reined in for the benefit of the public who could not discern quality content.  
In the process to better understand how people perceive different forms of 
communications control, the study also revealed how different forms of control can have 
different effects on the society and how it would affect the perception of the government. 
Respondents from both Beijing and Singapore noted how conversations moved on once a 
topic is no longer reported in the media, highlighting awareness of the agenda-setting 
function and effect of media control. Beyond agenda-setting effect, the two restrictive 
societies with different control strategies have produced different outcomes.  The focus group 
data showed that while media may be controlled in both Singapore and Beijing, the effect on 
the people are quite different due to the due forms of control. 
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China’s media control on the other hand works predominantly on distraction, deletion 
and blocking. There is ambiguity but there is less fear as compared to Singapore since 
deletion or blocking would not hurt. Those that truly incur the government’s wrath are 
shunted away from the public’s view. Ai Weiwei is better known as the designer for Beijing’s 
national stadium than as a political activist. Liu Xiaobo is well known outside of China but 
unheard of to the average person in China.   
There is a lack of distinction between facts and opinions in the discussion of 
information in news. Chinese respondents would frequently answer that they will judge for 
themselves what is right as oppose to what is real. While this frequent theme appears to show 
that there is some sophistication or scepticism in how they handle information, the inability to 
elaborate how they would go about critiquing or judging the information beyond the 
oversimplified “think for ourselves” showed limitations in their information literacy. 
Although, to be fair, it could also be the lack of credible and independent information sources 
that impair their ability to be critical about information. When one is in an environment that 
hinders access to facts, what is left for the average person is merely subjective opinions. So 
many of them would say they would “add in their own views” when explaining how they 
differentiate what information they could trust. It would also appear that many of the Chinese 
respondents mistake their scepticism for critical thinking. Critical thinking would allow 
evaluation of new information, attempting to understand the information, how the 
information came about and the arguments supporting the information. Having observed how 
certain events would result in the mainstream media carrying the exact content, many of the 
Chinese respondents simply distrust and reject the information from the media have. They 
know this is due to the CCP’s control of the media and when congruence within the media is 
seen as controlled and fabricated content, difference is then regarded as more real. As one 
respondent described, “You just search on the internet, then regardless of which station’s 
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news, headline by headline just read all, if they are too similar, those similar content, then 
maybe would not really read, but if anything that is different, I would read it more earnestly. 
So that’s it.” 
The Chinese government may think that it is preventing dissent and protecting the 
stability of the society but it is also inculcating an unhealthy level of scepticism into the 
Chinese society. When news lacks credibility, people’s sense of scepticism also grows. 
Critical thinking is also stunted when the government blocks off other independent sources of 
information. Credible information allows people to make decisions and plans. Lack of which 
would make people putting off decision making. 
The cloud of uncertainty that such a communications environment could create was 
exemplified by how many Chinese were unsure of what make of information of a major event 
that could disrupt their daily routine. A Chinese respondent described, “Previously there was 
a holiday for 6 days due to APEC, so maybe for the one two days before the school formally 
notified us, and then we were particularly confused, we just do not know whether there is 
holiday or not. So some people were spreading the news that there would be holiday then 
some other people said that the information was a false rumour. At that time, no one knows, 
cannot tell it apart.” 
This is a classic example of what an information deficient environment can do to 
people. The policy intent and aim would be to have a less crowded city, to ease the public 
resources and clean up the air with lesser human activities. However, the effects of the policy 
became less effective because people were unsure about the credibility of the information 
until the last minute. Plans to leave the city for short holidays could not or would not be made 
in time. What resulted would be that many people remained in the city. Public transportations 
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may be less crowded than normal but could have been even less had more people made plans 
to leave the city.  
While the political system does not have much mechanisms for procedural legitimacy 
and public opinion is not actively and widely sought at the national level, there is still an 
impression amongst the people that the political leaders do take into account public views in 
their public policies. Many respondents whom lamented that the government would not listen 
to them would also indicate that the leaders would probably think of the interests of the 
people. Although this is not logical, it would appear that the economic progress over the 
years has been equated as taking care of the people. The ability of the government to have a 
say in almost anything, possibly except the weather and natural disasters, meant that the 
people view the government as having the ability to keep the masses satisfied. Injustices may 
happen to a select few. Those who do not work hard may not get what they want in life. 
However on the whole, the majority would be satisfied because the people believe that the 
government would not let bad things happen. Especially any matter that may affect a large 
number of the people. The people has placed their trust in that the government would ensure 
that the economy keeps growing. This is cultivating a culture of misplaced responsibility. The 
people are not responsible in ensuring that they are well informed. The people are not 
responsible in ensuring that things are done well. The people are not responsible in ensuring 
that the right people are in positions of power. After all, why should they be responsible when 
they do not have a say or have any influence in how the government functions. When one is 
tied up, can the person be responsible for not stopping the wrongdoings happening in front of 
his eyes? As the people constantly think that the government would be responsible in 
ensuring that nothing bad would happen, it ultimately creates a moral hazard.   
Singapore’s communications control works mainly through fear. Fear of misspeaking 
and fear of repercussions. So the repercussions are immense and widely publicised. Legal 
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demands and apologies are always made public and reported in the media. There is no 
secrecy or doubts about the government’s willingness to . Perhaps the only ambiguity is the 
content. Many would say they know where the line is and would not cross it. But in reality, 
most are giving a wide berth and would not even touch it with a 100-foot pole. Background 
research conducted for this study through interviews with journalists who had worked in both 
Singapore and China indicated that it is easier to get people to talk to the media in China than 
in Singapore. Singaporeans would frequently decline to express views or after expressing 
their views would indicate unwillingness to be identified by name.  
While the calibrated controls by the Singapore government provided more trust in the 
mainstream media as compared to China, there still is some lingering scepticism. That 
lingering scepticism could pose a potential problem as Singaporeans continue to see the 
mainstream media as being partial to the government. As Singaporeans demand for more 
independent perspective, the perception of a controlled mainstream media could possibly 
drive Singaporeans towards misinformation simply because those sources serve up different 
perspectives.  
Freedom of expression only refers to the right to speak without government 
intervention. It does not guarantee that the people would be able to receive diverse and 
accurate information. Given how participants responded in Hong Kong and Taipei. There is a 
need to examine communications beyond the over-simplified lens of freedom of expression. 
The excesses of a free environment that lead to deluge of information, disinformation and 
misinformation can also cause problems as people would become more sceptical of the 
information circulating in society.  Excessive scepticism is not healthy for a society as 
demonstrated by the responses from Beijing. If it is so excessive as to create distrust in public 
institutions and organs of state the government would then be rendered useless. Respondents 
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from Taipei are experiencing this excessively media which they see more harm than good. 
Hence, there is this tendency to seek regulations out of this conundrum.    
However, the answer to fighting this excessive freedom is not to simply implement 
state controls. State controls too would create scepticism in the people. Media literacy is thus 
more important than ever. Promoting freedom of the press or free speech is meaningless if 
people are sceptical of all the information in circulation. Press freedom may help those 
working in the industry to function freer or face lesser persecution but the end product of 
their collective endeavours do not necessarily lead to more trust from or better representation 
of the public. Coupled with the lowered barrier of entry to create and disseminate content, it 
is even harder now to discern good quality credible content.  
It should also be noted that Taipei respondents demonstrates a moderate level of 
scepticism that can be healthy. They are sceptical of politicians but they also showed a 
flexible attitude towards who to support in terms of political party. They demand more 
information rather than quickly taking a position. While they are critical of their local media 
in various aspects such as tendency to be sensational, lack of depth and lack of international 
outlook, the respondents are still of the opinion that the press and internet deters the 
government from hiding important information.  
The argument for a free media environment is that it would allow or encourage the 
people to discuss and participate in the deliberation of socio-politico issues. Even for those 
who do not participate in the discussions, they would be exposed to the arguments of the 
issue from different perspectives. Through such actions, people would then come to better 
understand the reasons why certain policies are adopted. The open and inclusive process 
would also imbue in the people positive feelings in the system since they are or can be part of 
the deliberation process.  
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This can be observed in the focus group sessions for which most respondents from 
Taipei do not outright reject the idea of a nuclear power plant but are willing to examine the 
safety measures and weigh the pros and cons for which the plant may be constructed. The 
free media environment allows people to know more viewpoints and encourages people to 
participate in the discussions. As people articulate issues, it makes them think through the 
issue more coherently. We do not usually think in sentences or linearly but the need to 
express ourselves pushes us to put ideas into words and sentences and that could modify how 
we view issues (Pingree 2007). 
Chinese respondents however reasoned that their government would simply have 
considered the feelings of the people and probably would not build a nuclear power plant 
near the city if the people are against it. Although when pushed to consider what they would 
do if the government went ahead and build it, they simply acknowledge that there is nothing 
they could do to change the result and a few indicated that they would simply leave the city if 
there are safety concerns. Of all the respondents, only Beijing respondents expressed fleeing 
the city as a possible course of action. Fleeing the city was also mentioned when exploring 
the scenario on the possible public health crisis. All these point the how the lack of credible 
information would likely drive the people towards a self-preservation mode and possibly not 








Chapter 9  
9.1 Legitimacy and Media Freedom 
 
The government can censor, can direct, can block information but at the end of the 
day, whether the people believe in the narratives in the mainstream media depends on 
whether there is resonance between the information transmitted and what the people 
experience. What the control of information can achieve is at best what a blinker can do, it 
can focus attention or divert attention but can never completely blindfold the public. 
Authoritarian governments throughout history had tried to control the flow of information but 
those regimes would eventually still collapse. If the experiences of the people do not align 
with the information transmitted then there is no resonance and no matter what the controls 
are, increasing levels of dissatisfaction would eventually bring about loss of legitimacy for a 
regime.  
The resonance achieved by the Chinese and Singapore government with their citizens 
have been predominantly based on economic progress. One respondent from Beijing 
mentioned that they are aware that they are at the “feet of the emperor” and thus many 
aspects of their life have been well taken care of because Beijing (referring to city leadership) 
is in the constant sight of the national leaders. However, from the insistence and assurance of 
8% annual GDP growth in the 2000’s to the gradual lowering of target growth of 6.5% in 
2017, it shows that no country can sustain such high level of economic growth. Hence, 
legitimacy would eventually have to depend on aspects other than or in addition to economic 
progress. China is already preparing for the inevitable economic slowdown with the gradual 
lowering of expectations. There are also signs that China is strengthening its economic data 
collection and reporting as its leaders know that its infamously inaccurate statistics would not 
fool people into contentment. In managing the expectations of the people, the CCP would 
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have to choose between being more open and honest about their policies or carry on 
blinkering the masses with its information control policies.  
Singapore, too, would have to face its own economic challenges and examine whether 
it could still deliver on performance legitimacy. Once it was the only developed city in 
Southeast Asia, serving as a launching pad for enterprises to invest into the region. Now other 
cities in the region have grown in capabilities and may no longer need Singapore to serve as 
an access node. For Singapore, it is not being more open. Rather it is more about involving 
and accepting the opinions of the people in policy making. The technocrats that have run the 
country for half a century generally sees public opinions as noise and would rather have the 
ability to shut out those noises.  
As demonstrated by the data from Taipei and Hong Kong, in freer media 
environments, the cacophony of voices in general are not beneficial in allowing people to 
form an impression that their voices are heard. Rather, the competing demands and narratives 
from different segments of society in freer media environments would only add to the 
impression that their voices are ignored. Taipei and Hong Kong are not unique in their 
situations. What we witness in many freer media societies is basically a situation of tragedy 
of the commons, in varying degrees. Most people in liberal democratic societies would very 
readily tout support for democracy but at the same time, too many assume that someone 
(else) would be paying attention to the news/information to keep themselves informed and 
hold their political leaders accountable. Theiss-Morse and Hibbings (2002) bigheartedly 
termed this inactive support for democracy as “stealth democracy”, more demanding people 
might perhaps find it more apt to term such low effort as “free-rider democracy”.  
That said however, the freer media environments do create conditions and perceptions 
that it would be difficult for the government to hide information from them. Hence while they 
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may harbour some level of scepticism of the government, many would still trust the more 
critical information disseminated.  
 
9.2 Different Challenges  
China 
This study might have found that many people accepts and has internalised the control 
of the media but that does not mean that the situation would stay that way. As the reasons for 
tolerating becomes lesser (e.g. lesser disparity in literacy and perceived societal/national 
needs), it might be harder to justify the controls.  
Depending largely on performance legitimacy would mean that China has to keep up 
its economic progress. However, economically, China is facing challenges on numerous 
fronts. Many state-owned enterprises are zombie organisations which are inefficient and 
unprofitable but kept alive by state funding. Many of these enterprises also have large amount 
of debts which are not transparent and could possibly expose the finance industry to 
enormous risks. There is also an overcapacity property market that has built so many new 
homes that there are numerous ghost cities spread across the country. Despite the apparent 
oversupply, property prices are still high as most properties are bought and left empty for the 
purpose of investment. There is a lack of investment options for the large quantity of savings 
that has accumulated in the masses and thus much of the savings are ploughed into property 
investments as it is deemed as the safest form of investment. 
There have been proclamations about the restructuring of economy to grow domestic 
demand so as to alleviate the slowing growth (and possibly shrinking) of exports for China. 
However, restructuring the economy at this point is challenging for China demographically. 
China has to create employment opportunities for 7 million new graduates annually while 
manufacturing jobs are moving overseas to less developed countries as wages in China have 
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become unaffordable for many manufacturers. In addition, the country has an increasing 
number of old people that the healthcare and social welfare system is inadequate in handling.  
In terms of media, It would appear that the CCP has taken a leaf out of Goebbels’s 
playbook in their management of the media. A quote that is attributed to Joseph Goebbels, 
“what you need to control a media system is ostensible diversity that conceals actual 
uniformity” sums up the strategy of the Chinese government. Taking advantage of its massive 
consumer market, China is able to shut out the rest of the world without antagonising most of 
its own people, for now. The China market is so big and significant that technology 
companies are bending over backwards to satisfy the demands of the government. Microsoft 
even created special operating systems just for the Chinese government. Most Chinese know 
about Google and Facebook but are not upset to be blocked from using those services and are 
happy to use the homegrown equivalent services Baidu and Wechat. This is also reflected in 
the survey done by this study. When asked to state three most used/visited mobile App or 
websites, respondents in Beijing all gave Chinese based services while the other three cities 
predominantly gave the examples of Facebook, Instagram, Google, etc that are more widely 
used worldwide. However, whether the Chinese people would continue to accept the walled-
off media in the long run is uncertain. China already has a very vibrant user generated content 
industry whereby many independent content producers are supported by widely used mobile 
payment services. It will be a struggle even for the CCP’s massive army of censors to control 
these independent content producers and the high demand of alternative media content could 
signal that people want content that is not regulated closely. Controlling might be 
increasingly difficult but what direction such controls would proceed depends on whether 
technology can keep up with the demands as the CCP increasingly depends on artificial 




Hong Kong  
 The transitioning political landscape of Hong Kong poses a great challenge for both 
the people and the government. Given the years of relatively ample civil liberties, the people 
of Hong Kong would not be willing to cede freedom to the government easily. However, 
there are also many who think that they are politically impotent as the Hong Kong 
government answers to the government in Beijing rather than the people of Hong Kong. The 
tension is already showing with the widespread and sustained protests in 2014 and the 
eventual dissipation of the protests. While the government would not be able to restrict civil 
liberties easily or overtly, there would still be attempts to encroach on and gradually restrict 
through salami slicing. After all, the 1 country 2 systems pledge was for only 50 years and 
there is no possibility that Hong Kong can be independent from China. 20 years of hands-off 
approach had already shown the Chinese government that the people of Hong Kong are 
becoming more different rather growing closer to China. Thus the Chinese government 
would want be more assertive in assimilating the 8 million Hong Kong people to be closer to 
the Chinese system.  
As Hong Kong undergoes the transition period, there would be tensions and 
pushbacks from various segments of the society. Particularly amongst the younger 
generations who are more politically active than the older generation, there would be more 
demands for more transparency and participation in the political processes. The media would 
probably continue to be a highly contentious space for Hong Kong and attempts to tame it 
would likely carry on and grow to be increasingly stricter. 
 
Singapore 
 Singapore, like China, is able to sustain the one-party rule largely due to its 
performance legitimacy. The main challenge thus would be also the ability to keep its 
economy growing and unemployment low. As a small market without natural resources and 
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insignificant manufacturing sector, Singapore is susceptible to global economic cycles. The 
Singapore government had been able to mitigate these cycles through controls of foreign 
labour as a large proportion of labour force consist foreigners. This dependence on foreign 
labour however has also caused resentment to grow as some think that they are being 
replaced by foreign labour. Balancing this issue would be important in keeping dissatisfaction 
levels down.  
In terms of media, the local media industry is anaemic and appears to have a declining 
readership/viewership over the years. Some in Singapore have the perception that the 
mainstream media is biased and hence seek out alternative sources on the internet. This has 
resulted in the government attempting to regulate online media outlets that are based in 
Singapore. The growth of more online media outlets reflects the desire for more varied voices 
and opportunities to voice opinions in recent years. There has been more contestation of ideas 
in various issues in recent years and how to handle this growth in dissenting voices would be 
the main challenge for the Singapore government. However, relatively speaking, the scale 
and proportion of nonconforming voices is still very low as compared to other cities 
compared in this study.  
  
Taiwan 
The main challenge for Taipei and Taiwan as a whole is that it is being choked by the 
Chinese government on the international arena. As Taiwan loses more diplomatic ties and 
shut out of international organisations, it would be harder for the domestic media to have 
more of an international outlook as demanded by some focus group respondents from Taipei.   
The actions of the Chinese government, however, would more likely result in push 
back by many people in Taiwan. Taiwan already has a national identity of its own and most 
Taiwanese do not see their political values in alignment with the mainland. While they know 
that their political scene is chaotic and at times corrupted, the liberal and open nature of it still 
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offer them assurance that it would be better than an authoritarian government. Having 
experienced an extended period of martial law during the “White Terror” era, the people of 
Taiwan would be averse towards governments with such strong-arm tactics. The example of 
how the mainland government encroached on the local government in Hong Kong would 
more likely convince that such one country many systems would not work for the people of 
Taiwan.  
The choke on economic relations is causing a larger impact than diplomatic ties. 
Taiwan has been going through an extended period of slow growth and stagnant wages. 
Tourism receipts from China and export trade to China has fallen drastically since the 
election of Tsai Ing Wen in 2016. This creates a tension between those who are wary of 
China’s encroachment on Taiwan’s independence and those who think that their livelihood 
has been hampered by cross straits politics. The ability of the government in mitigating the 
economic sway from China while balancing a vocal and critical domestic populace would be 
the main challenge facing Taiwan. 
 
9.3 Civic Responsibility  
The responses from Beijing and Singapore appear to suggest that people in 
authoritarian system expect the government to be responsible for most matters in society. 
Other than for matters that pertain to their private lives, everything else would fall under the 
responsibility of the government. Be it provision of public services and goods or how much 
social welfare the country should provide or what sectors in the economy require 
governmental support or whether more resources should be allocated to protect the 
environment, all these are the government’s responsibilities. After all, since there is a lack of 
process for which the people could be involved in the policy formulation, the people would 
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not be able to involve themselves in the policy formulation even if they have any opinions 
about the issues.  
 The complex challenges faced by the countries, however, mean that there need to be a 
shift in perception of responsibility if stability is desired. Many aspects in governance are 
interdependent and create repercussions that require trade-offs. Given also that information is 
more readily available and accessible in this digital age, there would be more comparisons 
with what and how other countries are doing and have achieved. This then give more impetus 
for the people to be critical of policies and dissatisfaction to manifest. However, if policies 
are crafted with input from the people, public consultations if done well would mean that 
there is a sense of shared responsibility.  
Responses from Taipei and Hong Kong however do not demonstrate overt sentiments 
that the government would take care of matters. They may lament or grumble about the 
shortcomings of government but would also highlight the need for the people to be involved 
in policy making. The respondents from these 2 societies do not simply expect the 
government to solve their problems. Rather it is more about having the government listen to 
them more. Thus, there seems to be a shift in perception of who should bear responsibility or 
where the burden lies in terms of how well run the country is. While the responses from 
Taipei and Hong Kong do not indicate the respondents think that the people are fully 
responsible and so deserves the government that they have, there is also no indication that 
they expect the government to be fully responsible for preventing anything negative from 
happening. The shift in perception could have been due to the differences in political context 
in that there are expectations of the people to participate in policy formulation and there are 
processes in existence to allow for the people to provide input.  
The difference in attitude could also be due to differences in civic education in the 




9.4 Scepticism  
This study found that many respondents exhibit some level of scepticism during the 
focus group sessions. However, the level and the target of scepticism is different. Scepticism 
needs to be examined further rather than taken at face value. Scepticism could either be 
constructive or destructive depending on how it manifests.  
Scepticism has taken on a negative image in recent years and to many people, 
scepticism equates to denial. This is especially so in areas that have been heavily backed up 
by science such as climate change and vaccine safety. Or it could be events based such as 
holocaust sceptics or 911 sceptics. All these examples suggest that sceptics are conspiracy 
theorists who are irrational. There may be some emotional and irrational segments of the 
public that has hijacked the meaning of scepticism but just because some had used the word 
and concept negatively does not necessarily mean that scepticism is all bad.  
Moderate and healthy level of scepticism can exist. At the individual level, moderate 
level of scepticism can be a sign of a thinking and independent mind. Those who do not trust 
information easily and would always verify information given are also sceptics. However, at 
healthy level, these sceptics are open-minded and are willing to be convinced to particular 
perspectives as long as the evidence supports the position. Doubts may exist but constructive 
scepticism would drive people to seek out information so as to clarify the doubts. Sceptics 
who question rationally would also allow them to think about issues from more perspectives 
and more coherently.  
As explained by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), people demand for those 
processes in democracy because they do not want to be taken advantage by those in power. 
As long as there are check and balance mechanisms, most people are generally willing to just 
coast along without paying much attention to what the government is doing. Most people do 
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not want to be involved in policy making process and are happy to turn over the decision to 
empathetic non-self-interested people. They care about the process but have no interest in 
being part of the process, thus making it stealth democracy rather than participatory 
democracy. This shows that scepticism is integral to procedural legitimacy since it is this 
scepticism of those in power that creates a demand for processes that aid in procedural 
legitimacy.  
 
The problem is that check and balance mechanisms is not reflected in level of trust 
and support of system. Systems that emphasizes on check and balances would inherently 
have more scepticism and lower level of support as democracy encourages people to be more 
critical of the government. Scepticism can be constructive as it is a form of feedback. When 
there is scepticism over a policy, it meant that it may not have been well-thought out or 
scepticisms may reveal the unintended consequences of a policy. Moderate scepticism also 
contributes to checks and balances when people question who actually benefits from policies 
implemented. It pushes government to be more transparent in their actions. It also indicates 
that more work and stronger evidence is needed to convince those small pockets of people. It 
demands policies to be backed up by evidence While it lowers support, it also mitigates 
against system collapse. The legitimation crisis that democratic societies faced is perhaps 
more of feature that pushes those in power towards constant review of policies and processes.   
Unhealthy scepticism would result when people doubt the government or information 
but have no other credible avenues to verify their information. In these cases (as exhibited by 
respondents from Beijing), they would just go along with the doubts and then make the best 
of what they could possibly do in their best interest. Just as in game theory whereby people 
without information would assume that others would pick the option that is best for 
themselves and thus they would reciprocate with the same. Even if there might be options 
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that may result in a better overall outcome for all, the lack of communication and information 
hinders cooperation or community sentiments.  
Extreme sceptics are suspicious of mainstream information and doubt even the most 
widely accepted opinions. However, everyone needs information to function in the world. So 
extreme sceptics find information that fits their world view rather than change their views to 
fit widely accepted information. For example, a climate change sceptic doubting that global 
temperature rise is due to air pollution from human activities would find that temperature rise 
is due to natural long term fluctuations make more sense to them. These sceptics might then 
find the explanation of long term natural fluctuation allows them to carry on with their 
normal activities without any cognitive dissonance. Extreme scepticism at the individual level 
probably is probably harmless. Refusal to accept scientific information or any information 
that is properly sourced and well backed up probably would not affect the life of any one 
person much. For some other issues, scepticism adds up to harm the population. In the case of 
vaccination sceptics, as more people refuse to accept vaccination, the protection from herd 
immunity drops and diseases that had been previously eradicated might return. The 
population as whole then suffers because of a growing number of sceptics. This too applies in 
policy making. When there are too many people holding extreme sceptic views, it impairs fair 
assessment of policies and paralyses decision making in governance. Everything becomes an 
opinion, resulting in no common ground for which to base arguments and justifications.  
Press freedom is a value for which many in the West wants to spread as a universal 
value. However, press freedom in its basest form without professionalism from media 
practitioners is not going to be attractive to many people. If an unbridled press breeds more 
scepticism than is needed to keep a government in check, if the press disseminates more lies 
than facts, if the media confuses rather than inform, then people would question whether the 
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benefits of press freedom are really as what liberal theorists tout them to be. Thus, there need 
to be emphasis on cultivating a responsible media while preaching about press freedom.  
So what is a healthy level of scepticism? The level of scepticism should be one that 
pushes the state to engage with the people and the people are willing to be engaged rather 
than outright rejecting whatever claims that the government may make. This mirrors the 
mutually justifiable values element of Beetham’s legitimacy theory. This can be seen in 
Taipei’s focus group data whereby the respondents exhibited a healthy level of scepticism. 
When responding to questions concerning “not in my backyard” scenario, many said that they 
need more information and evidence before coming into any conclusion. When asked about 
whether young people in general are more supportive of any particular political party, they 
indicated that they generally would support based on past actions and manifesto rather than 
based on party loyalty.  
Destructive scepticism may not just be due to individuals. It could be problems that 
exist within the structure of the society. For example, for Hong Kong and the demand for 
universal suffrage, the political system extends beyond the control of the Hong Kong 
government creating a situation whereby people doubt any form of real progress can take 
place. The system creates the feeling of helplessness and scepticism that the Hong Kong 
government would be able to act on their wishes.  
In China, when what is reported in the news regularly do not tally with what they 
experienced, scepticism would grow. People assess the government based on their personal 
experience instead of perusing through rims of policy papers and legislations. Personal 
experiences would be affected by people in their social circles and the media. If the media 
and what they feel and what they hear from their social circles are not aligned, then their level 
of scepticism would increase.  
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It may seem that authoritarianism has a monopoly on scepticism but democracy does 
not prevent the growth of destructive scepticism. The playing up of identity politics and 
fuelling of emotions to the point of irrational rejection of any policy in India and the USA, is 
about as destructive as any form of scepticism can get. Irresponsible media that publish 
misleading stories would also create scepticism amongst the people. Hence, there is a need to 
emphasize on civic responsibility and a responsible press rather than simply freedom of 
expression.  
 
9.5 Way Forward 
A nation with people that bothers and questions is better than a nation with people that do 
not care. Depending solely on performance legitimacy is hoping and depending on a 
constantly clean and competent leadership to be in power. It is about as effective as hoping 
that one never gets stricken by any major illness. Checks and balances that is carried by the 
people are akin to the insurance that people buys to prepare for unfortunate events. One does 
not hope that it would happen but the constant effort in payment prevents life from turning 
into a hopeless situation when any crisis happens. While the data suggests that people do not 
necessary make the effort to keep themselves informed or participate in the processes when 
given the chance, a freer media do help give assurance that government would not hide 
matters from them. Thus, what is needed is to enhance the environment for people in having 
more confidence in the information.  
The way forward would not be to blindly champion for a freer press or simply freedom of 
speech. Free speech is frequently compared with the free market but free market is not an 
anarchy. In a free market, people still have expectations of fairness, interpersonal 
responsibility and some forms of adjudication when disagreements arise. Institutions and 
norms are developed to support a free market. Totally unfettered speech without personal 
responsibility is anarchy. Rather the entire ecosystem of information needs to be strengthened 
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with trust. First off would be educating information consumers. There need to be better media 
literacy amongst the people. However, information/media literacy across cultural and 
political contexts are viewed differently. A limitation of media literacy would be that there 
would be biases according to where it is taught. The main tool of media literacy is to be able 
to compare and critique sources and content. Educators in the UK may give the examples of 
the BBC or The Guardian as credible sources while those in the USA might point out the 
New York Times or the Washington Post. The choice of examples may appear to be fair and 
partial to bastions of good journalism but this also reflects the biases of different societies. 
Educators in China and Singapore may teach the same concepts of critiquing the sources and 
comparing reports but their examples could not entirely be made up of foreign sources. The 
society may teach media literacy and the people may be increasingly media savvy, but for 
media literacy to be effective, there has to be sufficient sources that are widely perceived to 
be independent and trustworthy. Hence while general ideas of media literacy are imparted, 
biases would also naturally be imbued since information sources within a community affects 
how effective one can critique sources and content. This limitation can be observed in the 
focus group data as respondents from Beijing struggle to give examples on what they think 
are credible sources of news.   
This thus brings us to a second point of having independent sources in the system that the 
people have confidence in. The public service media outlets in many countries offer some 
insight to public funded independent media outlets. The key point is to allow the editorial 
team the independence and leeway to report fairly and accurately. Media outlets that are 
funded by charity trusts, for example The Guardian, could also be a way forward as this allow 
the media to function without having to bow to commercial interests. Both Singapore and 
China could possibly heave off their main media organisations from governmental control 
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and allow independent boards to appoint editorial teams so as to give the media outlets more 
independence and credibility.  
Having these independent media sources would not be sufficient as people can still be 
sceptical about whether the media outlets are truly independent. There need to be other 
sources of information that are independent of government and media commercial influences 
that are able to fact check and keep media outlets accountable for their reporting. Non-profits 
and academic institutions could possibly provide such alternative sources of information to 
keep media practitioners on their toes. Media practitioners constantly struggle with “getting it 
right or getting it first” as they compete for eyeballs. In this era of instant news, there need to 
be outlets that emphasize on getting facts right over getting news first.  
Finally, for all the NGOs who are fighting for media freedom, how they could help the 
media would be to champion for higher levels of professionalism in the media. Only when 
the people have more confidence in media that are operating in freer media environment 
would there be more pressure and incentive for the authoritarian governments to loosen 
control over the media. When media professionals sensationalise or do not do their due 
diligence in reporting, it would only serve as examples for governments to carry on their 
control of the media.  
 
9.6 Future Research  
The limitation of political comparison is that it would not be possible to make any 
causation conclusions. However, the similarities between each of the case studies would help 
point to possible relationships to be studied further. For one, scepticism towards information 
in restrictive environments could be research in finer details. There are surveys that indicate 





This study is limited by resources and hence had to limit the study to just university 
students. Expanding the study to include other generations could reveal more about 
perspectives that may be different across generations. In order to better understand media 
control’s impact on procedural legitimacy, the survey could be expanded to include items that 
explore willingness to change their mind for controversial issues. The focus group data 
surfaced the possibility that respondents from Hong Kong and Taipei were more willing to 
consider different angles for a particular controversial issue while those from Beijing and 
Singapore were quicker to settle on a particular viewpoint. Hence investigating this aspect 
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Table 1. Summary of media control in the four countries 
 
 



























Figure 1. Do you think the media should have less 
freedom, more freedom or stay the same?
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 Table 3.1 Demographics of survey respondents 
  Beijing Hong Kong  Singapore Taipei 
Number of respondents 182 198 220 230 
Gender Male 82 86 98 76 
 Female 100 112 122 154 
Age
  
Mean (Range) 21.3 (19-26) 21.9 (19-26) 22.6 (19-27) 20.8 (17-27) 




 Table 3.2 Means and standard deviation for survey questions     
  Beijing Hong Kong Singapore Taipei 








 How would you rate the overall economic condition of the 
country today 
3.58 (0.924) 2.99 (0.740) 3.95 (0.856) 2.46 (0.934) 
 How do you rate the economic situation of your family today 3.27 (0.822) 2.94 (0.623) 3.24 (0.730) 3.11 (0.856) 
 How often do you discuss social/political issues online/with your 
family or friends (2 items) 
5.02 (1.947) 5.24 (1.678) 4.59 (1.851) 4.44 (2.016) 
 How interested would you say you are in politics 2.90 (1.120) 2.79 (0.987) 2.45 (1.183) 2.57 (1.278) 
 People like me don’t have any influence over what the 
government does 
3.45 (1.095) 3.07 (0.998) 3.40 (0.967) 2.85 (1.123) 
 Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all 
follow their decisions 
2.45 (0.931) 2.20 (0.966) 2.73 (0.992) 1.90 (0.966) 
 For the sake of national interest, individual interest can be 
sacrificed 
3.09 (1.058) 2.63 (0.919) 2.98 (1.031) 2.64 (0.979) 
 How much freedom do you think the newspapers/television 
stations have (2 items) 
5.10 (1.811) 6.26 (1.628) 5.17 (1.710) 7.60 (1.889) 
 How well do you think the media represent the views of 
people like yourself 
2.65 (0.874) 2.76 (0.748) 2.75 (0.846) 2.53 (1.024) 
 I think it is important for the media to be free to publish news 
without government control  
3.31 (1.144) 4.06 (0.946) 3.19 (0.982) 3.95 (1.115) 
 People are free to speak what they think without fear 2.72 (1.074) 3.33 (0.966) 2.70 (0.913) 3.75 (1.087) 












Table 3.3 Percentage of respondents who choose more freedom for questions pertaining to freedom of expression 
 Beijing Hong Kong Singapore Taipei 
I think it is important for the media to be free to publish news 
without government control  
41.8 74.2 41.4 69.4 
The media should have the right to publish news and ideas without 
government control  VS The government should have the right to 
prevent the media from publishing things that it thinks will be 
politically destabilising 
37.9 66.7 36.8 60.0 
People should have the right to read whatever is on the internet VS 
The government should have the right to prevent people from 
having access to some things on the internet  
61.5 73.2 51.4 82.6 
The government should decide whether certain ideas should be 
allowed to be discussed in society 
30.8 46.0 30.9 45.4 
COMMUNICATION CONTROL AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY  219 
 
Table 3.4 Regression predicting perception of legitimacy of political system in four cities 
   Beijing Hong Kong     Singapore Taipei 
Gender   -.044 (.398)  .091 (.238)  .145* (.246)  .025 (.327) 
Age  -.043 (.163) -.029 (.086)  .072 (.081)  .089 (.099) 
Household income -.042 (.024) -.098 (.095)  .006 (.010) -.031 (.009) 
Assessment of country’s economic condition  .291** (.234)  .054 (.175)  .344*** (.142)  .144* (.181) 
Assessment of family’s economic condition  .027 (.281)  .011 (.218)  .084 (.164) -.030 (.194) 
Frequency of political talk -.033 (.106)  .012 (.075) -.071 (.062) -.044 (.080) 
Political interest  .029 (.178) -.190** (.127)  .068 (.108) -.121 (.128) 
Political efficacy  .118 (.174)  .206** (.123)  .007 (.122) -.064 (.135) 
Authoritarian orientation -.067 (.220)  .271*** (.152)  .243*** (.126)  .196** (.171) 
Individualism/Collectivism orientation  .051 (.195)    .176** (.137)  .094 (.118)  .009 (.161) 
Assessment of media freedom  .096 (.117)  .167* (.087)  .155* (.076) -.148* (.087) 
Assessment of representation in media  .001 (.221)  .169* (.176)  .071 (.143)  .228** (.152) 
Preference of media freedom -.273*** (.166) -.015 (.140) -.053 (.122)  .049 (.144) 
Assessment of freedom of speech  .204* (.188)  .038 (.134)  .126* (.143)  .169** (.140) 
     
N 182 198  220 230 
R Square .293 .409 .517 .191 
Adjusted R Square .224 .364 .483 .137 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
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Table 4.1 Mean and SD of Survey 
 Beijing Hong Kong Singapore Taipei 
How much freedom do you think the newspapers/television 
stations have (2 items) 
5.10 (1.811) 6.26 (1.628) 5.17 (1.710) 7.60 (1.889) 
I think it is important for the media to be free to publish news 3.31 (1.144) 4.06 (0.946) 3.19 (0.982) 3.95 (1.115) 
without government control     
People are free to speak what they think without fear 2.72 (1.074) 3.33 (0.966) 2.70 (0.913) 3.75 (1.087) 
The government should decide whether certain ideas should be 
allowed to be discussed in society 
2.99 (1.033) 2.66 (1.077) 2.95 (1.019) 2.70 (1.181) 
The media should have the right to publish news and ideas 
without government control  /  The government should have the 
right to prevent the media from publishing things that it thinks 
will be politically destabilising 
2.88 (1.183) 2.07 (1.118) 2.86 (1.083) 2.35 (1.153) 
People should have the right to read whatever is on the internet  
/  Government should have the right to prevent people from 
having access to some things on the Internet 
2.35 (1.183) 1.99 (1.071) 2.48 (1.062) 1.65 (1.062) 
Do you think the media should have more freedom, less 
freedom or the same amount of freedom 
3.91 (0.760) 3.90 (0.867) 3.73 (0.666) 3.15 (0.929) 
Do you think the people should have more freedom, less 
freedom, or the same amount of freedom over what they can 
access on the internet 
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Table 4.2 Percentage of respondents choosing lesser or a lot lesser 
 Beijing  Hong Kong Singapore Taipei 
Do you think the media should have more freedom, less 
freedom or the same amount of freedom 
5.0 5.1 0.9 28.4 
Do you think the people should have more freedom, less 
freedom, or the same amount of freedom over what they can 
access on the internet 
2.8 3.0 1.8 3.5 
 
Table 4.3 Participants Characteristics 
 Beijing Hong Kong Singapore  Taipei 
Total recorded time 5:25:09 4:34:08 3:53:00 3:57:41 
Total respondents 18 12 12 11 
Male/Female 8/10 9/3 6/6 6/5 
Age range 19-21 19-23 20-25 18-24 
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Table 4.4 
Themes Beijing  Hong Kong  Singapore  Taipei  
Apathy or  
Defensive of self 
- Most indicate no interest in 
politics  
- Many mention that self-interests 
comes first 
- Talk about fleeing Beijing if 
anything drastic happens 
- “We are only students, who are 
we to comment on such things” 
- Think that others are not 
willing to express their 
opinions as well 
- Some indicated that their 
family are not supportive of 
participation  
- Many indicated no interest in 
politics 
- Pins it on possible 
consequences as seen from 
defamation cases 
- “As students, it don’t really 
bothers us”/ “not something 
people our age really 
concerned with” 
 
- Some think that people are 
less apathetic now 
- Some still indicate that if it 
does not concern them, then 




- Some respondents mention 
applying “mosaic” effect on their 
face before commenting. This 
shows the idea that what one says 
tie strongly to their identity.  
- Think that safer to speak to local 
media than foreign media as local 
media would edit out any 
inappropriate comments.  
 
 
- Cautious about getting 
into conflicts due to 
differences in viewpoints. 
So many would rather avoid 
talking about politics  
- Many are unwilling to 
speak to the media. 
Unwillingness to speak to 
media is not expressed 
outright but framed as due 
to fear of being edited into 
mimes, loss of privacy, 
misrepresentation, lack of 
knowledge etc.  
 
- Tend to be hesitant in the 
willingness to be interviewed 
by media. Many explain that 
they need to be really prepared 
or because the likelihood of 
being misrepresented is high.  
 
- Polarisation of opinions 
causing some people to be less 
willing to express political 
views.  
- Seems to be more willing to 
discuss specific issues rather 
than party politics 
-  Many indicated that there is 
a generational divide, with 
older generation more inclined 





- Most view participating in 
protests negatively, see protests as 
“creating trouble” 
- Most think that “liking” social 
media posts are the most they 
would do 
- Mixed views on protest 
- Some would participate 
but others think that it is not 
useful 
- Most view participating in 
protests negatively 
- Most think that signing 
online petition or “liking” 
social media posts are the most 
they would do 
 
- Most indicate willingness to 
participate if the cause is what 
they believe in 
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Table 4.5 




- High confidence in the 
government  
- Most think that the government 
is constrain by the large 
population, of which a large 
portion still lacks education  
- Some think that the government 
would still take into account the 
opinions of the people even if 
there are no direct public 
consultations  
- Conflicted views as many think 
that government would just do 
whatever they think is right but at 
the same time would think that the 
government would into account 
the public’s sentiments   
 
- Confidence in the civil 
service is still high but 
appears to be eroding 
- Acknowledges that the 
Hong Kong government is 
constrained by the CCP. So 
even if the people expressed 
their views and opinions, 
the HK government may 
not be able to carry it out 
due to the CCP 
- Generally positive views on 
the government 
- Many think that life is good 
and no change is needed 
- Most think that the 
government would do 
whatever they think is right 
instead of what the people 
want 
- Most think that public 
consultations are merely going 
through the motion as the 
government would just do 
what they had planned 
 
- Mixed views, many 
emphasize that it is dependent 
on the person in office rather 
than the party 
- Many are aware about the 
various forms of public 
consultations and think that 
those have some impact on 
government policies 
- Many indicated that diversity 
in views also mean that not all 
opinions would be heeded 
Views on existing 
media system 
 
- Most are sceptical of the 
credibility of information in 
mainstream media, preferring to 
rely on information from “friends 
around me” 
- Think that mainstream media 
like CCTV is too positive 
- Tend to mention “Phoenix TV” 
as example of media that present 
alternative views 
- Tend to have a negative 
impression of foreign media, as 
many think that foreign media 
- No one expects media to 
be balanced 
- Many respondents indicate 
displeasure at the changes 
they can observe with TVB   
- Even if mainstream media 
has low credibility, 
respondents indicate that 
they still have to depend on 




- Tend to mention “Yahoo 
Singapore” as example of 
alternative media that is not 
government controlled 
- Shows awareness of 
alternative information sources 
but also indicate lack of trust in 
those sources 
- Generally trust that the 
mainstream media is accurate 
- Think that for reports relating 
to politics, the mainstream 
media is biased, portraying the 
PAP more positively while 
- Generally critical of media 
system as being too free and 
lacks depth 
- Many think that the media is 
too inward looking, most 
focuses on domestic matters  
- Many think that media 
companies would pander to the 
most basic tastes. 
- Many would still turn to local 
media for information  
- High level of trust in PTT 
(online forums) 
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intentionally portray China 
negatively  
  




on the media 
 
 
- Conflicted sentiments amongst 
the respondents, on one hand they 
want to portray that the 
government is credible but on the 
other hand they know that there 
are many misinformation out 
there. So questions addressing the 
same issue but asked differently 
or repeatedly could get different 
responses.  
- Some would express frustration 
over controlled media and 
supportive of freer media at the 
beginning but as the session 
proceeds on, they slowly come 
round to defending the 
government once it appears that 
the conversation frequently puts 
the government in negative light.  
- Most think that there is room for 
more freedom  
- Views are mixed. Some 
think that control is getting 
worst, some don’t think so 
because there is no way to 
hide in this internet age.  
- Generally disturbed by the 
influences from mainland 
China 
- Shows understanding of 
the links between 
commercial, readers, 
government and publisher.  
- Feels conflicted that 
government intervention 
needed against invasion of 
privacy invasion by the 
media and misinformation; 
however government 
intervention would mean a 
lack of independence.  
- Do not agree with the 
argument that control is 
needed for social stability  
 
- Shows knowledge that the 
government has much 
influence over the local media 
- Most indicate that the internet 
allows them unfettered access 
to information even if the 
mainstream media is under 
government control 
- Some are surprised about the 
low ranking in media freedom 
and think that it should not be 
that low 
- Most think that there should 
be more media freedom  
- The prosecution of internet 
users for comments made have 
a chilling effect on some 
-Think that the media control 
in Singapore is not as bad as 
the control in China 
 - When asked whether they 
think that the media is being 
controlled, some expressed a 
sense of puzzlement. Need to 
clarify control what or by 
whom. Others show nuanced 
understanding of financial 
influence in media industry.  
- Would not think that 
censoring occurs on the 
internet. Most think that more 
likely technical error or 
mistake in reporting if 
anything gets deleted 
- Some mused about how some 
regulations and processes 
should be introduced to keep 
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Table 4.6  




- Most think that the government 
would cover up serious disasters.  
Some think it would just be 
covering up the extent or 
seriousness 
 
- Most think that the 
government would not 
cover up serious disasters  
- Most think that the 
government would not be able 
to cover up any serious 
disaster. However, some think 
that the government would 
manage the release of 
information to manage public 
reactions 
- Most think that the government 
would not be able to cover up any 
serious disaster because the 





- Most think that media would 
represent the views of the 
government.  
- Most think that only positive 
views are reflected 
- Some think that comments 
sections are more representative of 
public opinion 
- Think that media should just be an 
independent source of information 
-Tend to say that media cannot be 
representative of the public’s views 
because there are so many people in 
China 
 
- Mixed views on 
representation in the 
media 
- Some mention that 
internet are better at 
representing views of the 
public 
 
- Most think that media 
represent the views of the 
government 
- Most think that only positive 
views are reflected 
- Think that media should just 
be an independent source of 
information 
- Show awareness of the 
agenda setting role that the 
media play 
- None mention about media 
being voice of the people, 
rather a few mentioned that 
there should be more experts 
that are independent  
 
- Mixed views on representation 
in the media 
- Many think that need to have 
many in public making noise 
before the media would report 
- Many think that the media 
represent their own company’s 
viewpoints   
Check and balance 
role  
 
- Most are unwilling to whistle-
blow 
- Most do not think that reporting to 
the media would be effective 
- Most believe that any report on 
corruption is because it is 
directed/allowed by government 
- Most would choose to 
report to authority than 
media  
- Strong sense that media 
should act as fourth estate 
- Think that media should 
expose wrongdoings 
- Some are willing to report to 
authority while some are 
apprehensive 
- Most do not think that media 
is appropriate  
- Most are willing to whistle-
blow 
- Variety of avenues indicated 
(local media, internet forum, 
authority) 
- Strong sense that media should 
act as fourth estate 
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- Only one mentioned about 
media acting as a check on 
government 
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